I wonder really how much of this attitude "rolled downhill" to the enlisted ranks of these Allies (if any).
Good question. I'll have to think of some examples for you.
The riff in the higher command is best exemplified in the decision to bomb the Monastery at Cassino. The New Zealand Corps commander, Freyberg, put this request into the Army Group commander, Gen. Alexander(British). The Brits did not want to offend Freyberg, who was respected as a WW1 veteran but also they didn't want the NZ troops to go back "home" to the Pacific theater. Gen Mark Clark was the immediate commander between Freyberg and Alexander and he didn't think the bombing was necessary. So I don't know how he did it but he got out of making the decision. He went on a trip and left the decision to his Chief of Staff. Backed by the Army Air Force commanders, Alexander made the decision in favor of Freyberg and the Monastery was bombed.
The day after the bombing, the Allied Air Forces initiated Operation STRANGLE, which was the strategic bombing of targets in Northern Italy that would cut the supply line----no longer would they use heavy bombers for tactical situations.
Steve