FIFTH ARMY
HISTORY
FIFTH ARMY HISTORY

7 OCTOBER - 15 NOVEMBER 1943

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by

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The Volturno Valley near the Triflisco Gap...... painted by Sergeant Frank D. Duncan, Jr.
PART II

Across the Volturno to the Winter Line
Lieutenant General  MARK W. CLARK

... commanding
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CHAPTER I

Approach to the Volturno

The end of the first week in October 1943 found the American Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, generally along the southeast bank of the Volturno River and south of the Calore River. The British 10 Corps was deployed along the Volturno from its mouth at Castel Volturno northeast to Mount Tifata beyond Capua. The American VI Corps held a line curving northeast along the Volturno to its junction south of Amorosi with the Calore and then along that stream to Benevento. The British Eighth Army, under the command of General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, had driven up on the right and had reached a line running from Termoli on the Adriatic Sea to a point slightly north of Benevento, where it was in contact with the American 45th Infantry Division.

These lines had been reached after a month of hard fighting against the forces of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring's German Tenth Army. The British 13 Corps, composed of the 1 Canadian Division and the 5 Division, had crossed from Sicily and made Eighth Army's assault on the Italian mainland on the morning of 3 September. The British 1 Airborne Division had landed at Taranto on 9 September, and the British 5 Corps, made up of the 8 Indian Division and the 78 Division, had come across the Straits of Messina from Sicily. Eighth Army then took up the pursuit of the retreating Germans. Fifth Army had landed on the beaches of Salerno on the morning of 9 September and started its drive north and northwest toward Naples, Benevento, and the banks of the Volturno River.

After days of hard fighting along the coast against the determined German forces, the tide of battle turned definitely in favor of Fifth Army, and it threw its full weight into the chase. The British 10 Corps fought its way up the coast and entered the rubble-filled streets of Naples on 1 October, the day...
that Foggia and its airfields fell to the onrushing Eighth Army. The American 34th Infantry Division occupied Benevento on 3 October, and the 45th Division passed through the bomb-blasted town the following day to drive on across the Calore against the retreating 26th Panzer (Armored) Division. 10 Corps pushed on past Naples toward the Volturno River, the next natural line of defense for the Germans. Elements of the 23 Armoured Brigade reached this barrier on 5 October, and the 56 Division occupied Capua the next day. VI Corps found the opposition stronger in the mountains on the right, but by 6 October the 3d Infantry Division had driven above Caserta and had reached the Volturno. Enemy outposts still remained on the southeast side of the river, but for all practical purposes Fifth Army had reached the Volturno-Calore river line. The port of Naples and the surrounding airfields were secure and were being repaired for use in the forthcoming operations of Fifth Army on its way north toward Rome.

The month of hard fighting, which had thoroughly tested the mettle of the carefully trained Fifth Army, had been extremely successful. The combined American and British forces had accomplished one of the most difficult of military operations—a successful landing on hostile shores. They had beaten off everything the enemy could throw against them and had pushed forward relentlessly to their objectives. The next problem that faced them was also a difficult military operation—an assault on a defended river line.

A. TERRAIN BEFORE FIFTH ARMY

See Map No. 10

The section of the Italian peninsula which Fifth Army faced on 7 October is just about as difficult for offensive operations as could be found in Europe. The terrain, together with rainy weather, severely limited the opportunity for varied tactics. Armor, wide envelopments, and swiftly striking spearheads could not be used to speed up the advance. Frontal attack was the only method available to General Clark in pursuing the enemy across the Volturno and through the mountains toward Rome.

The area that lay before Fifth Army is a series of river valleys, coastal plains, and hill masses stretching toward Rome between the Tyrrhenian Sea on the left and the Apennine Mountains on the right. It may be divided more or less arbitrarily into three main sections as follows: the Volturno-Calore Valley, the Garigliano-Rapido Valley, and the divide between the two valleys. The bald, steep, and lofty Matese Mountains, a part of the Apennines,
The Calore River rises some 20 miles southeast of Benevento and flows north and west almost 40 miles to join the Volturno south of Amorosi. From its source the Calore winds through mountain gorges and narrow farm valleys until it reaches the Volturno. Steep hills and towering mountains rise on either side of its valley and in places are impassable to the vehicles of modern warfare. This is particularly true of the hill mass south of the river and west of Benevento. On the other side the rugged foothills rise to 736 meters at Mount Acero before they start falling off to the flat Volturno Valley.

The Volturno River rises high in the mountains northwest of Isernia and drains more than 1500 square miles of fertile farm valley and steep mountain slopes on its tortuous way 94 miles to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Its intensively cultivated farm valley, lined with scrub-covered hills and barren mountains, is from two to seven miles wide between Montaquila and the Triflisco Gap above Capua. The river runs generally south some 15 miles from its headwaters to a point northeast of Presenzano, turns southeast to its junction with the Calore below Amorosi, and then flows southwest to Castel Volturno on the coast. These two lower sections almost form a perfect V and enclose a hill mass about 15 miles long and 10 miles wide. After the river passes through the narrow Triflisco Gap about 18 miles from the sea, it meanders in large tight loops through the olive groves of the Campanian Plain and by the towns of Capua, Santa Maria la Fossa, Grazzanise, and Cancelllo ed Arnone before reaching Castel Volturno at its mouth.

The Rapido River rises in the mountains near Atina and flows south some ten miles between terraced mountain slopes to Sant'Elia, where it emerges into a fertile valley which broadens into the Liri Valley below Cassino. At the southern edge of the Liri Valley it joins the Liri River to form the Garigliano River. This stream then cuts through the hill mass between Mount Camino and Mount Majo, flows into a triangular coastal plain below Sessa Aurunca (Sessa), and empties into the Tyrrhenian near Minturno. The slopes into the valley of these rivers are generally less precipitous than those that descend into the Volturno-Calore Valley.

The divide between the Volturno-Calore and the Garigliano-Rapido valleys is a mountain range generally 3000 feet high, running some 40 miles from the crest of the Apennines south to an abrupt ending at Mount Massico and its foothills, which tower above the narrow beach north of Mondragone. This mountain mass, which was a source of great annoyance to our troops, did not resemble anything with which the men were familiar. It does not consist of
a long mountain range with rolling foothills at the approaches, as is usually found in the native land of the Fifth Army soldier. Instead, it is a large area cut by deep gorges into numerous isolated peaks, often devoid of vegetation, which rise from the flat valleys almost as walls from the floor of a room. Few roads or trails enter these forbidding areas, and mule pack trains at times failed to negotiate the jagged ridges and overhanging cliffs of these hills.

Southwest of the section of the Volturno that runs from Presenzano to Amorosi the mountain masses fall away into the coastal plains, except for the ridge that extends on to the sea near Mondragone. A slight rise might normally be expected to divide the watersheds of two river valleys that flatten to the plains along the coast. Such is not the case, for a high spur, cut off from the main ridge by a low pass at Mignano and a narrow valley southeast of Mount Camino, separates the valleys of the lower Volturno and the Garigliano. The high points on this brush-covered and wooded divide are Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico, rising 1005 and 812 meters above sea level.

A good road net exists in the open terrain, although many of the roads are not hard-surfaced. The main routes along the axis of the advance of Fifth Army were two first-class roads known as Highways 6 and 7. The latter of these runs from Benevento to Capua, continues across the plain and through a gap to Sessa, crosses the Garigliano below Minturno, and follows the coast northwest toward Rome. Highway 7B from Naples joins this route at Capua. Highway 6 branches off Highway 7 across the Volturno from Capua, goes northwest through the Mignano Gap to Cassino, and continues on to Rome. Highways 87 and 85 are two first-class lateral roads that were useful in moving troops and supplies. The first extends from Naples through Caserta, crosses the Volturno at Triflisco and again at Amorosi, and then passes through Pontelandolfo on its way over the Matese Mountains. Highway 85 leaves Highway 6 below Presenzano and runs up the Volturno Valley to Isernia.

B. ENEMY USE OF TERRAIN

The operation which lay before Fifth Army, that of continuing an advance along the mountain ranges running some 550 miles down the center of the narrow Italian peninsula, was as difficult as could be conceived. The terrain and the direction of advance in the face of such staunch fighters as the Germans meant that every river, gully, ravine, and spur jutting out from the Apennines would have to be stormed. Although the Germans were committed
to fighting a delaying action, they stubbornly defended the river lines, the mountains, and other obstacles as they slowly fell back before Fifth Army.

Demolitions and mining were used extensively by the Germans to delay the progress of the hard-driving forces of Fifth Army. Almost every bridge and culvert on main highways and secondary roads was destroyed by the thoroughly trained and experienced German demolition experts. Where roads ran through the narrow streets of the stone villages, buildings were blown down to block traffic. Trees were blown across highways wherever possible. Often these road blocks were mined and booby-trapped to present greater obstacles to the engineers. Some concrete obstacles were used to block strategic points on routes of advance. Intersections and shoulders of the roads were mined and had to be cleared before armor, artillery, and transport could be moved up to support the troops.

The use of mines and booby traps often caused the infantrymen more difficulties than enemy machine-gun and artillery fire. Not only did the Germans mine the roads, but they were also lavish in the use of mines and booby traps in vineyards and orchards, along the beds and banks of streams, in trails and likely avenues of approach, in possible bivouac areas and buildings that might be used by troops, and even in shell and bomb craters where the soldier might take refuge. Their S-mines and Tellermines could be detected by mine sweepers, but some areas were sown with mines made of concrete, wooden, and plastic materials. The content of the soil and numerous shell fragments often made the problem of minesweeping arduous and dangerous.

The Germans did not use their artillery extensively in a campaign that consisted mostly of delaying action. This was particularly true during October, but the situation changed when Fifth Army reached the mountain divide between the Garigliano-Rapido and the Volturno valleys. The Germans were in the mountains with their artillery well defiladed and enjoyed superior advantages of observation. In the first half of the campaign the enemy used self-propelled guns, mortars, rocket launchers, and tanks as roving artillery efficiently and with good effect. The rocket launchers, such as the six-barreled Nebelwerfer and the ten-barreled weapon mounted on a half-track, were first encountered in the Volturno Valley about the middle of October. Mortars and artillery were often zeroed on draws, road intersections, stream crossings, and probable strongpoints before they were used or occupied.

Early in the Italian campaign the Germans attempted to block highways and prevent movement by placing self-propelled guns and machine guns in well protected positions near sharp curves in the roads. During October they tended to change to delaying action from forward slopes and crests of hills,
with mortars and artillery on the reverse slopes or in the valleys behind them. The infantrymen fought from hastily scooped foxholes on the slopes, from behind boulders and stone walls, and from the brush and olive groves on the hills. Small groups were often left behind with machine guns after a village or position had been abandoned. After the third crossing of the Volturno the enemy was found to have the forward slopes of the hills lightly organized, while the reverse slopes were strongly held and fortified. Automatic weapons were sited to cut down anything that came over the crests.

When Fifth Army reached the mountains across the upper Volturno, the enemy defenses became more formidable. Caves in the mountains were enlarged and fortified, holes were dug and blasted in the rocks for foxholes and machine-gun positions, observation posts were underground and covered with as much as two feet of timber and rock, wire obstacles became more numerous, tank traps had been constructed, and minefields were greatly increased. One of the most annoying tactics of the resourceful enemy was his method of withdrawing from hills and strongpoints and then infiltrating back if they were not immediately occupied by our troops.

The numerous peaks in the mountain mass were usually so situated that each was dominated by one or more on either side. This meant that the attackers of one hill were often subjected to cross fire from rifles, machine guns, and mortars on the slopes of adjacent hills to the right and left. If forces were directed at the hills on either side, they were then taken under fire from other dominating slopes. The Germans were most efficient in siting their weapons from mutually supporting positions on the slopes, so that they could take advancing forces under fire day or night. These tactics employed by a stubborn and resourceful foe presented great obstacles to the advance of Fifth Army and resulted in much fierce and determined fighting.
A. ENEMY FORCES AND THEIR POSITIONS

WHEN Fifth Army invaded Italy, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring had eight divisions, four of which had been evacuated from Sicily, available to oppose it and Eighth Army. Two of these were in or north of Rome, two were in the vicinity of Naples, and four were south of Naples. The 16th Panzer Division was in the Eboli-Battipaglia area. The Hermann Goering Panzer Division was apparently dispersed in the plain of Naples from Caserta south. The 15th Panzer Grenadier (Armored Infantry) Division was probably northwest of this force, generally in the Gaeta area. Some elements of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division were at Frascati, but most of it apparently was north of Rome. The 2d Parachute Division garrisoned Rome and the vicinity from the Alban hills to Viterbo. The 1st Parachute Division was on the Adriatic coast, with part of its strength south of Bari. The 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were generally in Calabria.

When Fifth Army reached the Volturno and Calore rivers early in October, Kesselring's forces were generally recognized as the German Tenth Army. The German Fourteenth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, was in control of northern Italy, with its southern boundary some distance north of Rome. Tenth Army was composed of XIV Panzer Corps, which was opposing the advance of Fifth Army, and LXXVI Panzer Corps, which stretched generally from the Apennines to the Adriatic Sea. Rommel was believed to have at least 12 divisions in northern Italy and Yugoslavia, not more than 4 of which were thought to be south of Bologna. There was some probability that he had been reinforced with four additional divisions. With the 8 divisions in Tenth Army, there was a possibility that the German forces in Italy might reach a total of 24 divisions.
On the British Eighth Army front the Germans had the 1st Parachute Division, the 16th Panzer Division, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, and elements of the 26th Panzer Division on a line extending south from the Adriatic Sea. The 26th Panzer Division was falling back before the American 45th Division and was gradually withdrawing over the mountains from the Fifth Army front. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, which composed XIV Panzer Corps, held a defensive line along the Volturno from the Volturno-Calore junction to Castel Volturno on the coast.

The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division held a line in front of the British 10 Corps from the mouth of the Volturno up to Grazzanise. The 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was deployed along the river, while the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was echeloned back along the coast. The 382d Panzer Grenadier Regiment had not been identified by 10 Corps, but was thought to be in reserve north of Cancello ed Arnone. The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was believed to have had its origin in the 33d Grenadier (Infantry) Division, which fought in France in 1939 and was reorganized the following year as the 15th Panzer Division. After fighting in Libya it entered Tunisia and was virtually destroyed in 1943. The Division Sicily, which was formed in May and June 1943; first was called the 15th Panzer Division and then became the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. The new division assimilated the part of the 999th Grenadier Division that did not get to Tunisia, and fought in Sicily with two panzer grenadier regiments. Some of its elements were in the Naples area in September, but the 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which had been a part of the 15th Panzer Division in Africa, was with the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. The 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment had been in the 21st Panzer Division in Africa, the 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was originally the Regiment Fullrieder, and the 382d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, which was probably used to replace casualties in the other two regiments, had been in the 164th Division in Africa.

The Hermann Goering Panzer Division, which was divided into two battle groups, was responsible for the line from Grazzanise to Piana di Caiazzo. The Corwin Battle Group was deployed from Grazzanise to Capua, while the Mauke Battle Group was defending the valley from Trifisico to Piana di Caiazzo. The division was formed in 1942 by the expansion of the Hermann Goering Brigade. Elements of the division fought in Tunisia and suffered considerable losses in 1943. It was then reformed in the Naples area and appeared in Sicily in July. After suffering further losses it returned to Naples, where its rehabilitation was interrupted by the landing of Fifth Army on the beaches of Salerno.
MAP NO. 1
DISPOSITION OF ALLIED AND ENEMY FORCES
7 October 1943
Scale

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The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division was brought down from the Rome area early in October and thrown in line between the Hermann Goering Panzer Division and the 26th Panzer Division. Originally it appeared to take over a sector from Piana di Caiazzo to the junction of the Volturno and Calore rivers, but its left boundary was gradually extended across the Volturno toward the mountains as the 26th Panzer Division withdrew to the Eighth Army front. The 1st Battalion, 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, was in the vicinity of Caiazzo, while the 3d Battalion was deployed east to the river. The 8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, reported to be fighting in Russia, was encountered by the 45th Division as it advanced up the northeast side of the river. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division fought in the Polish and French campaigns, was motorized in 1940, and participated in the Russian campaign from the beginning. After being destroyed at Stalingrad it was reformed in France, incorporating elements of the 386th Grenadier Division. It saw duty on the Spanish border, moved into Italy north of Rome, and had elements in the Naples area in September.

Tenth Army continued its delaying action against the Allied Fifth and Eighth Armies throughout October without reinforcement. The German order of battle in northern Italy remained obscure in some respects, but by the end of the month Rommel appeared to have more than 14 divisions under his command. Ten of the 20 divisions destroyed at Stalingrad had been reformed and were now in Italy. As the British 10 Corps approached the Garigliano River and the American VI Corps prepared for its third crossing of the Volturno River early in November, the Germans sent down the 94th Grenadier Division to take over their right flank on the coast and the 305th Grenadier Division to hold their left flank in the mountains. The German policy seemed to be to put in these two fresh infantry divisions, which had been reformed in France after their destruction at Stalingrad, to hold the coastal hills and inland mountains, while the three panzer and panzer grenadier divisions defended the main axis along Highway 6. The terrain in this sector was the most passable, the most important to defend, and better for the movement of semi-armored mobile formations. The 3d Battalion, 6th Parachute Regiment (2d Parachute Division), appeared in the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division sector. On 9 November elements of the 9th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (26th Panzer Division) also entered the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division area as a vanguard of the division, which was being withdrawn from the Eighth Army front to help halt the advance of VI Corps.
B. ALLIED FORCES AND THEIR POSITIONS

1. British Forces. When the British 10 Corps reached the Volturno River early in October, its commander, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard L. McCreery, had three battle-tested divisions to throw across the river against the Germans. The 46 Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. L. I. Hawkesworth, was deployed along the river from Castel Volturno on the coast to Cancello ed Arnone. The 7 Armoured Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. M. G. G. Erskine, was responsible for the zone from Cancello ed Arnone to a point about midway between Santa Maria la Fossa and Capua. The 56 (London) Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. D. A. H. Graham, occupied the Capua area from the 7 Armoured Division boundary to Mount Tifata. These three divisions had been fighting since their landings at Salerno and were destined to continue the 10 Corps drive to the Carigliano River without reinforcements.

2. American Forces. Fifth Army had five well trained and battle-experienced American divisions available for future operations as it prepared for the first Volturno crossing. VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, had three divisions in line along the Volturno and across the Calore. The 45th Division, under the command of Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, was advancing northwest of Benevento and was responsible for the zone between the Matese Mountains and the Volturno River. The 34th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, had moved up to the river from its assembly area near Montesarchio and held a line from the Volturno-Calore junction to a point south of Caiazzo. The 3d Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., was deployed through the hills from the 34th Division boundary to that of the 56 Division slightly west of Mount Tifata. The 36th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, was in Army reserve, and the 82nd Airborne Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, was policing the city of Naples.

C. PLANS FOR CONTINUING THE CAMPAIGN

See Map No. 2

1. 15th Army Group Strategy. Fifth and Eighth Armies were making excellent progress in their drives up the Italian peninsula during the last week in September. Just before midnight on 29 September, General Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, commanding 15th Army Group, instructed General Clark that future operations of his Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army were to be con-
ducted in two phases. *(For text of message see Annex No. 2A.)* The first phase was designed to secure the Foggia airfields and the port of Naples, together with the airfields north of that city, and included the capture of a line running southwest from Termoli on the Adriatic Sea along the Biferno River to Castropignano and then through Isernia, Venafro, and Sessa to the Tyrrhenian Sea. Airfields, ports, and centers of road communications were to be secured in this area before the second phase was started.

When the first phase line was reached by Fifth and Eighth Armies, they were to consolidate their gains and prepare to advance to the second line. The instructions specifically stated: "Firm base will be established on the areas gained but light mobile forces will operate ahead and keep up active patrolling against enemy rearguards." The second phase, conducted to secure the airfields and airfields in the area, was to include the capture of a line running west from San Benedetto del Tronto on the Adriatic Sea to Visso and then southwest through Terni to Civitavecchia on the Tyrrhenian Sea above Rome. This line would place Fifth Army in secure possession of Rome and would give both armies numerous airfields much closer to Germany.

The boundary between Fifth and Eighth Armies was to be extended to include Benevento in the Fifth Army zone. Eighth Army was to have the road from Pontelandolfo to Isernia. The boundary was then to run from Isernia to the road junction southwest of Celano, up the Salto River to Rieti, and thence along the road through Terni, San Gemini, and Todi. 15th Army Group probably contemplated changing the boundary when the first phase line was reached, for it stated that it intended to transfer the British 10 Corps to Eighth Army at a suitable date, possibly when both armies had completed the first phase of their advance.

2. *Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 5, 2 October.* On 2 October General Clark issued Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 5 from his headquarters near Pontecagnano Faiano. *(See Annex No. 2B.)* Fifth Army was ordered to continue its advance to the Isernia-Venafro-Sessa line. The drive toward this objective was to be made with VI Corps on the right and 10 Corps on the left along the sea. The boundary between the two corps extended from Formo northwest along the eastern edge of the Campanian Plain to the Volturno east of Capua and thence northwest across the plain to Sessa. This boundary confined the efforts of 10 Corps to the coastal plain and to the high ridge separating the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano rivers. VI Corps would have the valley of the upper Volturno, the steep foothills of the Apennines on the right, and the hill mass northwest of the section of the river between the Volturno-Calore junction and Triflisco. Its main effort would
have to be directed across the Volturno between the junction and Triflisco. Across the flat river valley the rugged hills rose abruptly and extended from 10 to 15 miles northwest until they dropped off into another flat valley before the towns of Presenzano and Teano.

General Clark directed 10 Corps to "push its attack to the Volturno, force the crossings of that river and continue the advance on the first phase line." He further instructed General McCreery: "Due to the present location of the VI Corps, the advance of 10 Corps will not await the arrival of the VI Corps abreast of it, but will advance as rapidly as the situation permits." VI Corps was ordered to use not more than one division to capture Benevento on the right, secure the crossing of the Calore River in that area, and advance by road northwest to the first phase line. The remainder of VI Corps was directed to continue to move forward with all speed by road between Benevento and the Corps boundary. The 36th Division, in Army reserve, was to be available after 6 October to VI Corps in exchange for another division.

3. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 6, 7 October. VI and 10 Corps had both reached the Volturno in their zones of action by the morning of 7 October. General Clark then issued from his headquarters near Naples Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 6 (See Annex No. 2C) directing VI Corps to cross the Volturno on the night of 9-10 October and 10 Corps to force a crossing on the following night. VI Corps was to concentrate one division along the Volturno and one division in the Montesarchio area without delay. The 36th Division was ordered to move immediately into an area northwest of Nola. This movement was to be co-ordinated by VI Corps in order not to interfere with the flow of supplies from Avellino.

VI Corps was ordered to force a crossing of the Volturno on the night of 9-10 October in the vicinity of Triflisco and then attack toward Teano along the high ground northwest of Triflisco. 10 Corps was directed to force a crossing in its zone of action on the night of 10-11 October and to drive northwest to seize the ridges north and northeast of Mondragone. 10 Corps was made responsible for arranging for naval gunfire in support of its advance. The corps commanders were instructed to secure mutual support of the operations in the Capua-Triflisco area. Fifth Army would obtain an intensive air bombardment of all appropriate targets on the fronts of both corps, and the corps were to submit requests for specific missions.

The 82d Airborne Infantry Division was ordered to continue its mission of patrolling Naples, but was also directed to make plans for dropping one parachute battalion in the Sessa area. This battalion was to have the mission of interrupting communications and blocking the withdrawal of the enemy to
the northwest. This plan was later canceled because of the strength of the enemy forces in the area around Sessa. It was feared that the Germans had sufficient reserve troops in the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division to defeat a parachute battalion before the forces crossing the Volturno could reach its position.

Operations Instruction No. 6 further explained that Fifth Army was preparing plans for an amphibious landing on the beaches north of Mondragone with one regimental combat team from the 36th Division. This force would have the mission of assisting 10 Corps in the capture of the high ground north and northeast of Mondragone and of blocking the retreat of the enemy to the northwest. The indications were that the enemy had strong forces in the area of the proposed landing, and the operation would not be ordered unless the main attacks of VI and 10 Corps drew a major portion of the enemy in that district to other localities. The crossings of the Volturno failed to cause the enemy to move his forces from the Mondragone area, and the plan for the amphibious operation was canceled.

4. **Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 7, 14 October.** (See Map No. 3.) A number of factors, including the weather, difficulties in moving troops and supplies, and strong enemy rearguard action, caused changes in the plans outlined in Operations Instruction No. 6. The crossings of the Volturno were not attempted until the night of 12-13 October, and the failure of the 56 Division to force its way across at Capua resulted in another modification of plans. After the 56 Division was not successful in its initial efforts, it made a feint attack on 14 October. The strong resistance to this effort made it apparent that the division could not cross in its zone without heavy losses. The lack of success on the part of the 56 Division resulted in the 3d Division's left flank becoming dangerously exposed, as it continued to exploit its successful crossing. General Clark then decided to alter the boundary between the two corps so as to include in the 10 Corps area the ridges running north and northwest from Triflisco. This boundary change would give the 56 Division access to the 30-ton bridge constructed in the 3d Division zone at Triflisco. He issued verbal orders to that effect at 1530, 14 October, and confirmed them the same day with Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 7. (See Annex No. 2D.) The zones of action of the 56 Division and the 3d Division were now separated by a line running from the demolished bridge at Triflisco along the east side of the ridge line above Triflisco to the road junction south of Pontelatone, then across the ridge just east of Formicola, and northwest over the plain along Highway 6. The 56 Division was directed to make arrangements with the 3d Division for the use of the bridge at Triflisco.
5. Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 8, 20 October. (See Map No. 3.) VI and 10 Corps were making good progress after the middle of October in consolidating their Volturno bridgehead when Fifth Army reached the decision that an immediate advance to the second phase line previously delimited was beyond the capacities of the limited forces at its disposal. General Clark then issued from his headquarters in Naples Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 8, dated 20 October. (See Annex No. 2E.) The first phase line was moved forward from the Isernia-Venafro-Sessa objective to the line Isernia-Mount Passero-Garigliano River to the sea. When the mission of seizing this line was completed, Fifth Army was to continue its advance without delay to the general line Opi (exclusive)-Alvito-Arce-Fondi.

The area between this new phase line and the general line occupied by Fifth Army on 6 October is bounded on the southeast by the Calore and Volturno rivers, on the southwest by the Tyrrhenian Sea, on the northeast by the barren ranges of the Apennines, and on the northwest by a line running from Isernia across Mount Passero to the Garigliano River west of Mignano and then down the river to the sea. The distance straight across the hills and plains from Castel Volturno to Benevento is approximately 50 miles, some 45 miles of rugged mountains separate Benevento and Isernia, the mouth of the Garigliano is approximately 35 miles from Isernia, and the distance straight from the Garigliano along the sea to the Volturno is about 17 miles.

VI and 10 Corps were ordered to continue their advances in their respective zones. 10 Corps was to make its main effort against the mountains on its right, while VI Corps pushed on across the upper Volturno and made its main effort on the left. VI Corps was to continue to maintain contact with Eighth Army on the right, and 10 Corps was charged with maintaining contact with VI Corps on its right. Both corps were directed to push forward rapidly within their zones of action in order to facilitate the advance of one another. Operations to be conducted by either corps in the zone of action of the other were to be co-ordinated between corps commanders prior to execution, and Fifth Army Headquarters was to be notified of any such arrangements.
MAP № 3

CHANGES
in
PHASE LINES and CORPS BOUNDARY

Fifth Army O.I. № 7: 14 October 1943
Fifth Army O.I. № 8: 20 October 1943

Scale

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CHAPTER III

The First Volturno Crossing

A. PLANS FOR THE CROSSING

See Map No. 4

During the first week in October Fifth Army reached the Volturno-Calore river line, the next natural obstacle behind which the German Tenth Army could attempt a stand on the Mediterranean side of the Apennine Mountains. General Clark intended to send the British 10 Corps across the river in its zone along the coast as soon as it cleared the south side of the retreating enemy. When 10 Corps was delayed by rains, demolitions, and determined rearguard resistance, the decision was finally made to send both VI and 10 Corps across in a co-ordinated assault on the night of 12-13 October. Meanwhile the 45th Division had crossed the Calore at Benevento on 4 October and was pushing on northwest along the Apennines in contact with the British Eighth Army.

After 10 Corps was delayed in its preparations for the crossing of the Volturno, General Clark first decided to send VI Corps across the river 24 hours ahead of 10 Corps. General Lucas, commander of VI Corps, was accordingly instructed to force a crossing with one division in the vicinity of Triflisco on the night of 9-10 October. The occupation of the ridges running north and northwest of Triflisco would endanger the enemy’s main gun area west of the junction of Highways 6 and 7 and would facilitate the advance of 10 Corps, which was ordered to cross during the night of 10-11 October.

General Lucas made a careful estimate of the situation, taking into consideration that he had a three-to-one superiority in men, tanks, and guns, and decided that one division could cross the Volturno successfully, but that two divisions would probably be needed to continue the advance to the northwest. He believed that he could get a second division into position to make the crossing on the night of 9-10 October. Having secured approval of his plan, he issued Field Order No. 7 on 8 October ordering the 34th Division to move from its assembly area at Montesarchio to relieve the 3d Division along
the river from the junction below Amorosi to a point south of Caiazzo. The 34th Division started moving up that night, but was greatly hampered by a lack of roads and by the extremely muddy condition of those that existed. When the division could not get in line and bring up sufficient supplies in time for the attack, some consideration was given to postponing the crossing 24 hours. General Clark then visited both corps areas on 9 October to see what progress was being made in preparations for the crossing. After taking into account the delays over which his forces had no control, he ordered a co-ordinated attack all along the river for the night of 12-13 October.

B. **THE CROSSING OF VI CORPS**

1. **Plains and Terrain.** VI Corps had for all practical purposes reached the Volturno River by 7 October and had one division advancing northwest of Benevento beyond the Calore River. The 3d Division, with the 15th Infantry on the left and the 30th Infantry on the right, had pushed through the hills behind Caserta and held a line stretching some 15 miles along the river from its junction with the Calore south of Amorosi to the Triflisco Gap. Although some enemy posts remained south of the river, the division was securely in possession of the hills dominating the valley. After the enemy had evacuated Benevento, the 45th Division had moved through the town and had driven on along the slopes of the Matese Mountains toward the Volturno Valley.

The final plans for the attack of VI Corps called for two divisions to force a crossing of the Volturno at 0200 on the morning of 13 October. The 3d Division (reinforced) was to cross between Triflisco and a point south of Caiazzo, secure a bridgehead, and assist the advance of 10 Corps. The 34th Division (reinforced), which had relieved the 30th Infantry and part of the 15th Infantry along the upper eight miles of the VI Corps front, was to force crossings in its zone, secure a bridgehead, assist the advance of the 45th Division, and prepare to attack on Corps order toward Teano. The 45th Division (reinforced) was ordered to advance vigorously to the northwest, protect the right flank of Fifth Army, maintain contact with Eighth Army, and prepare on Corps order to attack in the direction of Teano. In order to have a secure bridgehead the three divisions were to advance to a line running generally from Raviscanina across Mount degli Angeli to Rocchetta e Croce.

The terrain that faced VI Corps was a river valley bounded on either side by steep and barren hills. The valley of the Volturno from the Triflisco Gap
northeast to the junction with the Calore varies in width from one to four miles. The hills on the south side of the river start with Mount Tifata (604 meters), extend east with Mount Castellone (405 meters), and gradually flatten out beyond Limatola. Both Mount Tifata and Mount Castellone come down to the bank of the river, but the hills swing away to the southeast to form a wider valley. Immediately across the river from Mount Tifata a high ridge rises abruptly and runs northwest to Mount Grande (367 meters). A pleasant farm valley extends from the Volturno on the northeast side of this ridge toward Pontelatone. The hills start on the east side of this valley with Mount Fallano (319 meters) and Mount Majulo (502 meters) and run east beyond Caiazzo.

The flat valley of the Volturno is broken south of Piana di Caiazzo by Hills 141 and 246, which rise steeply from the level farm land like solitary outposts. The river in this area varies in width from 150 to 200 feet, its depth ranges from 3 to 5 feet, and its banks rise from 5 to 15 feet above the water level. The intensively cultivated valley is cut by small tree-lined streams and sunken roads, and is covered with grain fields, vineyards, and orchards. The brush and the olive groves on the slopes of the hills on either side provide some concealment, but the valley itself offers little protection.

The road net available for the use of VI Corps was wholly inadequate for the speedy movement of large bodies of troops or supplies. The best road in the zone is Highway 87, which runs from Naples through Caserta, crosses the river at Triflisco and again at Amorosi, and then runs northeast to Pontelandolfo. Highway 7 runs from Benevento through Caserta to Capua in the British 10 Corps zone. Another road leaves Highway 7 at Maddaloni and goes northeast through Dugenta to Amorosi. The only other road of any consequence was the muddy one used by the 34th Division during its move to the Volturno. This route branches off Highway 7, runs northwest through Sant'Agata to Limatola, and continues on to Caiazzo. All bridges and culverts had been blown by the retreating Germans, and temporary by-passes constructed by the engineers were in many instances becoming almost impassable.

2. The Crossing of the 3d Division. The main effort of VI Corps was to be made by the 3d Division against the section of the river defended by the Mauke Battle Group of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division. General Truscott was well aware that the enemy would be prepared for an attack at the Triflisco Gap. He therefore planned to make a fake attack on the left flank, while he sent the 7th Infantry, commanded by Col. Harry B. Sherman, across the valley to make the main assault in the center. In order to effect this deception he ordered the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, and the heavy weapons companies of the 30th Infantry to concentrate all their available fire
power on the enemy defenses across the gap. The demonstration was to start at midnight, two hours before the jump-off time, and continue throughout the night. If the enemy showed any signs of withdrawing, the 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, was to cross the river. The ridges above Triflisco were to be blanketed with smoke until they were cleared of the enemy. On the right flank the 2d and 3d Battalions, 15th Infantry, were to attack north from Mount Castel­lone. Their first objectives were the German strongpoints on Hills 141 and 246. When these heights were occupied, they were to capture the high ground behind Piana di Caiazzo and then move west behind the 7th Infantry.

The 3d Division was in position and ready for the assault by the evening of 12 October. The various delays had given the regiments sufficient time for thorough reconnaissance and planning. The demonstration against the Triflisco Gap started promptly at midnight. An hour later the division artillery opened up with a terrific concentration on enemy positions across the river. This bombardment continued until 0155, when smoke shells were mixed with the high explosives to screen the crossing areas. The three battalions of the 7th Infantry had come down the valley between Mount Tifata and Mount Castellone, slogged quietly across the muddy fields, and started crossing at 0200. Some elements crossed in assault boats and on rafts, some used life preservers, and others forded the river with the use of guide ropes.

The 1st Battalion crossed below the hairpin loop southwest of Piana di Caiazzo, while the other two battalions crossed above it. They then pushed on across the plowed fields, hampered by machine-gun and rifle fire from positions in the valley and by occasional mined areas, toward Mount Majulo. Forward elements of the 1st Battalion had almost reached the foot of the mountain by 0800, and the other two battalions were slowly working their way across the valley. Later the 1st Battalion was ordered to hold the flat ground on the left, south of Highway 87. Waterproofed tanks and tank destroyers forded the river during the middle of the day and added their weight to the attack. The 2d and 3d Battalions took Mount Majulo during the afternoon and prepared to seize Mount Fallano on the left. The day's fighting was difficult for the men of the 7th Infantry, but they did an excellent job in battling their way across the river and in gaining the dominating heights on the other side. Their mission was so successful that General Clark called Colonel Sherman the next morning and personally congratulated him on the achievements of his regiment.

The 15th Infantry, temporarily commanded by Brig. Gen. William W. Eagles, assistant division commander, sent two battalions across the river south of Piana di Caiazzo. The 2d Battalion crossed at the west end of Mount
Castellone and broke through fierce enemy resistance to take Hill 141. The 3d Battalion climbed down the steep sides of Mount Castellone, forded the river at the island below, and drove on to take Hill 246. The enemy slowly pulled back, subjecting the two hills in the valley to intense artillery fire. The two battalions then reorganized and fought their way to the slopes above Piana di Caiazzo during the afternoon.

After the 7th and 15th Infantry were across the river and on their objectives, the key ridge above Triflisco remained to be taken. The 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, made two unsuccessful efforts during the afternoon to cross and drive the enemy off the ridge. After dark the 1st Battalion crossed the jeep bridge that had been completed below the hairpin loop, advanced down the valley, and cleared the slopes above the gap. The 2d Battalion, followed by the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, came across the next morning. The 30th Infantry, under the command of Col. Arthur H. Rogers, then began to drive along the ridges toward Pontelatone and Formicola.

In a little more than 24 hours of fighting General Truscott’s hard-driving infantrymen had won control of the Volturno Valley from the Triflisco Gap to Hill 246 south of Piana di Caiazzo. By the morning of 14 October every battalion of the 3d Division was across the river. There remained the problem of getting supplies and artillery over to support the advance. The engineers managed to get a light bridge in below the hairpin loop and an 8-ton bridge across at the foot of Mount Castellone during the first day of the assault. Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion, then built a 30-ton bridge just above the destroyed bridges at Triflisco. The victory won by the infantry was matched by the superb work of the engineers in constructing three bridges under observed artillery fire.

3. The Crossing of the 34th Division. The plan for the crossing of the 34th Division divided a front of approximately eight miles between the 168th Infantry, which was to make the main effort toward Caiazzo, and the 135th Infantry, which was to attack on the right. Col. Frederick B. Butler, commander of the 168th Infantry, ordered his 1st and 2d Battalions to cross the river northwest of Limatola to capture the village of San Giovanni and then drive northwest through Caiazzo. Col. Robert W. Ward, commander of the 135th Infantry, directed his 1st Battalion and Company E to lead the assault below the Volturno-Calore junction. Company E was ordered to ford the river south of Squille and take Hill 131, while the 1st Battalion crossed the Volturno just below its junction with the Calore and advanced northwest over the rolling hills beyond Squille. The remainder of the 2d Battalion was then to cross over and drive on Hill 283 southeast of San Giovanni.
The various delays in starting the attack had given General Ryder's regiments sufficient time to make thorough reconnaissance, and points of attack had been chosen carefully.

While the 3d Division was forcing its crossings on the left, the 34th Division was making its assault on the right. The 96 guns and howitzers representing the division and supporting artillery opened up at 0145. Fifteen minutes later the men of the 135th and 168th Infantry slipped down the muddy banks of the Volturno and waded through the icy water to press their attack. Reconnaissance had revealed that the strongest resistance might be expected in the flat valley below Caiazzo, but the men of the 34th Division knew that the enemy was waiting for them all along the river and that the battle ahead was not going to be an easy one.

The 168th Infantry sent one company of the 1st Battalion across north of Limatola, while the remainder of the battalion crossed 800 yards down the river. The 2d Battalion crossed in columns of companies east of Limatola. Company L went over on the extreme left to protect the flank of the 1st Battalion. The leading elements of the 1st Battalion got across without difficulty, but the swift current of the river began to carry their assault boats downstream and the enemy discovered their position. Enemy machine guns in the flat fields and in the olive groves on the slopes and artillery behind Caiazzo opened up on them. The battalion was pinned down during the morning between the river and the road to Caiazzo and made little progress, but managed with the aid of the artillery to drive on up the slopes during the afternoon. The 2d Battalion crossed without resistance and then fought its way into the hills southeast of San Giovanni. The 3d Battalion came across that night and aided the 1st Battalion in taking Caiazzo the next morning.

The 135th Infantry sent Company F across the river below Squille at 0200, and it had little difficulty in occupying Hill 131 southwest of the village. The 1st Battalion forded the river just below the junction with the Calore and made good progress during the early morning. The enemy appeared to be withdrawing without attempting to make a determined stand. Later in the morning the advance of the battalion was slowed down by tank fire from Amorosi. The remainder of the 2d Battalion came across during the day and had to fight its way through a pocket of Germans by-passed during the morning advance. The 1st Battalion occupied Hill 283 the next morning and drove on toward the hamlet of Ruviano.

The drive of the 34th Division was considerably slowed by its inability to get supplies and artillery over the river. The 135th Infantry put a small ferry into operation early on the morning of 13 October, but the engineers experienced
The Volturno River Bridge at Capua....... painted by Sergeant Frank D. Duncan, Jr.
great difficulty in building their bridges. The enemy was in direct observa­tion of all bridge sites and placed accurate artillery concentrations on the engineers whenever they approached the river. They finally managed to get a small bridge in near Squille on the morning of 14 October, but were unable to construct the 30-ton bridge below Caiazzo until 15 October.

4. The Advance of the 45th Division. While the 3d and 34th Divisions were forcing a crossing of the Volturno, the 45th Division was launching an attack on the right flank up the rugged slopes of Mount Acero. General Middleton had been assigned the task of breaking through the enemy defenses extending from the Matese Mountains above Faicchio to the Calore River south of Telese. This line was the enemy's last natural defensive position blocking the approach to the Volturno Valley. A good start had been made on 12 October when the 180th Infantry, commanded by Col. Forrest E. Cookson, took the high ground northeast of Telese and advanced on to San Salvatore. This success opened the way for an attack around the west side of Mount Acero and forced the enemy to give up the whole western flank of his line. General Clark was considerably concerned about the right flank of his Army during 13 October and kept in close touch with the progress of the 45th Division. By the end of the day there were indications that the enemy would only fight a delaying action while withdrawing across Titerno Creek. The 45th Division drove on toward Faicchio and the Volturno Valley.

C. THE CROSSING OF 10 CORPS

12-14 OCTOBER

1. Plans and Terrain. 10 Corps reached the Volturno on 6 October, but delays from swampy terrain, demolitions, and enemy rearguard resistance prevented it from making an immediate assault on the river line. General McCreery planned at first to exert his main effort on the right in order to make maximum use of the approaches and exits through Capua and to gain a position suitable for helping the 3d Division during the early stage of its attack. Reconnaissance soon indicated that the Capua area would be the most difficult in which to force a crossing, while reports from the 46 Division along the coast were more optimistic. The decision was then made to attack on as wide a front as possible, with the main weight on the left. A rapid assault appeared not to be feasible, and plans and preparations were made accordingly, as information about the river and surrounding terrain was built up over a period of several days.
The final plan of 10 Corps for the assault across the Volturno called for the 56 Division to cross one battalion immediately west of Capua, while the 201 Guards Brigade made a demonstration from the hills east of Capua. The 7 Armoured Division was to make a holding attack in the Cancello ed Arnone and Grazzanise areas and to harass by artillery fire movements of enemy reinforcements along the roads north of the river. The 46 Division was to cross on a two-brigade front between Cancello ed Arnone and the coast. The 40 Royal Tanks was to be moved by sea in LCT's to land north of the mouth of the Volturno. The attacks of the 46 and 56 Divisions were to be preceded by intense artillery concentrations.

The terrain along the lower Volturno was most difficult for an assault against a determined enemy. The distance from Mount Tifata above Capua to Castel Volturno on the coast is approximately 17 miles. The land is flat on both sides of the river, and toward the sea it has been reclaimed from marshes. Numerous canals provide drainage for the areas on both sides of the river. The most important of these is the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal, which parallels the north side of the river from Capua to the sea. There are few trees on the south side to provide concealment, but a thick belt of olive groves, vineyards, and scattered timber runs along the north bank of the river. The enemy had good observation from Mount Massico and the ridges running north and south, while 10 Corps was denied observation except from the slopes of the hills above Capua. The two-storey modern farmhouses dotting the plain provided some view of the enemy lines, but their use was limited.

The Volturno meanders between high banks from Capua to Castel Volturno. The width of the river varies from 150 to 300 feet, while the banks rise from 12 to 20 feet above the water. Levees 10 to 15 feet high, which had been built on both sides to prevent the flooding of the plain during the rainy season, provided defilade positions for the enemy. This factor gave the enemy a considerable advantage, for it made the use of the fire of supporting weapons difficult. Tanks and antitank guns could not get a good field of fire from the south bank. The depth of the water averaged about six feet, and no fords were found that could be used by equipped infantrymen or tanks.

Poor roads and ground soft from recent rains made approaches to the river difficult except on main roads. The 56 Division was limited to one road, the Naples-Rome highway (Highway 7B and 7), which crosses the river at Capua. The 46 Division had the use of two roads leading into Castel Volturno and Cancello ed Arnone. The 7 Armoured Division had only the road which crosses the Volturno at Grazzanise. A hard-surfaced road parallels the river on the south side from Castel Volturno to Capua, but it could not be used until the
enemy was driven away from the north banks. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed with care and thoroughness, and the enemy had his guns in position to harass any movements along the highways.

10 Corps faced the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and the Corwin Battle Group of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division across the Volturno. The 15th Panzer Division was responsible for the line from the sea to Grazzanise and had all three battalions of the 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment deployed along the river. The Corwin Battle Group defended the area between Grazzanise and Capua. The 115th Panzer Battalion had between 30 and 40 tanks and self-propelled guns around Mondragone and Carinola. The main gun area of the enemy was centered behind the junction of Highways 6 and 7 beyond Capua. The strength of the enemy was disposed to cover the three chief axes of advance through Capua, Grazzanise, and Cancellon ed Arnone. In addition to his artillery he had numerous machine-gun nests situated to cover the approaching roads. The belt of trees, the canals and dykes, and occasional concrete pillboxes on the north side of the river aided the enemy’s defenses.

2. The Assault of the 56 Division. The 56 Division planned for the 167 Brigade to make a crossing just south of the demolished railway bridge at Capua, while the 201 Guards Brigade made a demonstration on the right to lead the enemy to believe that a main effort was being directed at the Triflisco area. The site chosen for the crossing was the most obvious one and was well covered by enemy small-arms posts, pillboxes, mortars, and artillery. Reconnaissance, however, had indicated that no other suitable place for assault boats existed within the division boundaries. The depth of the river and the strength of the enemy positions made it impracticable to attempt to put an adequate force across at any other point by swimming or wading, with the mission of attacking the main crossing site from the rear.

The 56 Division began its assault west of Capua before midnight on 12-13 October. The 201 Guards Brigade started its deception near Triflisco, and the 167 Brigade sent the 7 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry across below the railway bridge. Surprise was not achieved, and the leading elements immediately met heavy opposition. Ten assault boats loaded with men were sunk before they reached the far bank, and the attack was then discontinued. The intense artillery preparation preceding the attempt to cross had failed to knock out the enemy along the river, although the forward troops had previously been withdrawn 400 yards in order to give the artillery a free hand. The demonstration by the 201 Guards Brigade resulted in one company securing a footing across the river, but the enemy strongpoints on the ridges above Triflisco made its position untenable. The company was withdrawn before daylight.
The 56 Division decided on the morning of 14 October that no crossing was feasible in its zone. All attacks in the VI Corps zone had been successful, and the 3d Division had completed three bridges over the Volturno. One of these was a 30-ton bridge just above the demolished highway and railway bridges at Trifisico. General Clark therefore decided to alter the corps boundary so as to include in the 10 Corps area the line of hills running north and northwest from Trifisico. This boundary change deprived the 3d Division of its proposed means of communication around the ridges above Trifisico, but it gave the 56 Division approaches to the 30-ton bridge in the Trifisico Gap. After General Clark issued verbal orders at 1530, 14 October, changing the boundaries, the 56 Division arranged for the use of the bridge.

3. The Crossing of the 7 Armoured Division. The 7 Armoured Division in the center was ordered to make a feint attack at Grazzanise to hold enemy troops and reserves in that area. In conjunction with the feint attack it was to infiltrate on one or both sides of Grazzanise with the mission of capturing the village of Brezza across the river and protecting the right flank of the 46 Division. The large loop between Brezza and Grazzanise was chosen for one crossing, because its shape made possible the placing of tanks, mortars, and other weapons on both sides of the enemy positions across the river. The approaches on both banks of the river were good, for the Italians had operated a ferry at one point and the Germans had built and later demolished a wooden bridge at the ferry site. The wet and soft ground made it impracticable to attempt a crossing at any place that could not be approached by existing roads. The Queen's Brigade (131 Brigade) was given the task of carrying out the plan of deception and of throwing the infiltrating elements across the river on the flanks of Grazzanise.

The 131 Brigade sent small parties of the 1/5 and 1/7 Queens across the loops at Grazzanise and below Santa Maria la Fossa before midnight on 12-13 October. The elements of the 1/5 Queens, which crossed near Santa Maria la Fossa, were withdrawn, but the small bridgehead in the loop north of Grazzanise was enlarged during 14 October. 10 Corps then decided to construct a Class 9 bridge at Grazzanise, and work on it was begun that night. This bridging operation was interrupted frequently by enemy shelling, but was completed successfully. Meanwhile the 7 Armoured Division gradually extended its bridgehead up the loop toward Brezza.

4. The Crossing of the 46 Division. The 46 Division was given the task of making the main effort of 10 Corps on the left flank along the sea. Its objective was a bridgehead 3000 yards deep from a point east of Cancello ed Arnone to the coast. Reconnaissance indicated that the steep and wooded
banks of the river would provide good concealment for the infantry, but would restrict the fields of fire of machine guns, tanks, and antitank guns. No suitable ford could be discovered nor could satisfactory exits for vehicles be found on the north bank opposite any possible approaches from the south. The assistance of the navy made it desirable to force one crossing near the sea to take full advantage of the naval gunfire. The use of LCT's and Dukws to ferry tanks, guns, and supplies around the mouth of the river also made an initial bridgehead near the sea necessary. Since the enemy was covering the main roads and was accustomed to the British habit of advancing under heavy concentrations of artillery, the division commander decided to attempt to achieve surprise by playing on these points. The decision was made to cross on the flanks of Castel Volturno and Cancello ed Arnone, while placing an intense artillery preparation on the latter town.

The crossings of the 46 Division were, with one exception, all successful. On the 139 Brigade front the 16 Durham Light Infantry and the 2/5 Leicesters got across northeast of Castel Volturno and repulsed an immediate counterattack. The two battalions then dug in along a secondary canal. On the extreme right the 5 Foresters reached a precarious and exposed position northeast of Cancello ed Arnone. Two counterattacks were beaten off during the day, but the enemy attacked again at last light and overran the battalion's positions. Most of the men were later able to get back across the river. The 128 Brigade was most successful and had the 1/4, 2, and 5 Hampshires over by daylight. They dug in along the road running northwest of Castel Volturno or west of it toward the sea and slowly pushed their positions forward a few hundred yards during the day. On their left one squadron (17 tanks) of the 40 Royal Tanks was ferried around the mouth of the Volturno and landed successfully. The ground, however, was too boggy in most places along the sea for the movement of tanks. The higher dry ground had been mined and had to be cleared before the tanks could proceed. Several were lost and the remainder immobilized until the slow process of removing the mines was completed. This task took longer than usual, for the mines were non-metallic.

During 14 October the leading troops of the 128 Brigade and left elements of the 139 Brigade were able to gain on an average of about 600 yards. No other advances were made during the day on the 10 Corps front, but by nightfall the 46 Division had six battalions across the river. All three battalions of the 128 Brigade, the 16 Durham Light Infantry and the 2/5 Leicesters of the 139 Brigade, and the 6 York and Lancasters of the 138 Brigade were on the north bank and ready to push forward over the coastal plain. Thirty-six 6-pounders and a troop of 17-pounders had been brought over, while other 17-pounders were doing a
good job in helping repel counterattacks, especially those directed at the 139 Brigade. Another squadron of tanks in LCT's was ready to land when needed. Two ferries were operating in the 46 Division zone without being molested by enemy artillery, and the division commander decided that there was no immediate necessity for building a bridge across the Volturno in his zone. The enemy began to show signs of withdrawing before the 46 Division, and by the evening of 15 October forward elements of the 128 Brigade reached the banks of the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal.

D. SUMMARY OF THE FIRST VOLTURNO CROSSING

Fifth Army was extremely successful in its first crossing of the Volturno on 12-13 October. The 34th Division had two regiments across, and the 3d Division had every battalion north of the river by the morning of 14 October. The 45th Division was pushing its drive on the right flank toward the Volturno Valley. The main assault of the 46 Division had succeeded on the ro Corps front, and it had six battalions dug in between the river and the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The 7 Armoured Division was slowly extending its bridgehead toward Brezza, while the 56 Division was preparing to cross on the 3d Division bridge above Triflisco. The efforts of both corps had been somewhat costly. VI Corps lost 544 men during 13 October. The 3d Division suffered 314 of these casualties, while the 34th Division had 130 men killed, wounded, and missing. General Clark's forces had within 37 days completed two of the most difficult of military operations— a landing on defended hostile shores and an assault against a defended river line— and were ready to continue their drive toward Rome.
CHAPTER IV

Consolidating the Bridgehead

VI CORPS had successfully fought its way across the Volturno, and the enemy had started his withdrawal by the evening of 13 October. The following morning found the 168th Infantry in the olive groves on the hills north and east of Caiazzo. The engineers, hampered by observed artillery fire, had been unable to construct either of the bridges in the 34th Division zone. Water, rations, and ammunition had to be carried across the river by hand or in assault boats and then transported by carrying parties over approximately six miles of rugged terrain. The wounded were being evacuated with extreme difficulty. General Ryder ordered the regiment to advance no farther until the supply situation was improved and strength was built up on the right flank. The 135th Infantry pushed up during the day to the high ground south of Ruviano. On the 3d Division front the 15th Infantry had reached the heights northeast of Piana di Caiazzo, the 7th Infantry had fought its way into the hills east of Pontelatone, and the 30th Infantry was driving along the ridges from Triflisco toward Formicola. On the right flank the 45th Division was pushing forward northwest of Benevento against stiff enemy resistance. The 180th Infantry was cleaning out the town of San Salvatore, the 157th Infantry was moving around the south side of Mount Acero, and the 179th Infantry was driving over and north of the mountain toward Faicchio.

The crossings on the 10 Corps front had been partially successful, and efforts were being made to enlarge the bridgehead. The 56 Division had no troops over the river in its zone across from Capua. The 7 Armoured Division enlarged its small bridgehead at Grazzanise, but had withdrawn the elements which had crossed near Santa Maria la Fossa. The only gain during the day was an advance of about 600 yards made by the 128 Brigade, but by nightfall the 46 Division had six battalions north of the river.
A. THE ADVANCE OF VI CORPS

14-25 OCTOBER

I. Plans and Terrain. (See Map No. 5.) The change in the boundary lines between VI and 10 Corps would have pinched out the 3d Division, for its objectives were now assigned to the 56 Division. VI Corps accordingly issued Field Order No. 8 at 2100, 14 October, changing the routes of advance of its forces. Originally the 45th Division was to push northwest between the Volturno and the Matese Mountains on the right to capture Alife, Sant’Angelo d’Alife, and Raviscanina. The 34th Division was to advance northwest through the valley on the southwest side of the river and over the high ridges to the left to seize the mountains and valleys around Baja e Latina, Roccaromana, and Pietramelara. The 3d Division was to drive northwest toward Teano over the Triflisco ridges and occupy Pignataro, Rocchetta e Croce, Mount Maggiore, and the Calvi Risorta feature northwest of Capua. The new order directed the 34th Division to advance up the valley beyond Alvignano and then turn northeast across the river into the 45th Division zone. The 3d Division was to turn northeast to Dragoni and then prepare to advance northwest in the area previously assigned to the 34th Division. The 45th Division was to revert to Corps reserve when it reached the high ground west of Piedimonte d’Alife.

The hill mass through which the 3d and 34th Divisions were ordered to advance stretches from 10 to 15 miles northwest of the section of the Volturno Valley running from the Volturno-Calore river junction to Triflisco and is about 10 miles wide. The area is bounded on the southeast and northeast by the winding V-shaped river, on the southwest by the plain along the Volturno to the sea, and on the west by an extension of the plain up into the wide valley below Teano and Presenzano. It is a series of high, rocky, brush-covered hills and ridges rising at Mount Sant’Angelo to 870 meters and at Mount Maggiore to 1057 meters above sea level. The mass is interspersed with deep ravines, narrow farm valleys, and small broken tablelands. The high ridges fall off sharply on the northwest side to Pietramelara and Roccaromana in the valley east of Teano. On the northeast side the hills drop steeply to the fertile valley of the Volturno, which is from two to three miles wide on the southwest side and somewhat wider on the northeast side of the river. Everywhere across the valley, on the right flank of VI Corps, the precipitous Matese Mountains tower over Piedimonte d’Alife, Alife, Sant’Angelo d’Alife, and Raviscanina.

The struggle through this rugged hill mass was not to be just against the determined resistance of the retreating Germans. Poor roads, demolished bridges,
and the problem of bringing in supplies slowed the advance of VI Corps. The only road through the hill area branches off from Highway 87 northeast of Triflisco and winds through defiles and around mountains, passing through the villages of Cisterna, Prea, Villa, Liberi, and Majorano di Monti, until it descends into Dragoni in the Volturino Valley. Another road runs northwest from Caiazzo along the foot of the northeast side of the ridges through Alvignano, Dragoni, and Baja e Latina. Along these roads the enemy was fighting a stubborn delaying action from the slopes and valleys. Ridge after ridge had to be taken; demolished bridges had to be bypassed; roads had to be built and repaired; and mines, booby traps, and road blocks had to be cleared. The enemy had to be driven from his well selected machine-gun positions and from his hastily scooped foxholes in the brush, from behind stone walls, and back over the crests of ridges.

2. The Advance of the 3rd Division. The 3rd Division was pushing its drive to the northwest when the news arrived during the afternoon of 14 October that the boundaries between VI and 10 Corps had been altered. The 7th Infantry was in the hills east of Pontelatone when it received verbal orders to change the direction of its advance and drive up the road through Liberi to Dragoni. The 3rd Battalion, supported by tanks and tanks destroyers, led the attack at 1645 in an effort to take Liberi before dark. The battalion encountered stiff resistance at Cisterna, a village in a saddle on the forward slopes of Mount Fallano, and the fighting continued there all night. The 2nd Battalion was committed at midnight to drive up the valley on the left and pass along the slopes of Mount Friento above the village of Prea. Opposition from tanks used as roving artillery in the broken tableland north of Cisterna caused some delay, but the 2nd Battalion was on the slopes above Prea by daylight and was making rapid progress above the road toward Liberi.

The drive continued on 15 October over the rough terrain and against determined pockets of enemy resistance. The 1st Battalion moved up to the right through Strangolagalli, a village in the ravine east of Mount Fallano, to drive straight north over the tableland and ridges toward Liberi. The enemy had withdrawn from Cisterna and offered the battalion no opposition until it hit the scrub-covered ridges northwest of the small village of Sasso. The battalion gained a footing during the afternoon on Hill 561, a high point on the ridge running northwest from Sasso through Villa, but the enemy was not completely driven off until after daylight the next morning. The 2nd Battalion on the left made steady progress during the day around the slopes of Mount Friento. Shortly after midnight it was stopped by strong resistance southwest of Villa, a small village in a pass across the ridge between Hill 561 and Hill 524, and suffered heavy casualties in the dark.
All three battalions of the 7th Infantry were engaged in sharp fighting around Liberi on the morning of 16 October. Elements of the 29th and 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiments were putting up a determined defense of Hill 524, a low knob less than 50 meters above the little tableland between Villa and Liberi, and twice repulsed the efforts of the 3d Battalion to storm it. The 1st Battalion beat off counterattacks on Hill 561 throughout the day and continually drove the enemy back down the slopes toward Liberi. The attack on Liberi was continued on the morning of 17 October, but most of the enemy forces had withdrawn. In the meantime the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, had been attached to the 7th Infantry and had come up the road from Pontelatone to assist on the left flank. This battalion and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 7th Infantry, drove on through Villa and Liberi and reached Hill 667 and Hill 618. The 1st Battalion pushed on into the narrow farm valley on the other side, but was pinned down by rifle, machine-gun, tank, and artillery fire before noon and was held south of Majorano di Monti until dark.

On the morning of 17 October the 15th Infantry was ordered to drive through the mountains west of Liberi and seize the high ridges east of Pietramelara. This move over rocky slopes, across deep valleys, and through narrow ravines was to protect the left flank of the division. At midnight the 1st Battalion reached castle-crowned Hill 446 above Roccaromana. The 2d Battalion occupied Hill 330 to the southeast and sent patrols to block the road running east to Dragoni. The 1st Battalion moved over Hill 446 the next morning and attacked Roccaromana, situated along a deep stream at the base of the hill. Pockets of enemy resistance on the slopes and out in the valley caused considerable difficulty, but the battalion temporarily cleaned out the village. The 2d Battalion moved to the slopes on Hill 446 vacated by the 1st Battalion and drove on that night to seize Mount della Costa to the north.

The enemy began to withdraw in front of the 7th Infantry late in the afternoon of 17 October. The 3d Battalion was then ordered to move up the road through Liberi toward Dragoni and was informed that General Truscott expected it to be in Dragoni by daylight. The battalion advanced rapidly up the winding road, reached Hill 371 south of Dragoni after midnight, and sent patrols down the slopes to the left toward the town. After daylight the battalion moved across the road to Hill 507. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion had occupied Mount Longo west of Dragoni and sent patrols down the slopes to cut the road toward Baja e Latina. General Truscott then ordered the 7th Infantry to stop its advance and rest its men.

VI Corps did not consider the Volturno bridgehead secure until the enemy had been forced out of the hill mass northwest of the river and into the valley
beyond it. General Truscott rested his men and gradually moved them up toward Baja e Latina. The 7th Infantry was then directed against Mount degli Angeli and Mount Monaco, two mountain masses northwest of Baja e Latina. The regiment occupied Mount degli Angeli on 22 October and spent the next three days driving the enemy from the slopes of Mount Monaco. When these areas were cleared, the 3d Division was in position to push across the valley and its obstructions toward the Mignano Gap.

3. The Advance of the 34th Division. The next immediate task of the 34th Division after it took Caiazzo was to drive the enemy up the southwest side of the valley beyond Dragoni. The main bridge in the 34th Division zone was not completed during 14 October. The 168th Infantry needed food, supplies, and artillery, and the 135th Infantry could not advance much farther without bringing up its supporting artillery. Late that night General Ryder secured permission from General Lucas to confine most of his activity on 15 October to patrolling. A few minutes later General Clark called General Lucas, explained that there were indications that the Germans were pulling out, and directed that the 34th and 45th Divisions push their advance. General Lucas immediately telephoned General Ryder and General Middleton and informed them that their units "must not lose contact and must push on as hard and vigorously as possible."

The 135th Infantry moved up to the low ridge south of Ruviano during the night of 14-15 October and prepared to attack the village the next morning. Shortly after midnight General Ryder postponed plans for the advance, but later sent Brig. Gen. B. F. Caffey, assistant division commander, up to direct an attack on the village. The regiment drove on through Ruviano on the morning of 15 October and swept across the rolling grain fields, vineyards, and olive groves of the valley. Enemy delaying action was at times stubborn, but a line from Hill 204 east of Alvignano to the Volturno was occupied by the evening of 17 October. There the tired infantrymen could look from their foxholes and see on their left the round towers of the old castle above Alvignano. Everywhere on the right, when the clouds lifted, the Matese Mountains rose gaunt and gray.

Before daylight on 16 October the 168th Infantry moved up the valley dotted with stone farmhouses and along the brush-covered slopes to the left to seize Alvignano. The 3d Battalion met some resistance on the slopes above the road, but drove the enemy off after a spirited engagement. The regiment reached the dominating hillsides south of Alvignano shortly after dark, and the 2d Battalion occupied the village the next morning. Orders were then received to outpost the area until passed through by the 133d Infantry on 19 October on its way to seize Dragoni.
The 135th Infantry continued to clear the valley during 18 October and prepared to use one battalion that night to force a bridgehead across the Volturno. Plans were changed during the morning, and General Ryder ordered the 168th Infantry to drive on toward Dragoni, while he sent the 133d Infantry, commanded by Col. Ray C. Fountain, across the valley to seize the highway-railway bridge over the Volturno north of the town. The 168th Infantry met strong resistance during the afternoon in the vicinity of Hill 371, where elements of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by self-propelled guns, attempted a counterattack. The fire of the 175th Field Artillery Battalion drove off the supporting artillery, and the enemy infantry withdrew.

The threatened counterattack, which proved to be an effort to cover the evacuation of Dragoni, caused General Ryder to postpone plans for the river crossing during the night by the 135th Infantry. All three battalions of the 133d Infantry were struggling across the valley to block the road from Dragoni to Piedimonte d'Alife and to force a bridgehead just north of the bridge over the Volturno. The 7th Infantry was on the high ridges above Dragoni threatening the escape of the enemy up the road toward Baja e Latina. General Ryder knew that the enemy was trying to retreat up the road toward Piedimonte d'Alife and was particularly insistent that the 133d Infantry drive on the bridge with all speed.

The three battalions of the 133d Infantry were not on their objectives until nearly daylight on the foggy morning of 19 October. The 1st Battalion crossed the river during the afternoon of 18 October, made a wide sweep around to the right, and reached the bridge before midnight. The 3d Battalion arrived after midnight, and the 100th Battalion came up at dawn. The German demolition experts had thoroughly destroyed the bridge, and only its low gray stone abutments and one arch could be seen through the willows. All battalions immediately dug in under the grapevines and fruit trees and prepared to complete the crossing.

The 34th Division pushed on up and across the valley during 19-20 October. The 135th Infantry started its delayed crossing of the Volturno after midnight on 19 October; the 168th Infantry advanced early in the morning and occupied Dragoni without opposition. The 100th and 3d Battalions, 133d Infantry, forded the river after dark and closed into areas in the flat country south of Alife, with the enemy in the olive groves on the slopes overlooking them. The 135th Infantry completed its crossing just before 0200 on the misty morning of 20 October and drove toward Alife, which had already been visited by our air force. The infantrymen were delayed during the dark and foggy morning by swampy ground cut by swift canals fed by rippling mountain streams and
were hampered by sporadic artillery fire and occasional minefields; nevertheless they entered the rubble-filled streets of Alife before daylight.

The 34th Division then continued its advance up the valley on the right of the river. The 133d Infantry started a drive at 1800, 20 October, against Sant’Angelo d’Alife, a village nestling among the olive groves in a draw between Hills 630 and 529 northwest of Alife. The regiment met stiff enemy resistance from positions along the terraced slopes and encountered intense artillery fire from guns behind Hill 529. Stubborn fighting went on for three days, and two tank attacks on the left flank had to be repulsed. During the night of 23-24 October the enemy withdrew from Sant’Angelo d’Alife and Raviscanina, and the 133d Infantry moved up and occupied both towns the next day. This success completed the occupation of all objectives designated by VI Corps in its orders for crossing the Volturno and securing a bridgehead.

4. The Advance of the 45th Division. While the 3d and 34th Divisions were driving up the valley and through the hills on the southwest side of the Volturno, the 45th Division was securing the right flank and was maintaining contact with Eighth Army across the mountains. During 14 October the 180th Infantry had patrols operating through the valley west of the Volturno and north of Titerno Creek. The 179th Infantry, commanded by Col. Robert B. Hutchins, drove on Faicchio on the northeast side of Mount Acero and the 157th Infantry, commanded by Col. John H. Church, came up around the west side of the mountain. The advantages of terrain lay with the enemy, for the 179th Infantry had to fight its way down the narrow gorge of Titerno Creek between Mount Acero and the Matese Mountains, while the 157th Infantry had to advance up a road flanked on the left by the Titerno and on the right by Mount Acero. Despite a bombing and strafing attack by 20 enemy planes the 179th Infantry on 14 October reached the slopes northeast of Faicchio. When the regiment attacked the town the next day, it was beaten back by tank fire. Elements of the 157th Infantry forded the Titerno below Faicchio on 15 October and tried to drive up the west side of the river, but were stopped by fierce enemy resistance and a bombing and strafing attack. When the 157th Infantry continued the attack the next morning, it found that the town had been evacuated during the night. The 26th Panzer Division was gradually withdrawing to the Eighth Army zone, and the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division was extending its front across the Volturno to the Matese Mountains.

The 180th Infantry continued on up the valley across Titerno Creek and maintained contact with the 34th Division on the west side of the Volturno. The 157th Infantry drove through Gioia on 17 October. The regiment pushed on the next day along the slopes in the face of determined rearguard resistance.
The enemy apparently completed his withdrawal during the night, and the 157th Infantry entered Piedimonte d'Alife at 1700, 19 October. The right flank of VI Corps was secure, and the 34th Division was advancing on up the Volturno Valley toward Sant'Angelo d'Alife.

B. **THE ADVANCE OF 10 CORPS**

14-25 OCTOBER

1. **Plans and Terrain.** The assaults of the 7 Armoured Division and the 46 Division in the center and on the left of the 10 Corps front had been successful during the night of 12-13 October, but the 56 Division on the right had failed in its efforts to force a crossing of the Volturno in the Capua area. After it became apparent on 14 October that the 56 Division could not cross in its zone without heavy losses, General Clark changed the boundaries between his corps. 10 Corps issued Operations Instruction No. 9 on 15 October, which gave in detail the new corps boundary. The ridges north and northwest of Triflisco were placed in the 10 Corps zone so that the 56 Division might use the 3d Division bridge at Triflisco and also have high ground for observation over the coastal plain. The zones of action of the 56 Division and the 3d Division were now separated by a line running from the demolished bridge at Triflisco along Highway 87 to its junction with the road to Pontelatone and thence generally northwest to Formicola.

The area that faced 10 Corps was the flat coastal plain from the Volturno toward the Garigliano River, which is broken by a high ridge of mountains running southwest from Mount Santa Croce above Roccamominfina through Mount Massico to Mondragone on the sea. This broad stretch of land is approximately 7 miles long on the coast from Castel Volturno to Mondragone and is some 13 miles long along the foot of the ridges running northwest from Triflisco. The depth of the plain along the Volturno is about 17 miles, while the distance across the west side from Mondragone to the Calvi Risorta feature is approximately 14 miles. The coastal plain from the mouth of the Volturno to Mondragone is rimmed with sand dunes and marshes. The terrain soon rises inland to fertile grain fields, vineyards, orchards, and olive groves. Several drainage canals run immediately northwest of the river, and the plain is cut by numerous tree-lined streams, deep ravines, and sunken roads. The only high ground of any consequence that breaks the wide expanse is the series of low hills southwest of the Calvi Risorta feature. The most prominent elevations in this mass are Mount Maro, which is 212 meters high; Hill 226, a flat-topped knob above
Antiaircraft battery in the Mignano Gap...... painted by Technical Sergeant Savo Radulovic
Sparanise; and Hill 143, across a little farm valley, on which the hamlet of Francolise is situated.

2. The Advance of the 56 Division. The 56 Division started the 201 Guards Brigade across the 3d Division bridge at Triflisco on 15 October and moved northwest along the ridges toward Mount Grande. Most of the brigade and a squadron of the Greys (a tank battalion) were over by the evening of 16 October. The bridge was still under artillery fire, and a number of casualties were sustained during the crossing. The Guards pressed their attack along the ridges toward Mount Grande. After extremely hard fighting this height was taken by the 6 Coldstream Guards on 17 October. The brigade then swung to the west and continued its pursuit of the slowly retreating Germans. The spur northwest of Villa Volturno was stubbornly defended and caused considerable difficulty until cleared by the 2 Scots Guards.

Although the 56 Division originally had no interest in occupying the hills north of Mount Grande, the 30th Infantry had to be relieved southwest of Formicola. The enemy was dug in between the British and American forces southwest of the town and could shell the 3d Division zone whenever the 30th Infantry tried to withdraw to the east. The 6 Grenadier Guards accordingly turned north toward Formicola to effect the relief. Considerable difficulty was encountered on the ridge southeast of Camigliano, where the crest was so narrow that only one platoon could be deployed against the well situated enemy. The terrain through the area is extremely rugged, and the 3 Coldstream Guards had to be used as porters to maintain the 6 Grenadiers. A man could carry only two rounds of 3-inch mortar ammunition and required four and one-half hours for the round trip. The Grenadiers finally reached Formicola on the afternoon of 18 October and relieved the 30th Infantry. The rest of the 201 Guards Brigade had pushed on in the meantime against stubborn delaying action to a line running through Formicola to Camigliano.

The 169 Brigade began crossing the bridge at Triflisco during the early hours of 17 October. One battalion and a squadron of Greys were directed westward on the north side of the river to cut off the enemy forces still resisting stubbornly in front of Capua. Meanwhile small parties of the 167 Brigade crossed in the Capua area to assist the 169 Brigade. The remainder of the 169 Brigade pushed up Highway 6 northwest of Capua. A determined effort was made to rush the bridge over the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal below the junction of Highway 6 and Highway 7, but this effort was stopped by minefields. By the evening of 18 October the 169 Brigade had occupied Villa Volturno and Pignataro on the right and was in line with the advancing 201 Guards Brigade. Part of the troops of the 167 Brigade had come across the
river at Capua and had reached the area west of the airport; the remaining elements were crossing at Triflisco. The 169 Brigade drove on up Highway 6 to the vicinity of Calvi Vecchia and up Highway 7 across Lanzi Creek southeast of the town of Sparanise.

The 56 Division was strengthened on 19 October, when the 168 Brigade, newly arrived from Sicily, closed into the Caserta area and came under its command. Fresh troops were most welcome at this time, for the division had been fighting continually since its landing at Salerno. The supply situation was greatly improved on the same day by the completion of a Bailey pontoon bridge across the 240-foot gap over the Volturno in front of Capua. Despite bad approaches and 20-foot banks the engineers built the bridge and had supplies flowing up Highway 6 within 48 hours after the enemy was driven back sufficiently for them to start to work. The 168 Brigade then moved up on 22 October to help the 201 Guards Brigade improve its positions in the mountains overlooking the Calvi Risorta hills and ridges, the 168 Brigade reached the high ground north of the Guards, and the Greys worked up Highway 6 to its junction with the road to Teano.

3. The Advance of the 7 Armoured Division. The 7 Armoured Division in the center of the 10 Corps zone continued to push the 131 Brigade across the river at Grazzanise and captured the village of Brezza on the morning of 16 October. Its Class 9 bridge at Grazzanise was completed later in the day, and it began to get supplies and artillery across to support its drive over the flat plain. Progress was slowed by low wet terrain, good concealment for the enemy, extensive demolitions, and stubborn rearguard resistance. The high banks and the wide water span of the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal caused considerable difficulties, but a bridgehead was finally forced across it. The brigade pushed on over the grain fields and through the olive groves of the coastal plain. Its leading elements, supported by the City of London Yeomanry (a tank battalion), were just short of Sparanise and Francolise by 22 October, but were unable to occupy Sparanise until 25 October.

4. The Advance of the 46 Division. The crossing of the 46 Division had been most successful, but it encountered stiff enemy resistance as it attempted to drive on across the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The enemy withdrew from the area between the canal and the river during the night of 14-15 October, and elements of the 128 Brigade pushed on to the south banks of the wide and deep canal. This withdrawal cleared the district around Cancelllo ed Arnone, and bridging operations were started across the Volturno there at 1400, 15 October. The 138 and 139 Brigades, which had been slowly extending their bridgehead north and west, regrouped in front of the town to protect the
engineers who were building the bridge. Late in the evening of 18 October the 2/4 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry finally forced a bridgehead across the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal on the road running north from Cancello ed Arnone. By 20 October the division had three ferries in operation across the canal and was ready to continue its drive along the coast. Its advance, however, was stopped while 10 Corps paused briefly to regroup and prepare for an attack on Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico, the high points on the ridge between the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano.

C. SUMMARY OF THE ADVANCE

The troops of Fifth Army continued to push back the forces of Marshal Kesselring. The enemy retreated slowly, depending upon demolitions, road blocks, mined and booby-trapped areas, self-propelled guns, and small rearguard units to slow our advance. Villages and ridges in the hills were often defended stubbornly for a few hours or for days and then evacuated at night. On the VI Corps front the 45th Division had reached Piedimonte d'Alife and had gone into reserve. The 34th Division had forded the Volturno a second time and had fought up to Raviscanina. The 3d Division had driven up beyond Baja e Latina and had cleared Mount degli Angeli and Mount Monaco. The 56 Division, leading the advance of 10 Corps after it got across the Volturno, was in possession of the ridges northeast of the coastal plain and had crossed the hill mass that runs southwest to Sparanise and Francolise. The 3d, 34th, and 56 Divisions had thus gained the line originally designated by VI Corps as necessary to secure the Volturno bridgehead. The 7 Armoured Division in the center of the 10 Corps zone had crossed the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal and had reached Sparanise. The 46 Division along the sea still had most of its elements behind the canal, which continued to obstruct its advance. VI Corps was now in a position to drive on up the Volturno Valley and toward the Mignano Gap, while 10 Corps pushed across the valleys and ridges toward the Garigliano. The rains were becoming more frequent, the weather was getting cooler, and the men of both corps were becoming tired and worn after weeks of steady fighting against the elusive enemy.
Map N° 5
FIFTH ARMY
CONSOLIDATES ITS BRIDGEHEAD ACROSS THE VOLTURNO
14-25 October 1943

MONDRAZONE
CANCELLO ed ARNONE
Prazzanise
CASTEL VOLTURNO

PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP CO FOR ENGR HQ FIFTH ARMY
Before VI and 10 Corps had completed the occupation of territory considered adequate to secure the Volturno bridgehead, General Clark issued new orders for future operations. These orders, outlined in Fifth Army Operations Instruction No. 8 of 20 October, changed the phase lines next expected to be reached. The first phase line originally ran from Isernia through Venafro and Sessa to the Tyrrhenian Sea, while the second line stretched southwest from Terni to Civitavecchia on the sea above Rome. Fifth Army was now ordered to advance to a line running from Isernia through Mount Passero to the Garigliano River west of Mignano and then down the river to the sea. When this phase of operations was completed, Fifth Army was to drive on without delay to a line extending southwest from Opi to Fondi. (See Map No. 3.)

There was hardly a pause in the fighting by either VI or 10 Corps after they secured their bridgeheads across the Volturno. The 34th Division continued its thrust up the right side of the Volturno, while the 3d Division drove down out of the hills and plunged on across the valley toward the Mignano Gap. The 56 Division on the right flank of 10 Corps kept up pressure on the slowly retreating enemy and prepared to advance on Mount Santa Croce above Roccamonfina. The 46 Division and the 7 Armoured Division exchanged zones along the coast, but kept driving against the enemy rear guards.

A. 10 Corps Drive to the Garigliano
26 October - 4 November

1. Plans and Terrain. (See Map No. 6.) The next immediate task of 10 Corps was the capture of Mount Santa Croce behind Roccamonfina, Mount Mas- sico south of Sessa, and the steep ridges running southwest to the sea. This
advance was to be in preparation for an attack on the Mount Camino-Mount la Difensa-Mount Maggiore hill mass to the northwest. These five features are high points below the Mignano Gap in the chain of mountains that divides the valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano rivers. The problem that faced 10 Corps was not an easy one. In the first place Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico, together with the precipitous ridges that end with Mount Crestagallo on the coast, completely dominate the lower ground to the south and east over which 10 Corps had to advance. Mount Santa Croce, towering above Roccamonfina, rises 1005 meters above sea level, while Mount Massico is 812 meters high and Mount Crestagallo is 437 meters above Mondragone. In the second place the roads on the axis of the advance were few, mostly in poor condition, and their bridges were numerous and easily demolished. One rock road branches off Highway 6 below Calvi Risorta, runs across the valley to Teano, and then winds through the mountains to join the Sessa-Mignano road below Roccamonfina. Highway 7, a hard-surfaced road, which forms a junction with Highway 6 northwest of Capua, runs along the plain below Sparanise and Francolise, gradually rises to pass through the mountain chain approximately 200 meters above sea level, and then descends below Sessa to the flat valley of the Garigliano River. A third road, with a gravel surface, leads northwest from Cancelllo ed Arnone across the plain to Mondragone on the coast, skirts the end of the mountain chain near the sea, and then turns northeast through Carano to Sessa. It was therefore necessary to secure the Sessa road pass between Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico for supply purposes.

The terrain in the center of the 10 Corps zone was not suitable for the employment of tanks. General McCreery accordingly issued Operations Instruction No. 11 on 24 October, directing the 7 Armoured and 46 Divisions to exchange areas along the coast. Operation Instruction No. 12 was also issued on 24 October designating the attack on Mount Massico and Mount Santa Croce as Operation Thruster. On 26 October Operation Instruction No. 13 outlined the 10 Corps plan of attack and set the date for the advance as 31 October, the day determined for the continuation of the VI Corps drive toward the upper Volturno and the Mignano Gap. The 56 Division, using the Teano-Roccamonfina road as the axis of its advance, was to make the main attack between that route and the road south of Teano which winds through the terraced hills to Highway 7 at Cascano. The 46 Division was to drive up Highway 7 through the Cascano defile and take the road junction below Sessa. The 7 Armoured Division's primary mission was to protect the left flank. If the two infantry divisions could penetrate the mountain chain and plunge into the valley of the Garigliano, any enemy troops left on the coastal plain before the 7 Armoured
Division would be in danger of being cut off as they attempted to withdraw through Mondragone.

During the first phase of the attack the 56 Division was to advance west through the Teano area to a line running southwest from Hill 507 west of Teano to the ridges above San Giuliano. The 46 Division was to move up Highway 7 in close contact with the 56 Division, while the 7 Armoured Division was to gain ground preparatory to opening the coast road through Mondragone. During the second phase the 56 Division was to continue on to a line running southwest through Hills 532 and 576 southeast and south of Torano. The 46 Division was to keep abreast by taking Hill 291 northwest of San Giuliano, another hill of the same height west of San Giuliano, and the village of Ventaroli south of Highway 7. The 56 Division was then to seize the line running from Mount Mattone southwest to Hill 202, while the 46 Division was to advance on the left to Mount Vallerovina and Hill 542 southeast of Sessa. The 7 Armoured Division, in cooperation with the Royal Navy, was to exert maximum pressure on the extreme left and simulate a dangerous threat to the coastal route through Mondragone. The successful completion of these drives, together with the attack of the 3d Division toward the Mignano Gap, would threaten the enemy on Mount Santa Croce and Mount Massico with encirclement and force his withdrawal.

Meanwhile all divisions were ordered to work their way forward in order to push in enemy outposts, to obtain all possible information about his dispositions, and to secure suitable positions from which to start the main attack. The Germans were believed to be holding strong defensive positions, named by them the Barbara Line. The interchange of the 7 Armoured and 46 Divisions was completed early on the morning of 28 October, and elements of the 7 Armoured Division had the day before secured a bridgehead across the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The 56 Division was regrouping in the Rocchetta e Croce-Francolise area. Contact with the enemy was maintained along the entire front.

2. The Action. On 28 October the 56 Division had the 201 Guards Brigade in line on the right and the 168 Brigade on the left. The 167 and 169 Brigades were in divisional reserve. The 46 Division had the 139 Brigade forward, while the 128 and 138 Brigades were in reserve. The 7 Armoured Division had the 1 Rifle Brigade and the 11 Hussars over the Regia Agnena Nuova Canal. The 131 Brigade had crossed the Volturno at Capua and was in the Grazzanise area. The 5 Royal Tanks and the City of London Yeomanry were near Villa Liturno.

On 29 October it became apparent that the enemy was thinning out along the 10 Corps front. Advances of the 56 Division brought it within a mile of Teano, while the 46 Division established itself at Francolise, a weather-beaten village perched around the ruins of a castle on a hill southwest of Sparanise. Patrols
of the 7 Armoured Division found that the enemy was withdrawing in the coastal reaches. In view of this withdrawal of the German rear guards, 10 Corps pushed forward on 30 October. Although the co-ordinated attack of VI and 10 Corps was scheduled to begin on 31 October, it really began on the 10 Corps front one day early. It might be more accurate to say that 10 Corps never ceased advancing and attacking during this period.

On 30 October the 56 Division, with the 168 Brigade on the right and the 167 Brigade on the left, made local gains in the Teano area. The fresh troops of the 168 Brigade took Hill 333 northwest of Teano with considerable dash against determined enemy resistance. This advance cut the road leading into Teano from the northeast. The Teano railway station was then taken after a stiff fight. On the left the 167 Brigade met slight opposition in taking two small clusters of buildings a mile east of San Giuliano. The result was a partial encirclement of the town, and the enemy continued his retreat. In the center the 46 Division, with the 139 Brigade on the right and the 128 Brigade on the left, made good progress by occupying Nocelleto. The 139 Brigade then took Hill 127 and the road junction to the left, opening up the roads to the south. The 7 Armoured Division was meeting little opposition on the left, but was unable to exploit the situation. The 131 Brigade had not had time to complete its forward concentration, while the 22 Armoured Brigade was bogged down in low ground made unsuitable for movement by the recent rains.

On 31 October the 131 Brigade captured the badly damaged town of Mondragone and the dominating hill above it. On 1 November the 168 Brigade, still going strongly, occupied Roccamonfina, and the 139 Brigade took Giusti. The 7 Armoured Division drove the enemy from Mount Cicola, which completely freed the coastal route through Mondragone of enemy observation from the end of the mountain chain. The division then passed a tank battalion through and directed it northeast against Carano on the road to Sessa. The enemy gradually fell back, and the 56 Division continued on through the hills on the right. On 2 November patrols of the 7 Armoured and 46 Divisions reached the Garigliano River. The enemy was cleared from the low ground on the south side of the river except for some posts in a loop northwest of San Castrese. The Germans then began a series of demolitions along the sea north of the Garigliano, obviously fearing a seaborne landing on their flank and rear.

Operation Thruster was over and the battle for the Barbara Line was successfully concluded. Originally the line had been thought to be a belt of strongly defended positions from which the enemy would attempt to halt the advance of 10 Corps. Actually the struggle for it consisted of no more than the laborious wrinkling out of small but determined enemy machine-gun posts and the over-
coming of delays caused by numerous demolitions. 10 Corps was later to learn that the enemy's main positions were farther back on the way to Rome, but it was now ready to make its assault on Mount Camino to help open that route.

B. THE THIRD VOLTURNO CROSSING OF VI CORPS

26 OCTOBER 4 NOVEMBER

1. Plans and Terrain. (See Map No. 7.) The plan of the next operation of VI Corps, as outlined in Field Order No. 12 of 29 October and Field Order No. 13 of 31 October, was for two divisions to cross the Volturno during the night of 3-4 November to seize a line running from Isernia through Mount Passero to Mignano. The 504th Parachute Infantry (82d Airborne Infantry Division), which had come up the valley through Ailano to Valle Agricola in the mountains, was to drive along the slopes of the Apennine Mountains to protect the right flank. The 3d Division on the left flank was to make a demonstration toward Terra Corpo and then seize the mountains west of Presenzano. The 34th Division was directed to cross the Volturno east of Venafro and drive into the mountains southwest of Colli, while the 45th Division crossed the river south of Venafro to seize the high ground east of San Pietro and the 4th Ranger Battalion crossed to block Highway 6 north of Mignano.

The phase line that Fifth Army was next directed to reach in the VI Corps zone starts high on the slopes at Isernia, runs across the headwaters of the Volturno, and crosses the mountains to Mount Passero. Then it turns sharply southwest and passes through tangled hills and desolate mountains to a point on the Garigliano River west of Mignano. The area enclosed between this line and the upper Volturno is a great arc of mountains extending 15 miles south to the Mignano Gap and varying in width from 6 to 10 miles. The arc starts on the east side with the Roccaravindola spur, curves around Venafro, and ends with the high hills between Presenzano and Mignano. The brush-covered hills back of Roccaravindola and Santa Maria Oliveto rise from 400 to 600 meters above sea level, drop off into the narrow and desolate valley of Ravindola Creek, and then rise to 1036 meters at Alto Hill. The great rocky barriers of Mount Santa Croce and Mount Corno tower 1025 and 1052 meters above the olive groves around Venafro. Between Sesto Campano and Mignano and northwest of Presenzano the peaks reach 1120 meters at Mount Cesima. Through this rugged mass from Montaquila to Mignano numerous hills and mountains rise between other hills and mountains until it is a series of rounded hills, precipitous cliffs, jagged peaks, rocky slopes, high tablelands, deep gorges, and innumerable ravines and valleys.
The intensively cultivated valley of the Volturno is less than two miles wide at Roccaravindola, widens to five miles at Venafro, and narrows down to less than two miles northeast of Presenzano. The river in this sector flows in numerous streams, varying in depth from 10 to 20 inches, through clumps of willows and over a gravel bed reaching a width of 800 feet. The valley on both sides is cut by numerous streams and sunken roads and is covered with grain fields, vineyards, orchards, and olive groves.

2. Moving up for the Third Volturno Crossing. Several days of fighting still faced VI Corps before it was in position to make its third crossing of the Volturno River. The 34th Division had to drive on up the valley, the 45th Division had to move forward from Piedimonte d'Alife, and the 3d Division had to cross the valley toward the Mignano Gap to secure the left flank. The 135th Infantry took up the chase for the 34th Division on the morning of 26 October, with the high ground around Ailano and Mount Cavuto across Lete Creek southwest of Pratella as its objectives. The enemy, however, chose to make one of his most stubborn stands on Hill 235, an insignificant little obstruction rising less than 25 meters above the broken valley west of Raviscanina, and held up the advance for two days. The 168th Infantry came up and drove on past Hill 235 to Lete Creek on 28 October. The 135th Infantry pushed through Pratella and Prata the next day. The 133d and 168th Infantry then advanced up the Lete Creek valley and down into the valley of the rapid little Sava Creek during 31 October and 1 November, occupying the area as far as Capriati a Volturno. Meanwhile the 504th Parachute Infantry had moved up the valley through Ailano and closed into positions at Valle Agricola on the right flank of VI Corps.

While the 34th Division was driving up the right side of the river, the 3d Division was clearing the mountains and valleys on the left. The 30th Infantry attacked Mount San Nicola on 26 October and occupied Pietravairano, stair-stepped below the ruins of an old castle in the saddle between Mount San Nicola and Mount Gaievola. The 15th Infantry pushed from Roccaromana through Pietramelara and occupied Hill 342 to the west and the San Felice hills to the northwest. The regiment moved on across the valley and drove the Germans from the rocky slopes of Mount Gaievola and Mount Sant'Angelo.

On 3 November the 34th Division was poised in the olive groves on the slopes overlooking the flat valley of the Volturno east of Venafro. The 45th Division had moved up the valley from Piedimonte d'Alife and was in position for its first crossing of the Volturno. The men of both divisions could look westward across Highway 85 and the railroad running up the valley and see the mountain masses stretching beyond and towering over Santa Maria Oliveto, Venafro, Sesto Campano, and Presenzano. Men who thought they had seen mountains
in Africa and Sicily were about to learn what real mountain fighting was. The enemy had withdrawn west of the river, destroying bridges and leaving behind him his infernal minefields, and was waiting in the bald and rugged mountains.

On the right of VI Corps the 504th Parachute Infantry, commanded by Col. Reuben H. Tucker, had plunged into the great gray Gallo bowl high in the mountains and was advancing northwest toward Isernia in contact with the British Eighth Army across the Apennine Mountains. On the left the 3d Division was following elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer Division, retreating slowly over the valley and through the lower hills toward Mignano. The British 10 Corps had completed its laborious struggle through the Barbara Line south of VI Corps toward the sea.

3. **The Crossing of the 45th Division.** Since the 3d Division had made excellent progress on the left flank, VI Corps decided to send the 45th Division across the Volturno ahead of the 34th Division to direct its first efforts against Venafro and toward cutting Highway 6 north of Mignano. Company F, 180th Infantry, crossed the Volturno on the night of 2 November and went into position around Sesto Campano, a village high on the terraced hillside. The 4th Ranger Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy A. Murray, Jr., then went across the river in the 45th Division zone at 1800, 3 November, to drive across the mountains back of Sesto Campano and block Highway 6. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry, crossed the river southeast of Presenzano at 2000, climbed up the steep ridges north of the town, and advanced northwest to occupy the ridge running northwest of Rocca Pipirozzi and east of Vallecupa and Ceppagna. The 6th Parachute Regiment (2d Parachute Division) had reinforced this area the day before and put up a determined defense of Rocca Pipirozzi, a little stone village clustered around an old castle on one of the peaks of the narrow ridge. The battalion drove the enemy off the ridge during the day and then made contact with the 4th Ranger Battalion, which had been stopped on Cannavine Hill to the southwest.

The 179th Infantry was ordered to advance on Venafro and the surrounding slopes during the morning of 4 November. The 3d Battalion crossed the river after midnight and made good progress after dawn over the grain fields and through the vineyards of the valley. About the middle of the morning most of the battalion was pinned down a mile southeast of Venafro by machine-gun fire from the slopes below Mount Corno. Company K stubbornly fought its way forward through the town, but the remainder of the battalion was unable to reach the protection of the high ground until after dark. The 1st Battalion crossed the river during the morning of 4 November to pass through the 3d Bat-
talion the next day and drive on Pozzilli, a village scattered along a canal in the draw between Mount Santa Croce and Hill 540.

4. The Crossing of the 34th Division. The immediate objectives of the 34th Division across the wide Volturno were the villages of Santa Maria Oliveto and Roccaravindola on the hills to the northwest. The 168th Infantry was ordered to cross northeast of Venafro and seize Roccaravindola, a hamlet on a high spur jutting out into the valley. The 133d Infantry was to cross east of Venafro and drive northwest to take Santa Maria Oliveto and the ridges to the southwest. Shortly before midnight the 2d and 3d Battalions, 168th Infantry, and the 133d Infantry moved carefully down out of the hills and through the farms of the muddy valley to their positions along the low river banks. The division artillery opened up at 2330 with a terrific concentration on enemy positions across the river. Thirty minutes later the men of the 34th Division waded through the swift and icy waters of the Volturno for the third and last time.

The 2d and 3d Battalions, 168th Infantry, forded the Volturno abreast. Mortar and artillery fire from the hills was heavy, but the worst thing encountered in the valley was the extensive use of mines and booby traps. S-mines and Tellermines, separately and together, were planted thickly in the valley and along the embankment leading up to Highway 85. Trip wires were numerous and many were attached to grapevines, fruit trees, and haystacks. At the regimental command post high in the hills east of the river, the progress of both assault battalions could be followed by the explosions of the mines. The 3d Battalion, 133d Infantry, waded quickly through the wide and shallow water and advanced rapidly up into the hills. The 1st Battalion followed on the left, and the 100th Battalion splashed across to get astride of the road net in the valley and to protect the left rear of the division.

The 168th Infantry reached the hills early in the morning despite the minefields. The 3d Battalion climbed the slopes of Hill 400 and quickly mopped up its area. The 2d Battalion reached the rocky saddle between Hill 400 and its objective by the middle of the morning, but was held up by a mortar and machine gun in the draw north of Roccaravindola. This position was soon wiped out by a patrol, and the battalion was in the village by noon. The two assault battalions then reorganized, but their heavy losses from mines and booby traps prevented a renewal of the attack. The 1st Battalion came across the river after dark to pass between them and seize the ridge extending from Hill 518 to Hill 558 northwest of Roccaravindola.

All three battalions of the 133d Infantry were over the Volturno shortly after midnight and made good progress through minefields against small-arms, machine-gun, and artillery fire. Enemy delaying elements were disposed along
Highway 85 and the railroad, and resistance stiffened as the troops reached the hills. The 3d Battalion climbed the slopes into Santa Maria Oliveto after daylight; the 1st Battalion was on Hill 550 to the southwest by the middle of the morning. Casualties from mines and booby traps were particularly heavy in the 3d and 100th Battalions, and they made little progress after noon.

The 34th and 45th Divisions had completed the third Volturno crossing and had fought their way into the hills and up the mountain slopes on the other side. The 3d Division continued its advance on the left flank, while the 504th Parachute Infantry kept pace along the foothills of the Apennine Mountains on the right. Although the river was not strongly defended by an enemy in fixed positions, the artillery of the 34th Division expended 4122 rounds during the crossing to drive him back into the hills. The casualties in VI Corps were almost as heavy as they were in the first crossing, for 491 men were killed, wounded, and missing during 4 November. VI Corps had now hit the German Winter Line and was in position to start battering to break through it.

C. SUMMARY OF THE DRIVE

The tired men of Fifth Army continued to drive the Germans before them during the last week in October and the first in November. 10 Corps pushed across the divide between the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano. Forward elements of the 7 Armoured Division and the 46 Division reached the Garigliano on 2 November and soon cleared most of the southeast side of the river. The 56 Division had driven through Teano and Roccamonfina and was now preparing for an assault on the towering and jagged mass of Mount Camino. VI Corps had sent the 3d Division across the valley toward Mignano, and it had fought its way up to the Mignano Gap and the hill masses on either side. The 34th and 45th Divisions had made the last crossing of the Volturno and had pushed their way into the mountains on the other side. The rains were increasing, the weather was becoming steadily colder, and the German resistance was stiffening as Fifth Army hit the German Winter Line.
Map No. 7
The THIRD VOLTURNO CROSSING
26 October - 4 November 1943

SCALE:

1000 0 1 2 3 4 5 YARDS MILES

PRINTED BY 66TH ENGR TOP Co FOR ENGR HW FIFTH ARMY
FIFTH Army had now reached some of the most formidable obstacles that it was to face in Italy. 10 Corps had crossed the divide that separates the lower valleys of the Volturno and Garigliano rivers and was getting ready to attack the Mount Camino-Mount la Difensa-Mount Maggiore mass southwest of Mignano. VI Corps had one division driving on the Mignano Gap, while two divisions had crossed the upper Volturno successfully and were on the slopes of the mountain arc west of the river. The winter rains, which had started late in September, were increasing steadily, making roads and by-passes extremely difficult to maintain and turning the farm valleys into seas of mud. The enemy was reinforcing both of his flanks with fresh infantry divisions and was bringing a panzer division across the mountains from the Eighth Army front to oppose VI Corps. The men of all divisions of Fifth Army were tired and worn from long weeks in the line and suffered from the cold, wet weather.

The barriers that faced Fifth Army on its way to Rome were the mountains from Montaquila to Mount Camino below Mignano. The great arc through which the 34th and 45th Divisions were fighting extends from Montaquila to Mignano. The 3d Division was trying to drive the enemy from the slopes on either side of the Mignano Gap and cross into the valley south of Cassino. 10 Corps was moving up to make its main effort against Mount Camino in the great mass below the Mignano Gap. The chain of mountains immediately west of the Volturno ends above Mignano with Mount Cesima and Cannavinelle Hill which rise 1120 and 689 meters above sea level. The Mignano Gap, a wide pass from 100 to 150 meters high, separates this tangled mass from the Mount Camino (963 meters)-Mount la Difensa (960 meters)-Mount Maggiore (630 meters) obstacle to the southwest.
10 Corps was now in position to make an assault on Mount Camino, Mount la Difensa, and Mount Maggiore, which compose a huge dominating hill mass below the Mignano Gap overlooking the southern part of the Liri Valley. (See Map No. 8.) These mountains, some 3000 feet above the valley of the Garigliano River to the southwest, rise gauntly from the low ground around the villages of Galluccio and Cavelle. The slopes are steep and rocky; there is little cover and few feasible approaches. That part of Mount Camino, the highest of the mass, facing the 56 Division consists of two main spurs running approximately north and south. The westernmost of these spurs runs from Point 819 (Hill 819) southward through Point 727. The eastern spur runs parallel to it from Point 963. Both of these ridges are steep and razorbacked.

The 56 Division was assigned the difficult task of taking Mount Camino. This division, with the exception of the 168 Brigade, had been fighting continually since 9 September. It needed a pause for rest and reorganization as well as an opportunity to assimilate its numerous replacements. However, the enemy could be given no time for rehabilitation and strengthening his positions at this time. The attack began on 5 November, with the 201 Guards Brigade on the right and the 168 Brigade on the left. The Guards took Cavelle and the 168 Brigade occupied Sipicciano. On the right of the 56 Division the 3d Division was starting its assault on Mount la Difensa.

On 6 November the Guards attacked toward the north at 1600, with the 6 Grenadier Guards on the right and the 2 Scots Guards on the left. The 2 Scots Guards took the village of Calabritto, while the 6 Grenadiers made some progress on the right. After repulsing a counterattack on Calabritto the 2 Scots Guards tried to find a route up the mountain sides by which they could take the village of Cocuruzzo from the rear. When this effort failed, they withdrew and attacked the following night through the Grenadiers. This assault proved costly, for the battalion encountered formidable defenses consisting of weapons pits blasted out of solid rock and heavily wired. All usable approaches were carefully mined and booby-trapped.

On 8 November two fierce counterattacks on Calabritto were beaten off with considerable loss to the enemy. Over on the right the 3d Division was also up against the enemy main positions on Mount la Difensa, Mount Lungo, and the heights above San Pietro, and was being subjected to determined counterattacks. During the night of 8-9 November another counterattack on
Calabritto was repulsed, while the Grenadiers gained a footing on Mount Canino by driving the enemy from Point 727. Meanwhile the 168 Brigade on the left was incurring casualties from the infernal German S-mines, the enemy weapon most hated by the infantry.

The Guards began to show signs of exhaustion by the morning of 10 November. The weather was becoming colder and wetter, and small enemy counterattacks were a continual source of annoyance. The 7 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry was brought up from the 167 Brigade to help the Guards, while the 10 Royal Berkshires of the 168 Brigade relieved the 3 Coldstream Guards at Calabritto. The 7 Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry then made a strong attack east through the Guards and fought their way to the top of Point 819. They were driven off the peak by an immediate counterattack, but the fact that they reached Point 819 at all was a magnificent achievement.

Losses and continued action had seriously reduced the combat efficiency of the 56 Division, so that it was doubtful if Mount Canino could be held if taken. The positions of the division on the mountain slopes were impractical to hold. On 12 November General Templer decided to assist the 201 Guards Brigade with an attack by the 167 Brigade on the right. The 23 Armoured Brigade and the 44 Reconnaissance Regiment therefore started taking over the 167 Brigade zone. Meanwhile the 201 Guards and 168 Brigades were fully occupied in trying to hold what they had won. Enemy artillery was very active, and frequent determined counterattacks were directed on Calabritto. Maintenance of troops on Mount Canino was becoming increasingly difficult. A battalion was required to manhandle supplies up to forward elements. Extreme difficulty was being experienced in getting the wounded down the steep mountain sides. On the right the 3d Division was everywhere held up and in a similar plight. The 7th Infantry was on the eastern slopes of Mount la Difensa. North of Mignano only the southern slopes of Mount Lungo were held, while toward the northeast Mount Rotondo and the high ground east of San Pietro was in the possession of the 3d Division.

In view of these facts it was decided on 12 November, with the approval of General Clark, to withdraw from Mount Canino. The plan for the attack by the 167 Brigade was canceled, and the 169 Brigade moved up on the afternoon of 14 November to occupy San Clemente and cover the withdrawal of the Guards. The 23 Armoured Brigade was to hold the Ponte area, the 168 Brigade was to hold the Sipicciano Gap, and the 167 Brigade was to occupy a position covering the Roccamonfina-Conca road. The Guards started withdrawing through the 169 Brigade during the night of 14-15 November, and
that somewhat hazardous operation, thanks to very bad weather, was accomplished without any enemy reaction. The indications were that it was not until 36 hours later that the enemy realized that the Guards were no longer on the slopes of Mount Camino.

B. **THE ADVANCE OF VI CORPS**

5-15 NOVEMBER

1. **The 3d Division at the Mignano Gap. (See Map No. 8.)** The 3d Division continued to make the main effort of VI Corps on the left flank to drive past Mignano and into the valley south of Cassino. Mignano is situated in a wide gap across the mountain chain which separates the valleys of the Volturino and Garigliano rivers. The brush-covered sides of Cannavinelle Hill and Mount Cesima rise to the northeast, and the huge mass of Mount Camino-Mount la Difensa-Mount Maggiore towers on the other side. The Mignano Gap itself contains two formidable barriers in the shape of Mount Rotondo and Mount Lungo. Mount Rotondo rises 357 meters just west of Cannavinelle Hill and is densely covered with brush. Mount Lungo is a long barren ridge with several peaks which thrusts itself up 351 meters almost in the middle of the gap. If the 3d Division was to break through the Mignano Gap and pour into the valley south of Cassino, the enemy had to be driven from the dominating heights to the northeast and southwest.

Patrols found that minefields, tank traps, and machine-gun positions on Mount Rotondo and Mount Lungo made an attack through the gap a hazardous operation. General Truscott then sent the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, over Mount Cesima to Cannavinelle Hill, while the 30th Infantry went around to Rocca Pipirozzi to launch an attack across Cannavinelle toward Mount Rotondo, which protected the gap from the north. The regiment passed through the 180th Infantry during the night of 5-6 November and made an unsuccessful attack the next afternoon on Mount Rotondo. At the same time the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, made an unsuccessful effort to seize the southeast nose (Hill 253) of Mount Lungo. Another co-ordinated attack was launched, under cover of the fire of eight battalions of artillery, on the foggy morning of 8 November. The 30th Infantry occupied the crest of Mount Rotondo, and the 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, took Hill 253. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, then moved up and beat the enemy off Hill 193 in the horseshoe curve of Highway 6. Both regiments spent the next few days in repulsing almost continual German counter-attacks, in digging deeper for protection against mortar and artillery fire, and in trying to keep reasonably warm and dry.
Soldiers brew coffee before the ruins of Mignano...... painted by Lieutenant Edward A. Reep
On the left the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, attacked on 5 November through Casale and Caspoli toward the high ridge between the jagged peaks of Mount Camino and the perpendicular cliffs of Mount la Difensa. The resistance of the enemy there demanded that the remainder of the regiment be brought up to assist the 2d Battalion. During the next ten days these battalions tried in vain to scale the heights of Mount la Difensa. Their every effort was balked by a cliff from 50 to 60 feet high running north and south some 1500 yards along the top of the mountain. They were met at every turn by commanding observation, by rifle and machine-gun fire from holes blasted in the rocky slopes, and by accurate mortar and artillery fire. The enemy paid heavily for holding his ground and his counterattacks were often costly, but he was always able to shift his reserves to replace his losses. The difficulties of supply were tremendous in this terrain cut by deep gorges and precipitous ridges. Everything had to be brought up by carrying parties, and a man could carry only a small amount when he needed both hands for climbing. Unsuccessful efforts were made to drop supplies from planes to relieve the situation. Six hours were required to bring down the wounded. The men of all battalions suffered from exposure to rain and cold and from a lack of proper food and clothing.

2. The 45th Division Battles at the Mountains. The advance of the 45th Division to the northwest was continued on 6 November by the 1st Battalion, 180th Infantry, on its way between Mount Corno and Mount Santa Croce toward Concacasale. The jagged cliffs and peaks of these precipitous mountains had to be cleared before the battalion could drive across the high saddle between them. Enemy resistance was strong, and the mountainous terrain made progress almost impossible. Supplying the forward elements was an arduous task, for the 1st Battalion reached heights that could not be negotiated by the sure-footed Italian pack mules that had been acquired. Positions blasted and dug into the solid rock had to be taken one by one, and if they were not immediately occupied, the enemy infiltrated back at night. His positions on the forward slopes were lightly organized, but the reverse slopes were held in strength and his guns were sited to wipe out anything coming over the crests. On 10 November the 1st Ranger Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William O. Darby, relieved the 180th Infantry on Mount Corno. On the following day the 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. William P. Yarborough, came up and drove the enemy from the saddle on Mount Santa Croce between Peaks 970 and 1025 to the right of Venafro.

On the morning of 6 November the 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry, moved through Pozzilli to seize the great dome-like mass of Hill 769 west of Filignano. Fighting over the slopes and through the valleys was fierce, for the enemy stub-
bornly defended every inch of ground in the mountains. During the next six days the battalion pushed steadily forward across mined ravines and valleys, over bullet-swept slopes, and through fog, rain, and bitterly cold nights. On 9 November the 1st Battalion occupied Hills 570 and 580 south of Filignano and east of Hill 769. Three days later it relieved the 2d Battalion, which was still fighting on the east slopes of Hill 769. The 3d Battalion then moved to Hill 873 northeast of Filignano and sent patrols to Hill 1036 to gain contact with the 168th Infantry on its right.

The 157th Infantry reached Venafro on 7 November and prepared to pass between the 179th and 180th Infantry and drive across the desolate hills toward Acquafondata. Threats of counterattacks on the 45th Division front delayed the commitment of this reserve until 11 November, when the 1st Battalion jumped off to take Hill 759 southwest of Hill 769, which was being attacked by the 179th Infantry. The terrain was extremely difficult, but the battalion reached the crest of the hill the next day. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion pushed forward at daylight on 12 November to seize Hill 640, a massive knob on the southwest side of Hill 769. In order to reach Hill 640 the battalion had to pass over Hills 460 and 470, which are slight rises on a ridge running southeast from Hill 640, and then drive across the road running from Pozzilli to Acquafondata. The top of Hill 460 is flat and partly cultivated; its left side falls away steeply into the narrow valley of a rippling mountain stream.

The 3d Battalion made little progress during 12 November, for its line of advance was dominated by Hill 769. Elements of one company climbed the steep slopes of Hill 460 early in the following morning and drove a score of the enemy across the road toward Hill 640. The company then reorganized to push on, but soon began to receive intense mortar and artillery fire. The enemy counterattacked with about 50 men at noon, at 1330, and again during the middle of the afternoon, following his artillery concentrations closely and supported by small-arms fire from Hill 769. The top of Hill 460 was open to fire from three sides, and artillery fire finally forced a withdrawal late in the afternoon. Colonel Church, commander of the 157th Infantry, then decided that this was just another one of the hills in the area that was flanked by more hills. He advised Colonel Hutchins of the 179th Infantry that Hill 460 was untenable for both sides and that he could advance no farther until Hill 769 was cleared of the enemy.

3. The 34th Division Breaks into the Winter Line. The main efforts of the 34th Division to break into the upper end of the Winter Line were to be made by the 133d and 135th Infantry. The 133d Infantry continued its struggle northwest of Santa Maria Oliveto over the series of scrub-covered hills against an enemy that was no longer retreating and with problems of supply that could
not be solved with Italian pack mules. The enemy continued to hold positions on the reverse slopes of hills and to infiltrate back through ravines and valleys. Fighting and patrolling went on steadily until the regiment was pinched out on 12 November by the 135th and 179th Infantry. The casualties of the 133rd Infantry in the third crossing of the Volturno and the fighting around Santa Maria Oliveto were extremely heavy. Four officers and 81 enlisted men were killed, 24 officers and 216 men were wounded, and 6 men were missing. Exposure to rain and cold, however, struck down more men than did the enemy.

On 7 November General Ryder ordered the 135th Infantry; the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion; the 191st Tank Battalion; Company A, 3d Chemical Battalion; and Company B, 109th Engineer Battalion, to assemble in the vicinity of the highway-railway crossing in the valley southeast of Roccaravindola. This group, under the command of General Caffey, was to be known as Task Force A and was to drive up the road to secure Montaquila. The 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, led the attack the next morning and took the town and Hill 864 to the west. The 1st Battalion drove across the hills back of Santa Maria Oliveto and occupied Hill 1036. The 135th Infantry spent the next few days patrolling north across Chiaro Creek and west over the terraced hills toward Mount Pantano. Routes through mined areas were located by driving sheep and goats through them, and extensive minefields were discovered north of Chiaro Creek. Contact was made with the 504th Parachute Infantry, which had pushed along the right flank of VI Corps to Colli.

C. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

Fifth Army was everywhere held up by bad weather, mountainous terrain, and stubborn enemy resistance. The 56 Division, which had been making the main effort for 10 Corps, had given up its attempt to drive the enemy from Mount Camino. The 34th and 45th Divisions had been stopped in the mountains west of the Volturno River. The 3d Division had been successful in clearing the right side of the Mignano Gap, but Mount Lungo in the center and Mount la Difensa on the left were proving to be difficult to capture. The enemy had strengthened his right flank along the sea with the 94th Grenadier Division and his left flank in the mountains with the 305th Grenadier Division and the 26th Panzer Division. The rains had increased since October and the nights were bitterly cold. Problems of supply were becoming increasingly difficult as the Volturno rose, as the mud got deeper, and as the hills became steeper.
Men suffered from the rain and cold and from a lack of hot meals and proper clothing. The divisions needed rest and replacements if they were to maintain efficiency and high morale. The enemy's main defensive line had been reached and more men and materiel were needed to break through it. The resistance in this area caused 15th Army Group to direct Fifth Army to stop its attack and regroup its forces. General Clark took these factors into consideration and stopped the advance on 15 November. Our exhausted men could now rest and prepare for another assault to smash through the German Winter Line.
FIFTH ARMY REACHES the WINTER LINE
5-15 November 1943
CHAPTER VII

Summary of the Campaign

A. THE ADVANCE OF FIFTH ARMY

7 OCTOBER - 15 NOVEMBER

FIFTH Army made rapid progress during October and the first part of November until the German Winter Line halted the advance. (See Map No. 9.) VI Corps gained approximately 45 miles on its right flank and about 25 on its left flank during the period 7 October - 15 November. 10 Corps moved from the Voltturno River to the Garigliano River, a distance of some 17 miles, during the same time. Its advance from Capua to Mount Camino covered approximately 20 miles on its right flank. The Fifth Army front stretched some 50 miles from the vicinity of Benevento to the mouth of the Volturino at the beginning of this campaign, but eventually narrowed down to approximately 35 miles between the Colli area and the mouth of the Garigliano.

The troops of Fifth Army could well take pride in their achievements when they paused for rest and reinforcement in the middle of November. They had made a successful landing on the Salerno beaches on 9 September and had in the next month driven up to the Volturino-Calore river line, the next natural defensive positions of the enemy. On 13 October these indomitable infantrymen fought their way across the Volturino and continued to drive the enemy back toward Rome. During the month they drove across coastal plains and over mountains, twice more forced crossings of the Volturino, and finally hit the German Winter Line above Venafro and Mignano.

B. FIFTH ARMY CASUALTIES

The effective strength of Fifth Army rose from 130,246 on 7 October to 243,827 on 15 November. Most of these additional troops were in service units and were not available for combat duty. The total battle casualties in the Army
during this period were 9690. The American units had 6843 casualties, as follows: 1374 killed, 5183 wounded, and 286 missing in action. The 3d Division suffered 2699 casualties, the 34th Division 1660, and the 45th Division lost 1370 men. The heaviest losses in the American VI Corps occurred on 13 October and 4 November, the days during which the first and third crossings of the Volturno were made. The first crossing cost 544 men, while 491 casualties were suffered in the last. The British 10 Corps had a total of 2847 battle casualties, of which 443 were killed, 2007 wounded, and 397 missing in action. Non-battle casualties during the period were about equal to the number of the battle losses.

The German losses cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. A total of 1994 enemy prisoners fell into the hands of Fifth Army during the period 1 October - 15 November. VI Corps accounted for 1617 of these, while 10 Corps took 377. The enemy order of battle remained somewhat confused during the period, but practically all of the prisoners reported heavy casualties.

C. THE ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH EIGHTH ARMY

When Fifth Army had reached the Volturno-Calore river line at the end of the first week in October, the British Eighth Army, under the command of General Montgomery, had driven up on the right and had reached a line running generally south from Termoli on the Adriatic Sea to a point slightly north of Benevento. 5 Corps, with the 78 Division on the right and the 8 Indian Division on the left, was advancing along the coast. 13 Corps was pushing over extremely rugged mountain terrain between 5 Corps and the American VI Corps. The 5 Division was on the right, while the 1 Canadian Division was on the left and in contact with the American 45th Division across the Apennines.

Marshal Kesselring's Tenth Army was delaying the advance of Eighth Army with LXXVI Panzer Corps, composed of the 1st Parachute Division, the 16th and 26th Panzer Divisions, and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. The 1st Parachute Division was fighting a delaying action along the coast in front of the 78 Division. The lines of the 16th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division stretched south into the 13 Corps zone. The 26th Panzer Division front ran over the mountains to the Volturno, but the division was withdrawing over the Apennines to throw its full strength against Eighth Army.

General Montgomery's forces continued their drive to the northwest, hampered by demolitions, mountains, numerous streams, and stiff enemy resistance. 5 Corps drove on along the coast, with the 78 Division making the main effort.
After 13 Corps advanced beyond Campobasso, the 1 Canadian Division and the 5 Division exchanged zones for a continuation of the pursuit of the enemy. By the middle of November nearly all of the area east of the Sangro River from Alfedena through Castel di Sangro to the sea was cleared of the Germans. In five weeks Eighth Army had advanced along a front averaging about 35 miles in width, with a gain of some 30 miles along the coast and approximately 55 miles on the left flank. LXXVI Panzer Corps fought a persistent and stubborn delaying action during this period and was now ready to make a determined stand before Eighth Army.

D. AIR OPERATIONS

1. Allied Air Operations. Throughout the month of October and the first half of November the Strategic Air Force and XII Air Support Command continued to be of material assistance to the advance of Fifth Army. The Strategic Air Force slowed up the movement of enemy supplies and troops toward the front by continually bombing communications. XII Air Support Command made direct attacks on enemy troop concentrations and installations immediately in front of Fifth Army, and hindered the shifting of forces and the bringing up of supplies in the battle areas by bombing bridges and road junctions. The efforts of both groups practically swept the enemy air forces from the skies.

During October and November the Strategic Air Force unceasingly pounded enemy rear areas from the Volturno River to northern Italy. The weather was often bad for aerial operations, but the attacks continued on airfields, bridges, viaducts, railroad yards, road junctions, gun positions, troop concentrations, and factories. In the five weeks 9 October-13 November, 9563 1/2 tons of bombs were dropped during 493 attacks by Wellingtons, B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, B-26's, and P-38's. Although the Strategic Air Force gave some attention to enemy installations in Greece and Yugoslavia, its principal strength was directed toward aiding the advance of Fifth and Eighth Armies.

XII Air Support Command continued its tactical and reconnaissance missions during October and the first half of November. One of the main efforts of the tactical fighter-bombers in direct support of ground troops was made on 28 October. Twenty-four A-36's bombed Pratella and the bridge over Lete Creek south of the village in support of the 168th Infantry. During the same morning A-36's bombarded Mount Sant'Angelo for almost an hour and materially assisted the advance of the 30th Infantry. Throughout the period road
junctions, enemy transport, gun installations, and troop concentrations behind the lines felt the power of the fighter-bombers. Fifth Army troops were almost unmolested by enemy air power.

2. Enemy Air Activity. The German fighter-bomber effort on the Fifth Army front was small during the period of the drive from the Volturno River to the Winter Line. The power of the Allied air force available for Italian operations was too great for the enemy's air resources. The ground troops advanced during October almost without interference from the Luftwaffe, but during the first half of November began to receive sporadic raids from limited numbers of planes. Air cover of Fifth Army was sufficient to prevent continued and effective bombing, while ample antiaircraft artillery had been brought in to offer strong protection from raiders.

Only about 16 Messerschmitt 109's appeared over the Fifth Army front on 13 October, the day VI and 10 Corps crossed the Volturno River. At least 75 fighter-bombers attacked bridges and communications in the vicinity of Caiazzo 2 days later, when 7 planes were destroyed and 5 damaged. During the next 7 days not more than 100 fighter-bomber sorties were flown against the Fifth Army forces and installations. Fighter cover forced many of these planes to jettison their bombs or to turn back before reaching their objectives. Toward the end of the month a few small formations of fighter-bombers appeared over the battle areas, but did little damage.

The Germans attempted to raid Naples on 21 October and again on the 23d. During the first raid 15 twin-engined aircraft, probably Junkers 88's, dropped some 30 flares and more than 20 500-pound bombs on the water front at Bagnoli and in the Naples harbor. The planes came in low over the sea from the northwest and carried out their attack from low and medium altitudes. The only damage reported was a hit on a gun emplacement. An unsuccessful attack was made on one of the Volturno River bridges at the same time. About 20 Junkers 88's raided Naples again on the night of 23 October, but did little damage to our installations.

Enemy air activity during November was hampered by weather. Some days were completely unsuitable for air operations, while hardly one passed that did not have poor conditions for activity during at least a portion of the day. The Luftwaffe raided the front lines, artillery positions, command posts, and bridges at intervals. Formations of from 2 to 25 fighter-bombers were used to carry out bombing and strafing missions. These raids were usually made forward of the rear boundaries of the corps, but on at least one occasion during the first half of November fighter-bombers attacked the rear areas. Early on the morning of 12 November 9 Focke-Wulf 190's and Messerschmitt 109's bom-
bed and strafed the Pomigliano Airfield, causing six casualties and damaging six aircraft. Shipping in the Naples harbor was the primary target for three raids. On 1 November approximately 20 aircraft, some identified as Junkers 88's, were over Naples from 1850 to 1938. High level bombing, shallow dive-bombing, and aerial torpedo attacks were employed by the enemy. HMS Linet, a cable ship, was struck by a torpedo and had to be beached, but no military damage was suffered. Six enemy aircraft were destroyed by antiaircraft artillery and night fighters.

On the night of 5-6 November between 20 and 30 aircraft bombed the Naples harbor, dropping 40 bombs from altitudes of 4,000 to 16,000 feet. One LST containing ammunition was hit and exploded, one LCT was slightly damaged, a power station was damaged, the quartermaster warehouse on Pier K was hit, and a gasoline dump was hit and fired. The antiaircraft artillery claimed three planes destroyed and one probably destroyed. On 10 November 25 enemy aircraft were over Naples from 0322 to 0420, but no damage was done. Two aircraft were shot down by the antiaircraft artillery.

The enemy apparently was unable to put many fighters in the air to oppose either strategic or tactical bombers in Italy. His greatest effort during the period was on 14 October, when between 35 and 40 Messerschmitt 109's, Focke-Wulf 190's, Reggiane 2001's, and Macchi 202's attacked 34 B-17's in the vicinity of Terni. Few fighters were met during the remainder of October, and planes on bombing and strafing missions proceeded almost at will to any point in Italy. The principal defensive effort of the enemy during the first half of the next month occurred on 14 November, when 15 Messerschmitt 109's aggressively attacked 75 B-17's on their run over the Bolzano marshalling yards and for 25 minutes after they left the target.
ANNEX NUMBER ONE . . . . . . . .

Quartermaster Supply
I. Summary. During the Army's advance to the Winter Line quartermaster supply was hampered by a combination of circumstances. Perhaps the most important was the damage to the harbor and port installations of Naples, which severely limited the amount of supplies that could be unloaded during most of October. While Fifth Army was never without the amount of rations and petroleum required for operation, the port's limited capacity sharply reduced the supply levels.

Other factors seriously affected the flow of adequate supplies to the Army and in some cases caused shortages which threatened to become serious. Unexpectedly high maintenance rates, shortage of shipping, the demands of other theaters of operations, inadequate stocks in North Africa and the United States, the delay of shipments from the Zone of the Interior or Base Sections, and the time-lag between the order and the delivery of supplies all contributed to the Quartermaster's problems. To one or more of these factors could be attributed the shortages of soap, socks, intrenching tools, components of the B rations, and waterproof footwear. Along with the slow discharge of cargoes at Naples, they largely explain the fact that Fifth Army did not receive an adequate supply of woolen clothing until after 1 November.

Another serious problem was the transportation of quartermaster supplies from Naples and the Salerno beaches to the forward areas. German demolitions at bridges and culverts, an inadequate network of supply routes, and the limited usefulness of railroads clogged the roads with traffic and put a serious strain upon the motor transport system. Though required in mountainous terrain, pack trains were hard to procure and at best were a slow means of pushing supplies forward. The difficulties of transportation were surmounted, though in some cases barely in time to meet the needs of tactical situations.
2. Reduction of Supply Levels. When the Allies entered Naples on September 30, they found the port a shambles and its normal capacity of 8000 tons cut to 10% of its usefulness. Allied air raids and German demolitions had wrecked the docks and warehouses along the waterfront. The pipelines had been ripped up and the unloading machinery systematically destroyed. Allied bombers, moreover, had taken a heavy toll of German shipping at Naples, leaving a trail of sunken and half-submerged hulks. As if that were not enough to prevent the Allies from using the port facilities, the Germans had scuttled ships at their berths and had sunk others in the harbor.

In spite of the herculean labors of the port personnel the facilities at Naples were not easily or quickly restored to use. While repairs were being made, supplies were transferred from Liberty ships to Dukws and small landing craft which ferried them ashore. This method of unloading slowed up the transfer of supplies from the harbor to the port and reduced the levels in Army dumps to dangerously low points. Although the ships in the harbor were bursting with rations on 6 October, the Army had only enough for four days' supply. During most of the period 25 September-17 October the troops received only occasional tobacco issues, while convoys loaded with millions of cigarettes awaited discharge. By 12 October the levels of gasoline had been so reduced that the Army had only three days' supply on hand. Throughout the first half of October Class I and III supplies were being issued from Army dumps faster than they were being received from the ships. On 1-14 October the average daily receipts of Class I supplies were 427 tons; the issues, 501 tons. For the same period the average daily receipts of Class III were 445 tons; the issues, 582 tons.

Until repairs restored the port's facilities, some ships continued to discharge their cargoes at the beaches south of Salerno. There the limited unloading capacity and a violent wind and rain storm on 28 September curtailed the flow of supplies and reduced the levels in Army dumps. For two and one-half days high winds and a rough sea prevented unloading at the beaches. Fifty-six small craft, LCM's and LCVP's, as well as 28 LCT's, were put out of commission; 1 coaster was beached; and the 6 cubicle-ponton-bridge unloading ramps were broached. Nevertheless, by 14 October repair of the port installations had progressed so far that unloading of American supplies was stopped at the Salerno beaches and transferred to Naples. At the same time the British 10 Corps, which in the early phase of Operation Avalanche had supplied its forces through the port of Salerno (capacity, 3000 tons daily), was unloading at Naples, Torre Annunziata, Castellamare, and Salerno.

The loss of rations due to enemy action, handling by civilian personnel, and the arrival of some 15,000 troops not originally planned for was more than
offset by the small numbers of prisoners to be fed. In planning, provision had been made for the feeding of some 50,000 prisoners, most of whom were expected to be Italians. The armistice, which was announced on 8 September, made most of these rations surplus.

3. Transportation. The transportation of supplies to forward troops was made extremely difficult throughout the entire period by the demolitions created by the retreating forces. While the engineer troops performed a magnificent job of building bridges and by-passes, the extent of these demolitions did not permit a two-way traffic throughout the mountainous supply routes. Strict traffic control materially aided the delivery of supplies. Difficulty was encountered with the roads when the rainy season arrived and by-passes had to be hard-surfaced. In one instance 1200 tons of rock were necessary to make the approaches to one bridge passable.

For the transportation of quartermaster supplies the railroads had a limited usefulness. The Germans had torn up the tracks, damaged the locomotives, most of which were electric, and rendered the power lines useless. During the Army's advance to and across the Volturno the repair of the railroad from Naples to Caserta proceeded slowly. By 15 October the number of locomotives in service had increased to 6 and an additional 16 were being repaired. The line, completed as far as Aversa by the end of October, was extended to Maddaloni on 4 November and to Caserta a few days later.

The Army's advance into the mountains where no roads or trails existed required increasing use of pack trains. In many cases only mules or horses could reach the forward areas. The only pack train in Fifth Army was the one which the 3d Division had used in Sicily and brought with it to Italy. During the early days of the Italian campaign General Clark foresaw the use of this means of transportation. On 27 September he wrote to the Chief of Staff: "As I look at the map it appears that our future operations, as we wind our way to the north in Italy, will be through mountainous terrain. I am impressed with the pack train which the 3d Division has. We are going to need more of this type of transportation. Please have a study made, estimating our future requirements and recommending to me the best way to fulfill them." As a result of this study it was determined that 1300 mules were needed by the Army and that few could be secured from local sources. A requisition, placed with Peninsular Base Section for 900 animals, produced a total of 316, although the countryside was scoured for three weeks.

There was a noticeable shortage of pack equipment in Italy and North Africa. Shoes, nails, halters, and saddles were not available in sufficient quantities. Because of the inadequate supply of horseshoeing equipment, a daily
average of 72 animals from the 34th Division Pack Train could not be used during November. In the main the equipment was secured from local sources or was made by Italian blacksmiths and saddlers.

Suitable feed was equally hard to find. In North Africa the grain stocks were needed for the French units, and in Italy the retreating Germans had taken or destroyed much of the forage. Not only were hay and straw scarce, but the Italian grains lacked proper nutritive content. Over a two-week period in November the 3d Division mules lost 50 pounds each, using pressed Italian feed.

The damage to the installations at Naples hampered the delivery of petroleum from supply ships to the Army. Before evacuating the port the Germans had destroyed storage tanks with a capacity of 1,500,000 barrels, ripped up the pipelines, and left the unloading machinery a mass of rubble and scrap iron. Although tankers could enter the harbor, they could not unload until extensive repairs were made. During October much reconstruction work was accomplished. By the end of the month petroleum storage tanks with a capacity of 600,000 barrels had been repaired, one 4-inch pipeline had been laid from the docks to the tanks, and the construction of another line was well advanced. When the first tanker arrived on 29 October, bulk unloading was possible.

According to the plans of Allied Force Headquarters a pipeline would follow the advance of Fifth Army up the Italian peninsula. A double 4-inch pipeline would be laid to Cassino or Frosinone, from which a single 4-inch line would be built to Rome. The petroleum requirements of Fifth Army were not expected to exceed the capacity of one single 4-inch line, leaving the second for the use of Eighth Army. After the capture of the Italian capital and the reconstruction of the port facilities at Civitavecchia, the pipeline from Naples would be salvaged and relaid north of Rome. Work on the first leg of the pipeline from Naples to Fertilia was begun on 30 October and completed on 12 November. By this means a daily average of 250 tons of truck cargo space was saved and diverted to other purposes, and traffic was reduced on 12 miles of the overcrowded highway.

Beginning on 8 November, 2000-gallon tankers were used to transport bulk gasoline to the Army Base Dump at Caserta. There it was placed in 5-gallon cans or 55-gallon drums and shipped by truck to forward distributing points. During 12 November-12 December tankers delivered 80,000 gallons daily from Fertilia to Caserta. The remaining petroleum requirements of the Army were filled by truck delivery of packaged petroleum directly from the port of Naples.

4. Class I. Although supply levels dropped during the first part of October, there was always enough food to provide each man with rations, and in spite of some deficiencies the B ration was made available. During the period 1 October-30 November the issue of B rations increased from 43% to 76%, while
the issue of C rations decreased from 21% to 8%. The issue of the D type remained negligible. By far the greatest change made was in the issues to non-combat troops. As for the hard-type rations, the C and K types, complaints were made as to their lack of variety and their unpalatability. Most disliked were the meat and vegetable stew and hash in the C type and the biscuits and dextro-maltose tablets in the K rations.

Vitamin and caloric deficiencies in the rations were revealed by medical studies. The vitamin deficiency in all types was found to be an important cause of pyodermia, a skin disease that became a problem in the 3d Division. Relief of this deficiency was hampered by the shortage of multi-vitamin tablets. Owing to depleted theater supply, few tablets were received by Fifth Army during October and November. Besides the vitamin deficiency the C rations were found to have a caloric deficit for troops who were undergoing strenuous exercise in mountainous terrain and cold weather.

Notwithstanding their shortcomings the B rations were improved considerably. As the weather grew colder, efforts were made to provide more hot drinks each day for combat troops. On 11 October General Clark requested an increase of the coffee allowance from 4 pounds per 100 men to 8 pounds per 100 men. Although the request was approved promptly by Services of Supply, Natousa, shortages in the North African Theater and the time required to secure supply from the United States prevented issue of the increased allowance until 12 November. Coffee then began to be issued to front-line troops at the rate of 4 pounds per 100 men with the C, K, and 5-1 types. The increased issue was made possible by the reduction or elimination of the coffee allowance in the Army rear areas and the Peninsular Base Section.

The repair of the cold storage facilities in the Naples area and the arrival of refrigerator ships from the United States late in October resulted in the first issue of fresh frozen fruits and meats. By the use of 10 five-ton mobile refrigeration vans, these items were delivered to the forward truckheads 3 times each week. Owing to the fact that civilian needs were given priority, only a few issues of fresh fruits and vegetables were made during October. The following month they were issued 15 times.

During this period two quartermaster bakery companies were brought into the theater. They provided approximately one-half of the bread ration; the remainder was made up by issue of bread ingredients or C ration biscuits.

Before leaving North Africa General Clark had requested an issue of Coleman stoves to heat the C rations for the front-line troops. Receipt of these stoves began in October, but the needs of the troops were not met until some months later.
One result of the limited harbor facilities at Naples was the low level of the tobacco supply. Priority of issue during this period was given to front-line troops, but the rear area units were more seriously affected. Even though issues to the former were omitted only eight days, General Truscott considered this a "serious threat to the morale and efficiency of combat troops." Temporary relief was obtained by emergency air shipments from the Island Base Section in Sicily. On 15 and 16 October General Clark sent his personal plane to Palermo for tobacco components. Each day a truck met the plane at Capodichino Airport and rushed the tobacco to front-line troops. In compliance with the Army Commander's instructions none of these emergency shipments were issued to troops in rear areas or even to hospital patients, except when the amounts exceeded the needs of the combat troops. In this manner enough tobacco was obtained to supply the front-line troops until the convoys at Naples discharged their cargoes and other shipments arrived by coaster from Sicily. Besides shortages the issue of off-brand cigarettes caused considerable dissatisfaction. The troops wanted only the more popular brands to which they were accustomed.

The shortage of soap was seriously felt in the early months of the campaign. Frequently the supply was insufficient for the operation of the laundries servicing the hospitals. On one occasion germicidal rinse was issued to meet the emergency when this critical item could not be secured.

5. Class II. Owing to the slow unloading at Naples and the delay in shipments from New York, the troops did not receive full issues of T/BA woolen clothing until after cold weather had started. Before 1 November few units were equipped with heavy underwear, overcoats, wool gloves, or the second pair of O.D. trousers. Although the Army Quartermaster requested that these items be shipped on D plus 12, priority could not be obtained until the D plus 24 convoy. As it happened, even that schedule was not followed. Shipments from New York arrived in the theater later than expected, and the damage to the port of Naples delayed the dispatch of woolens from North Africa. After the clothing arrived at Naples, delivery to the troops was further hampered by the slow rate at which ships could discharge their cargoes.

On 1 November the need for woolens was so acute that the Army Quartermaster urgently requested the Peninsular Base Section to expedite the shipments. One hundred truckloads of clothing were needed each day to meet the immediate requirements of the Army, especially the front-line units. Finally, to speed up the issues, the Army unloaded the clothing directly from shipside to trucks which carried it to the Class II and IV dump at Santa Maria. By this means 80% of the divisions' requisitions were filled by 7 November.
The issue of woolen clothing did not meet the needs of combat conditions in Italy. The field jacket was not warm or durable enough; the overcoat was too heavy and cumbersome. Even the O.D. shirts and trousers were not sufficient for use in extremely cold weather. All the infantry divisions regarded the combat suits as the only desirable clothing for winter operations. Fifth Army's needs were recognized by the War Department and the Theater Commander before Operation Avalanche was mounted. On September 1, General Dwight D. Eisenhower informed the War Department that a restudy of Fifth Army's requirements revealed that mountain or arctic clothing was needed for 50,000 men. They were expected to be fighting in altitudes above 2500 feet and in temperatures of zero or below. An order was placed for 60,000 combat jackets and trousers which Fifth Army would use.

An attempt to increase the order for combat suits was not successful. Although Fifth Army asked for 100,000, only half that amount could be furnished. At the time when the request was made, combat suits were no longer being procured in the Zone of the Interior and were not available in North Africa. Other theaters placed heavy demands upon the stocks in the United States. In spite of the efforts to secure combat suits and arctic clothing, none arrived in Italy until the end of November.

Although frequent rains required that the troops be supplied with wool socks and waterproof footwear, neither was available in sufficient quantities until after December 1. It was estimated that only 10% of the Army's sock requirements were filled during October. So critical was the shortage at one time that the Army Quartermaster could scrape up only 500 pairs for the 45th Division, which had requested 16,000. The shortage of socks was caused by an unexpectedly high rate of maintenance, due primarily to the rough terrain over which the troops were operating. This shortage was instrumental in a large number of trench-foot cases and similar ailments. An increase in maintenance requirements, which was requested by the Army Commander, relieved the situation. The number of arctics which were received was sufficient to equip no more than a handful of troops. The need for arctic overshoes, estimated at 230,000, could not be met because of the rubber shortage. Nevertheless, a limited number were made available.

The clothing normally carried in the individual barracks bag was of little use to the soldier, as it could not be stored near the front lines. The long period that troops remained in action prevented their making use of these articles. Accordingly all outer clothing not worn by the men was turned into supply channels and reissues were made as requested.
QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES

OCTOBER - NOVEMBER

**CHART I**

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**CHART II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Daily</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>5-1 &amp; 10-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>5,768,685</td>
<td>186,087</td>
<td>2,473,621</td>
<td>1,205,941</td>
<td>18,772</td>
<td>636,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>5,279,693</td>
<td>175,990</td>
<td>4,022,300</td>
<td>372,517</td>
<td>29,420</td>
<td>416,473</td>
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</table>

**CHART III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tobacco</th>
<th>Toilet Arts.</th>
<th>Candy</th>
<th>Soap</th>
<th>Bread (pounds)</th>
<th>Meat (issues)</th>
<th>Butter (issues)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>2,427,978</td>
<td>2,534,404</td>
<td>2,939,284</td>
<td>126,635</td>
<td>730,788</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>3,555,108</td>
<td>3,257,334</td>
<td>4,221,887</td>
<td>318,745</td>
<td>1,732,380</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHART IV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>V-80</th>
<th>Diesel</th>
<th>Kerosene</th>
<th>Lubricating Oils</th>
<th>Greases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>4,326,514</td>
<td>283,299</td>
<td>5,491</td>
<td>72,927</td>
<td>52,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>3,820,960</td>
<td>119,781</td>
<td>16,130</td>
<td>78,048</td>
<td>40,805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72
Operations Instructions
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: Hq. 15th Army Group

REF No: 0-1202

PRIORITY: Urgent

DATE: 292330 Sept/43

DATE REC'D: 300448 Sept/43

To: 5 Army, 8 Army, repeated AFHQ, C-IN-C, Med, MAC, TAF, No. 2 District.

1. Before beginning the second phase of future operations, certain airfields, ports, and centers of road communications will be secured. These future operations will be conducted in two phases. Firm base will be established on the districts gained, but light mobile forces will operate to the front against enemy rearguards and keep up active patrolling.

2. Phase I: To secure Port of NAPLES together with airfields north of that city, and Foggia Airfields. In Phase I will be included capture general line SESSA AURUNCA (H 9392) – VENAFRO (H 0320) – ISERNIA (H 1931) – CASTROPIGNANO (H 4635) – BIFERNO River – TERMOLI (H 8278). Above references to 1/100,000 map.

3. Phase II: To include capture of general line CIVITAVECCHIA – TERNI – VISSO – SAN BENEDETTO DEL TRONTO, airdrome, and airfields in the area.

4. Between Fifth and Eighth Armies the present boundary will be extended as follows (1/100,000 map refers): inclusive Fifth Army BENEVENTO – thence (all inclusive Eighth Army) road PONTELANDOLFO-ISERNIA to road junction southwest CELANO – thence SALTO River to RIETI – thence road TERNI-S. GEMINI-TODI.

5. Points of junction: Phase I ISERNIA; Phase II TERNI.

6. At a suitable date it is intended to transfer 10 Corps to Eighth Army. This will probably be when Phase I has been completed by both armies.
In accordance with 15th Army Group instruction, future operations of the Fifth and Eighth Armies will be conducted in two phases as follows:

a. **Phase 1**
   1) Fifth Army to secure the Port of NAPLES together with airfields north of the city.
   2) Eighth Army to secure Foggia airfields.
   3) This phase will include capture of the general line Termoli (H 8275) – Biferno River – Castropignano (H 4635) – Isernia (H 1931) – Venafro (H 0320) – Sessa Aurunca (M 9392). Point of junction Isernia.
   4) Before beginning the second phase, a firm base will be established in the areas gained but light mobile forces will operate to the front and keep up active patrolling.

b. **Phase 2**
   1) Both Armies to secure airdromes and airfields in respective zones of action.
   2) This phase will include capture of general line San Benedetto del Tronto (R) (B 9184) – Visso (R) (B 2582) – Terni (R) (A 8941) – Civitavecchia (R) (F 1790).
   3) Point of junction – Terni.


3. The Commanding General, 15th Army Group, has indicated his intention to transfer 10 Corps to Eighth Army at a suitable date, after phase 1 has been completed.

4. a. In accordance with the above instructions, Fifth Army will continue its present advance to secure phase line 1.
b. The advance to the objective will be made with Corps abreast VI Corps on the right.


d. 10 Corps will push its attack to the VOI/TURNO, force the crossings of that river and continue the advance on the first phase line. Due to the present location of the VI Corps, the advance of 10 Corps will not await the arrival of the VI Corps abreast of it, but will advance as rapidly as the situation permits. Operations outside of zone of action by either Corps will be coordinated with the other Corps and this headquarters notified.

e. VI Corps will capture BENEVENTO and secure the crossing of the CALORE River in that area using initially not to exceed one division. As soon as the crossings are secured, this division, moving by roads northwest of BENEVENTO, will advance to the first phase line. The remainder of the Corps, moving northwest by road between BENEVENTO and Corps boundary, will move forward with all speed in the Corps zone of action.

5. After 6 October the 36th Division, now in Army Reserve, is available to VI Corps on call in exchange for another division to be placed in Army Reserve.

CLARK
Commanding

Official:
BRANN
G-3
1. a. The Fifth Army continues its attack northwest to seize the line
ISERNIA (exclusive) – VENAFRO – SESSA AURUNCA.

b. Boundaries: See Overlay.

2. Plan of Operations:
   a. VI Corps will:
      1) Concentrate a force of two divisions (less dets) as indicated
         on the overlay without delay. This force to be prepared on
         Army order to attack in the direction of TEANO.
      2) On the night of 9-10 October with one division force the crossing
         of the VOLTURNO in the vicinity of TRIFILISCO and attack
         NW along the high ground running NW from TRIFILISCO.
      3) Protect the right flank of the Army.
      4) Maintain contact with Eighth Army.

b. X Corps will:
   1) On the night of 10-11 October force the crossings of the VOL-
      TURNO within its zone of action and attack to the NW to
      seize the high ground N and NE of MONDRAGONE.
   2) Be responsible for arranging for Naval gun fire in support of
      the Corps.

c. Coordination:
   1) In order to meet the dates set for the above operations, it is
      essential that the VI Corps concentrate two divisions in the
      area indicated with the utmost speed.
   2) Corps Commanders will arrange for mutual support of the
      operations in the CAPUA – TRIFILISCO area.

d. Army Reserve.
   1) The 36th Division with present attachments will be moved
      immediately into the area NW of NOLA. Movement to be
coordinated by VI Corps with Army Traffic Control so as not to interfere with movement of supplies to Avellino.

2) The 82d Airborne Division will continue on present mission and will make plans to drop one parachute battalion in the Sessa Aurunca area with the mission of interrupting communications and blocking the withdrawal of enemy forces to the NW.

e. Air Support.

Fifth Army will arrange for an intensive bombardment of all appropriate targets on the front of both Corps. Corps will submit requests for specific missions.

f. Amphibious Landing.

Army is preparing plans for an amphibious landing on the beaches north of Mondragone with one RCT (36th Div). The force will have the mission of assisting 10 Corps in the capture of the high ground N and NE of Mondragone and of blocking the retreat of enemy forces to the NW. Present indications are that the area in which the landing will be made is strongly held by enemy forces. This operation will be ordered only if the indications are that the main attacks by 10 Corps and VI Corps have drawn a major portion of enemy forces now in the landing area to other localities.

CLARK
Commanding

Official:

BRANN
G-3
I. Confirming verbal orders issued by Army Commander at 1530, 14 October, boundary between Corps north of VOLTURNO River changed as shown.

2. No change in boundary south of the VOLTURNO River. Movement of 10 Corps troops within VI Corps zone of action south of the VOLTURNO River and over bridge near TRIFLISCO (N 213806) by agreement between Commanding General, 3d Division, and Commanding General, 56 Division.

CLARK
Commanding

Official:
BRANN
G-3
1. a. The Eighth Army continues its advance on our right. The present positions of its leading elements are: BOJANA (H 3919) – BARANELLO (H 4625) – MONTAGANO (H 5638) – LUCITO (H 5747) – M. PELOSI (H 6958) – PETACCIATO (H 7280).
    b. The XII Air Support Command continues to support the Fifth Army. The number of all weather fields from which this force can operate during inclement weather is steadily being increased.

2. a. The Fifth Army continues its attack to the northwest to seize the line ISENNA (H 1932) (exclusive) – M. PASSERO (G 9629) – GARIGLIANO River from G 9011 to the sea.
    b. Boundary between Armies and between Corps as shown on overlay.

3. a. 10 Corps.
    1) The 10 Corps making its main effort on its right will secure terrain objectives as shown on overlay and push light forces forward to seize the indicated phase line within its zone of action.
    2) Maintain contact with VI Corps on its right.

b. VI Corps.
    1) The VI Corps making its main effort on its left will seize the terrain objectives indicated and push light forces forward to seize the indicated phase line within its zone of action.
    2) Maintain contact with Eighth Army on its right.
    3) Protect the right of the Army.

c. Both Corps will push rapidly forward within their zones of action thereby facilitating the advance of the other Corps.

d. Operations to be conducted by either Corps in zone of action of the other will be coordinated between Corps Commanders prior to execution. This headquarters will be notified.
4. On completion of the current mission of seizing the line indicated in 3a the Fifth Army will, without delay, continue its advance to the general line Opici (G 8353) (exclusive) – Alvito (G 7943) – Arce (G 6431) – Fondo (G 5206). The general plan of advance to this line is as follows:

   a. Main forces of 10 Corps to remain in positions; light forces to maintain pressure on the enemy along the entire Corps front and, by patrols, movements of troops and massing of fire, give indications of forcing the crossing of the Garigliano with a main effort in the Minturno area. It is not planned to force the crossing of this river with large forces.

   b. The II Corps, consisting of the 36th Division, one other division and certain supporting troops, will be put into action generally in the zone of action now held by 10 Corps. When the hill mass that lies between Formia and Pontecorvo has been cleared of the enemy by the II Corps, 10 Corps less corps artillery and certain engineer and other service troops as may be required, will pass to Army Reserve, on Army Order, in the general area south of Highway No. 6 (exclusive) between the Garigliano and Volturino Rivers. Exact area later.

   c. VI Corps, consisting of two divisions and certain supporting troops, will continue operations as the right (north) Corps, generally north of Highway No. 6.

                     CLARK
                     Commanding

Official:

   BRANN
   G-3
### CASUALTIES, U. S. FORCES

7 OCTOBER - 15 NOVEMBER 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed in Action</th>
<th>Wounded in Action</th>
<th>Missing in Action</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>79</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>416</td>
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<td>544</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>177</td>
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<td>186</td>
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<td>57</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Killed in Action | Wounded in Action | Missing in Action | Total
---|---|---|---
1 November | 27 | 158 | 13 | 198
2 » | 5 | 73 | | 78
3 » | 24 | 85 | | 109
4 » | 94 | 363 | 34 | 491
5 » | 44 | 230 | 8 | 282
6 » | 65 | 276 | 29 | 370
7 » | 73 | 217 | 6 | 296
8 » | 90 | 290 | 9 | 389
9 » | 74 | 223 | 15 | 312
10 » | 55 | 200 | 14 | 269
11 » | 46 | 194 | 2 | 242
12 » | 37 | 149 | 1 | 187
13 » | 57 | 171 | 9 | 237
14 » | 13 | 76 | 8 | 97
15 » | 14 | 71 | | 85
Total | 1374 | 5183 | 286 | 6843

Casualties were not recorded daily by 10 Corps, but the British total for the period 7 October - 15 November was (as available on 16 November):

Killed in Action | Wounded in Action | Missing in Action | Total
---|---|---|---
443 | 2007 | 397 | 2847
## MAJOR ORDNANCE LOSSES

**30 SEPTEMBER - 11 NOVEMBER 1943**

### STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, MG, cal .30, M1917A1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, MG, cal .30, M1919A4</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, MG, cal .50, M2, HB</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, MG, cal .50, M2, WC</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, sub MG, cal .45, Thompson, M1928A1, M1 &amp; M1A1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, auto., cal .30, Browning, M1918, A1 &amp; A2</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 60-mm, M2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar, 81-mm, M1</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### STANDARD NOMENCLATURE LIST GROUP B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bayonet, M1905 &amp; M1917</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbine, cal .30, M1 &amp; M1A1</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife, trench, M1, M2, M3</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, grenade, M1</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, grenade, M2</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, rocket, AT, M1</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, auto., cal .45, M1911, M1911A1</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, pyro, M2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, Very, 10 Gauge, MK III, IV &amp; V</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projector, signal, ground, M4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, US, cal .30, M1903 &amp; M1903A1</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, US, cal .30, M1903A4, snipers</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, US, cal .30, M1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standard Nomenclature List Group C</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, 57-mm, carriage M1A1, M1A2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun, 57-mm, M1 &amp; carriage M1A1, M1A2 (w/o mount or telescope)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, 75-mm (pack), M1, M1A1 &amp; carriage M1A1, M1A2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Howitzer, 105-mm, M2, M2A1, CRG, M1A1, M2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer, 155-mm, M1917, M1918 &amp; carriage M1917, M1918</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard Nomenclature List Group D</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gun, 90-mm, M1 &amp; M1A1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard Nomenclature List Group G</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, Dodge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car, half-track, M2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Car, half-track, M9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Car, scout, M3A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carriage, motor, 3-inch gun, M10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle, chain driven, Harley-Davidson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-trailer, 2 wheel, cargo, 10 ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, light, M5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank, medium, M4 &amp; M4A1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trailer, 1/4 ton payload, 2 wheel cargo</td>
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<td>Trailer, 1 ton payload, 2 wheel cargo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trailer, 45 ton, tank transporter, M9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, amphibian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x 4, Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, WC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, carryall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 3/4 ton, 4 x 4, C &amp; R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 1 1/2 ton, 4 x 4, dump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, amphibian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, cargo, LWB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, LWB, w/winch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, cargo, SWB w/o winch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, cargo, SWB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, CO E 15' special body w/troop seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, dump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6 x 6, 750 gal. gas tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 4 ton, 6 x 6, wrecker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 4 ton, 6 x 6, cargo w/winchen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 4-5 ton, 4 x 4, tractor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck, 6 ton, 6 x 6, prime-mover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle, tank recovery, T-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX NUMBER FOUR . . . . . . . . . .

Fifth Army Staff
Chief of Staff          Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther
Deputy Chief of Staff  Col. Charles E. Saltzman
Secretary, General Staff Lt. Col. Ira W. Porter
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 Col. Cheney L. Bertholf
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Col. Edwin B. Howard
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Brig. Gen. Donald W. Brann
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 Col. Ralph H. Tate
Antiaircraft Artillery Officer Col. Joseph S. Robinson
Adjutant General        Col. Melville F. Grant
Artillery Officer        Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Lewis
Chaplain                Lt. Col. Patrick J. Ryan
Chemical Officer         Col. Maurice E. Barker
Engineer Officer         Col. Frank O. Bowman
Finance Officer          Col. Clarence B. Lindner
Inspector General        Col. Irving C. Avery
Judge Advocate General   Col. Claude B. Mickelwait
Medical Officer          Col. Joseph I. Martin
Ordnance Officer         Col. Urban Niblo
Quartermaster            Col. Joseph P. Sullivan
Signal Officer           Brig. Gen. Richard B. Moran
Troop List of Fifth Army

15 November 1943
FIFTH ARMY TROOPS

Headquarters, Fifth Army
Special Troops, Fifth Army
   Headquarters Detachment, Special Troops
   Headquarters Company, Fifth Army
   Attached:

   Band, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
   Battery A, 630th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
   2616th Engineer Utilities Platoon
   22d Quartermaster Car Company
   541st, 542d, 543d, 547th, and 549th Army Postal Units
   Company A, 756th Tank Battalion (Light)
   101st Military Police Battalion
   13th and 33d Finance Disbursing Sections
   30th Signal Construction Battalion [-Company A]
   51st Signal Battalion
   63d Signal Battalion; attached:

   Detachment D, 71st Signal Company (Special)
   Detachment A, 117th Signal Company (Radio Intercept); attached:
   4119-S and 4119-T Radio Direction Finding Detachments
   6681st Signal Pigeon Company (Provisional)
   Attached from 15th Army Group:
   Detachment, 55 Wireless Section, 15th Army Group Signals
   Teams 2 and 6, 2650th Signal Radio Relay Station Company
   105 Special Wireless Section
   Attached British Units:
   44 Wireless Telegraphy Intercept Section
   31 Cipher Section
71st Signal Company (Special) [-Detachments A, C, and D]
163d Signal Photo Company
180th Signal Repair Company [-2 Detachments]; attached:
   89th Signal Inspection and Maintenance Team
212th Signal Depot Company
229th Signal Operating Company
Attached from AFHQ:
   Detachment, 2680th Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (Provisional)
   305th Counter Intelligence Corps Section
   Detachment, AFHQ, Cen Public Relations Office and Liaison Group
   Detachment, AFHQ, G-2 Section
   Detachment, AFHQ, Document Section
   Detachment, Office of Strategic Services

Attached British Units:
   "Q" Air Liaison Section (Photo Reconnaissance Unit)
   3 Special Intelligence (B) Unit Type A

Antiaircraft Artillery:

45th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
   4th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached:
      3d Battalion, 68th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
      3d Battalion, 209th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
      3d Battalion, 213th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
      3d Battalion, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
      351st AAA Searchlight Battalion

9th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached:
   410th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion; attached:
      3d Platoon, Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion
      Battery A, 505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)
   630th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [-Battery A]

107th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached:
   400th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [-Battery D]
   409th AAA Gun Battalion (Semi-Mobile)
209th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-2d and 3d Battalions]
213th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-3d Battalion]; attached:
   505th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-Battery A, 3d Battalion, and Band]
   6673d Gun Operations Room Platoon (Provisional)
201st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Semi-Mobile)
439th and 532d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions
102d Barrage Balloon Battery (Very Low Altitude); attached:
   Detachment, 104th Barrage Balloon Battery (VLA)
688th, 689th, 690th, 691st, 692d, and 693d AAA Machine Gun Batteries (Airborne)
6672d Gun Operations Room Platoon (Provisional)
401st AAA Gun Battalion
Attached:
   24th Chemical Company (Decon) [-Detachment]
   168th, 172d, and 179th Chemical Companies (Smoke Generating)
Attached British Units:
   22 Anti-aircraft Artillery Brigade
   574 Coast Regiment [Headquarters only]

Armored Force:

1st Armored Division

   Headquarters and Headquarters Company
   Service Company
   1st Armored Division Trains, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
   Maintenance Battalion
   Supply Battalion
   47th Armored Medical Battalion
   81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
   16th Armored Engineer Battalion [-Company E]
   27th, 68th, and 91st Armored Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer]
   6th Armored Infantry Regiment
   1st Armored Regiment
   13th Armored Regiment
   141st Armored Signal Company
   Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Combat Command B
FIFTH ARMY TROOPS (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Attached:

701st Tank Destroyer Battalion
2d Battalion, 209th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA)

Chemical:

6th Chemical Company (Depot) [-Detachment]

Engineers:

1st Engineer Special Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Company

531st Engineer Shore Regiment
161st Ordnance Platoon
361st Quartermaster Truck Battalion
261st Medical Battalion
3497th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q)
286th Signal Company

337th and 343d Engineer General Service Regiments
540th Engineer Combat Regiment
Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion [-2d, 3d, and 4th Platoons]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters and Service Company, 85th Engineer Battalion
Company A, 85th Engineer Heavy Ponton Battalion
Company A, 1105th Engineer Water Supply Battalion [-1st Platoon]
425th Engineer Dump Truck Company
427th Engineer Dump Truck Company [-2d Platoon]
469th Engineer Maintenance Company
2699th Engineer Map Depot Detachment

Field Artillery:

18th Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
932d, 936th, and 937th Field Artillery Battalions [155-mm Howitzers]

General:

29th Replacement Battalion
Fifth Army Photo Center

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Infantry:

82d Airborne Infantry Division
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
80th Airborne Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
307th Airborne Engineer Battalion [-Company C]
82d Airborne Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
319th and 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalions [75-mm Pack Howitzer]
325th Glider Infantry Regiment
505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
307th Airborne Medical Company
782d Airborne Ordnance Maintenance Company
407th Airborne Quartermaster Company
82d Airborne Signal Company
Military Police Platoon

Medical:

3d Convalescent Hospital
8th, 16th, 38th, and 56th Evacuation Hospitals (750 Bed)
10th Field Hospital
12th Medical Depot Supply Company
15th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile); attached:
  Surgical Teams 14 and 19, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group
93d Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile)
94th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed) (Semi-Mobile); attached:
  Surgical Teams 1, 4, 10, and 12
  Orthopedic Teams 3 and 5
95th Evacuation Hospital (400 Bed)
161st Medical Battalion (Separate), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
  401st, 402d, and 403d Collecting Companies
601st Clearing Company
162d Medical Battalion (Separate), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
  404th and 405th Collecting Companies
602d Clearing Company
Attached:
  Company B, 36th Ambulance Battalion [-3d Platoon]
Military Police:

504th Military Police Battalion [-Company B]
379th Military Police Escort Guard Company

Ordnance:

6694th Ordnance Base Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (Provisional)

77th, 79th, and 189th Ordnance Depot Companies
330th Ordnance Company (Motor Transport Service) (Q)
411th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
684th Ordnance Ammunition Company
878th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Q)
42d Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)

46th and 94th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies
3488th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q)

45th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)

14th, 45th, and 101st Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies
3485th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company (Q)

Attached:

29th and 112th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies

62d Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)

53d, 58th, 66th, and 2652d Ordnance Ammunition Companies
3d Platoon, 236th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Company

87th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)

109th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
3407th and 3487th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies (Q)

188th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)
86th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company
87th, 525th, and 529th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Companies (Tank)
477th Ordnance Evacuation Company
1st Provisional Ordnance Recovery and Evacuation Platoon
197th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)
82d Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (FA)
476th Ordnance Evacuation Company
907th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Q)
991st Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (Tank)
2622d Ordnance Tank Transporter Company

2630th Ordnance Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (w/atched Med)
28th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
93d, 261st, and 262d Ordnance Maintenance Companies (AA)

Attached:
48th Finance Disbursing Section

Quartermaster:

94th Quartermaster Battalion, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
204th Quartermaster General Service Battalion [-Company B]; attached:
Company A, 205th Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion
242d Quartermaster Service Battalion [-Company C]; attached:
1st Platoon, 212th Military Police Company
249th Quartermaster Service Battalion [-1 Company]
263d Quartermaster Service Battalion [-Company B]
47th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration) [-2d Platoon]
90th, 93d, 94th, and 98th Quartermaster Companies (Railhead)
102d Quartermaster Bakery Company
1st Platoon, Company B, 95th Quartermaster Bakery Battalion
230th Quartermaster Salvage Collecting Company [-1st Platoon]
487th Quartermaster Laundry Company

Rangers:

3d Ranger Infantry Battalion
Tank Destroyer:

1st Tank Destroyer Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Group
899th Tank Destroyer Battalion; attached:
   Detachment, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion

Transportation:

2618th Quartermaster Truck Battalion; attached:
   53d Quartermaster Battalion (Dukw) [-2 Companies]
   56th Quartermaster Truck Battalion
   468th Quartermaster Truck Battalion (Mobile), Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
   3641st, 3642d, and 3643d Quartermaster Truck Companies

Attached from AFHQ:

2675th Headquarters Company, Allied Military Government
   Mobile Stars and Stripes Unit

Attached from NATOUSA:

9th Machine Records Unit

Attached British Units:

7 Army Air Support Control
   Detachment A, Field Press Censor Section
   46 Survey Company (South African Expeditionary Corps)

II CORPS

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Antiaircraft Artillery (attached):

2626th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (Provisional)
   8th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached:
   403d AAA Gun Battalion
   534th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
   68th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-2d and 3d Battalions]
II Corps (continued)

Attached:
4th Platoon, Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion

Armored Force (attached):
1st Tank Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
757th Tank Battalion (Light)

Cavalry (attached):
91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron

Engineers:
1108th Engineer Combat Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
235th Engineer Combat Battalion
19th Engineer Combat Regiment; attached:
434th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
66th Engineer Topographical Company

Field Artillery (attached):
194th Field Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Company
194th Field Artillery Battalion [8-inch Howitzer]
985th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Gun]
995th Field Artillery Battalion [8-inch Howitzer]
77th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]

Finance (attached):
30th Finance Disbursing Section

Infantry:
36th Infantry Division

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
36th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
111th Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
36th Infantry Divisional Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
155th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer]
III Corps (continued)

111th Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
736th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
36th Quartermaster Company
36th Signal Company [-Detachment]
Military Police Platoon

141st Regimental Combat Team
  141st Infantry Regiment
  131st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
    Company A, 111th Engineer Battalion
    Company A, 111th Medical Battalion
    Detachment, 36th Signal Company

142d Regimental Combat Team
  142d Infantry Regiment
  132d Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
    Company B, 111th Engineer Battalion
    Company B, 111th Medical Battalion
    Detachment, 36th Signal Company

143d Regimental Combat Team
  143d Infantry Regiment
  133d Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
    Company C, 111th Engineer Battalion
    Company C, 111th Medical Battalion
    Detachment, 36th Signal Company

Attached:
  636th Tank Destroyer Battalion [-1st Platoon, Company C]
  443d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
  753d Tank Battalion (Medium)

Medical:
  54th Medical Battalion
  Attached:
    111th Field Hospital
    Shock Team 3, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group

Military Police:
  202d Military Police Company
Ordnance (attached):
   55th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad (Separate)

Quartermaster (attached):
   Company C, 242d Quartermaster Service Battalion

Signal:
   53d Signal Battalion; attached:
   Detachment A, 128th Signal Company (Radio Intercept); attached British Unit:
   52 Wireless Telegraphy Intercept Section

Transportation (attached):
   3644th Quartermaster Truck Company
   523d Quartermaster Car Company

Attached Italian Unit:
   1st Motorized Brigade

Attached from NATOUSA:
   25th Machine Records Unit

VI CORPS

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Antiaircraft Artillery (attached):
   35th AAA Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
   5th AAA Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; attached:
   432d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
   435th and 451st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalions
   67th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) [-3d Battalion]; attached:
   450th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
   Battery D, 400th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion
   Attached:
   2d Platoon, Company A, 84th Engineer Camouflage Battalion
VI CORPS (continued)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Armored Force (attached):

755th Tank Battalion (Medium)
Company B, 756th Tank Battalion (Light)

Chemical (attached):

2d Chemical Battalion (Motorized) [Companies C and D]

Engineers:

36th and 39th Engineer Combat Regiments
661st Engineer Topographical Company
Attached:

48th Engineer Combat Battalion
Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion
1st Platoon, Company A, 405th Engineer Water Supply Battalion
2d Platoon, 427th Engineer Dump Truck Company

Field Artillery (attached):

13th Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
17th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
36th Field Artillery Regiment [-2d Battalion] [155-mm Gun]
178th Field Artillery Regiment [-Batteries B and E] [155-mm Howitzer]
1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion

71st Field Artillery Brigade, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
35th Field Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
15th Field Artillery Observation Battalion
939th Field Artillery Battalion [4.5-inch Gun]
976th and 977th Field Artillery Battalions [155-mm Gun]

6th Armored Field Artillery Group, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment
69th and 93d Armored Field Artillery Battalions [105-mm Howitzer]

Infantry:

3d Infantry Division
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
10th Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
3d Infantry Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
  9th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer]
3d Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
703d Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
3d Quartermaster Company
3d Signal Company [-Detachments]
Military Police Platoon

7th Regimental Combat Team
  7th Infantry Regiment
    10th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
    Company A, 10th Engineer Battalion
    Company A, 3d Medical Battalion
    Detachment, 3d Signal Company

15th Regimental Combat Team
  15th Infantry Regiment
    39th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
    Company B, 10th Engineer Battalion
    Company B, 3d Medical Battalion
    Detachment, 3d Signal Company

30th Regimental Combat Team
  30th Infantry Regiment
    41st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
    Company C, 10th Engineer Battalion
    Company C, 3d Medical Battalion
    Detachment, 3d Signal Company

Attached:
Companies C and D, 2d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
441st AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
Battery B, 178th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
Orthopedic Team, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group
2d Platoon, 48th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
751st Tank Battalion (Medium)
601st Tank Destroyer Battalion
34th Infantry Division

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
34th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
109th Engineer Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
34th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
  185th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer]
109th Medical Battalion [-Companies A, B, and C]
2634th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
2635th Quartermaster Company
34th Signal Company
Military Police Platoon

133d Regimental Combat Team
  133d Infantry Regiment [-2d Battalion]
    100th Infantry Battalion (Separate)
  151st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Company A, 109th Engineer Battalion
Company A, 109th Medical Battalion

135th Regimental Combat Team
  135th Infantry Regiment
  125th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Company B, 109th Engineer Battalion
Company B, 109th Medical Battalion

168th Regimental Combat Team
  168th Infantry Regiment
  175th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
Company C, 109th Engineer Battalion
Company C, 109th Medical Battalion

Attached:

3d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
105th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
Battery E, 178th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Howitzer]
406th Collecting Company
2d Platoon, 47th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
Detachment B, 72d Signal Company (Special)
191st Tank Battalion (Medium)
776th Tank Destroyer Battalion
45th Infantry Division

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
45th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop (Mechanized)
120th Engineer Battalion [Companies A, B, and C]
45th Division Artillery, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
   189th Field Artillery Battalion [155-mm Howitzer]
120th Medical Battalion [Companies A, B, and C]
700th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
45th Quartermaster Company
45th Signal Company [-Detachments]
Military Police Platoon

157th Regimental Combat Team
   157th Infantry Regiment
   158th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
      Company A, 120th Engineer Battalion
      Company A, 120th Medical Battalion
      Detachment, 45th Signal Company

179th Regimental Combat Team
   179th Infantry Regiment
   160th Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
      Company B, 120th Engineer Battalion
      Company B, 120th Medical Battalion
      Detachment, 45th Signal Company

180th Regimental Combat Team
   180th Infantry Regiment
   171st Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]
      Company C, 120th Engineer Battalion
      Company C, 120th Medical Battalion
      Detachment, 45th Signal Company

Attached:

   84th Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
   106th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (Self-Propelled)
   2d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment
   3d Platoon, 48th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
   756th Tank Battalion (Light) [-Companies A and B]
   645th Tank Destroyer Battalion
VI CORPS (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1st Ranger Infantry Battalion; attached:
83d Chemical Battalion (Motorized)
504th Regimental Combat Team
504th Parachute Infantry Regiment
376th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion [75-mm Pack Howitzer
Company C, 307th Airborne Engineer Battalion
4th Ranger Infantry Battalion

Medical:

52d Medical Battalion
Attached:
33d Field Hospital
Surgical Teams 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 20, 23, and 25
Shock Teams 1, 2, and 4
Orthopedic Teams 1 and 2

Military Police:

206th Military Police Company
Attached:
Company B, 504th Military Police Battalion

Ordnance (attached):

56th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad (Separate)

Quartermaster:

3404th Quartermaster Truck Company
Attached:
Company B, 263d Quartermaster Service Battalion

Signal:

57th Signal Battalion
Attached:
Detachment C, 71st Signal Company (Special)
Detachment B, 128th Signal Company (Radio Intercept)
Detachment, 894th Signal Intercept Company
Tank Destroyer (attached):
805th and 894th Tank Destroyer Battalions

Attached British Unit:
1 Special Liaison Detachment (Cipher)

Attached from AFHQ:
6655th Pictorial Service Company (Provisional)

10 CORPS

Headquarters 10 Corps
10 Corps Protective Squadron

Anti-Aircraft Artillery:
12 Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery (RA)
9, 57, and 87 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA [each 24 3.7-inch Guns]
13, 14, and 152 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments RA [each 54 40-mm Guns]
56 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns]

Armoured Force:

2 Forward Tank Delivery Squadron, Royal Armoured Corps

7 Armoured Division

Headquarters 7 Armoured Division
11 Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) [armoured-car squadron]

Headquarters 7 Armoured Division Royal Artillery
3 Royal Horse Artillery [24 25-pounders]
5 Royal Horse Artillery [24 25-pounders]
65 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders]
15 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns]

7 Armoured Division Royal Engineers
7 Armoured Division Royal Signals
7 Armoured Division Royal Army Service Corps
7 Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park
7 Armoured Division Provost Company

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10 Corps (continued)

2 and 121 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps)
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
22 Armoured Brigade Workshop Company (REME)
131 Armoured Brigade Workshop Company (REME)

22 Armoured Brigade
1 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment
5 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment
4 City of London Yeomanry [tank battalion]
1 Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment [motorized infantry]

131 Infantry Brigade
1/5 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
1/6 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
1/7 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment

23 Armoured Brigade
23 Armoured Brigade Royal Signal Squadron
331 Armoured Brigade Company (Royal Army Service Corps)
23 Armoured Brigade Ordnance Field Park
150 Light Field Ambulance (Royal Army Medical Corps)
23 Armoured Brigade Workshop (Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers)

40 Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment
Royal Scots Greys (2d Dragoons) [tank battalion]

Engineers:

10 Corps Troops, Royal Engineers
14 GHQ Troops, Royal Engineers
15 Airfield Construction Group, Royal Engineers

Field Artillery:

2 Army Group Royal Artillery

23 and 121 Army Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders]
24 Army Field Regiment RA [24 105-mm SP]
142 Army Field Regiment RA [24 25-pounders SP]
146 Army Field Regiment RA [24 15-pounders]
5 and 74 Medium Regiments RA [16 5.5-inch Gun/Howitzers]
51 and 69 Medium Regiments RA [8 4.5-inch Guns; 8 5.5-inch Gun/Howitzers]
56 Medium Regiment RA [16 7.2-inch Gun/Howitzers]

57 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [48 6-pounders]
654 Air Observation Post Squadron
8 Survey Regiment RA

Attached American Units:

2d Battalion, 36th Field Artillery Regiment [155-mm Gun]
935th Field Artillery Battalion [4.5-inch Gun]
59th Armored Field Artillery Battalion [105-mm Howitzer]

Infantry and Commandos:

King's Dragoon Guards [armoured-car squadron]
Company C, 1 Battalion, (22) Cheshire Regiment [machine-gun battalion]
2 Commando
41 Royal Marine Commando

46 Infantry Division

Headquarters 46 Infantry Division
2 Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers [minus Bn Hq and 3 Support Group] [weapons battalion]

46 Division Royal Artillery

70, 71, and 172 Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders]
58 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders]
115 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns]

46 Infantry Division Royal Engineers
46 Infantry Division Royal Signals
46 Infantry Division Royal Army Service Corps
46 Infantry Division Ordnance Sub Park
46 Infantry Division Provost Company

183, 184, and 185 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps)

46 Infantry Division Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
46 Reconnaissance Regiment [battalion]
128 Infantry Brigade
1/4 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
2 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
5 Battalion, Hampshire Regiment

138 Infantry Brigade
6 Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment
2/4 Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
6 Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment

139 Infantry Brigade
2/5 Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment
2/5 Battalion, Sherwood Foresters
16 Battalion, Durham Light Infantry

56 (London) Infantry Division

Headquarters 56 (London) Infantry Division
6 Battalion, (22) Cheshire Regiment [machine-gun battalion]

56 Infantry Division Royal Artillery
64, 65, and 113 Field Regiments RA [24 25-pounders]
67 Anti-Tank Regiment RA [36 57-mm Guns; 12 17-pounders]
100 Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA [54 40-mm Guns]

56 Infantry Division Royal Engineers
56 Infantry Division Royal Signals
56 Infantry Division Royal Army Service Corps
56 Infantry Division Ordnance Field Park
56 Infantry Division Provost Company
5, 167, and 214 Field Ambulance Companies (Royal Army Medical Corps)
56 Infantry Division Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
44 Reconnaissance Regiment [battalion]

167 Infantry Brigade
8 Battalion, Royal Fusiliers
9 Battalion, Royal Fusiliers
7 Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry

168 Infantry Brigade
10 Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment
1 Battalion, London Scots
1 Battalion, London Irish Rifles
169 Infantry Brigade
   2/5 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
   2/6 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment
   2/7 Battalion, Queen's Own Royal Regiment

201 Guards Brigade
   6 Battalion, Grenadier Guards
   3 Battalion, Coldstream Guards
   2 Battalion, Scots Guards

Medical (*attached American Unit*):
   Surgical Team 6, 2d Auxiliary Surgical Group

Service Troops:
   10 Corps Transport Column
   15 Line of Communication Transport Column (Royal Army Service Corps)
   10 Corps Troops, Ordnance Field Park
   10 Corps Troops, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Signal:
   10 Corps Royal Signals
   2 Companies, 16 Line of Communications Royal Signals

*Attached American Units:*
   Detachment A, 71st Signal Company (Special)
   Detachment A, 72d Signal Company (Special)
This part of the Army History was prepared under the direction of Col. John D. Forsythe, Army Historian, by Capt. William D. McCain with the assistance of Capt. John Bowditch, III, and Sgt. Sidney T. Matthews. The maps were drawn by S/Sgt. Alvin J. Weinberger and Sgt. Charles W. Petersen.

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