

02118

02113

MAIL ROOM
A.P.O. # 3

N **[REDACTED]** **-6528-A**

10 September 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Operation.

TO : The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. In compliance with provisions of Par. 10, AR 345-105, the attached report of operations of this command during the Sicilian Campaign, covering the period July 10 - 18, 1943, inclusive, is submitted.
2. Operation reports of subordinate and attached units are also inclosed. Unit and staff journals are being forwarded under separate cover.
3. Report of operations subsequent to July 18 will be submitted as soon as completed.

For the Commanding General:

12175

B. C. Price
B. C. PRICE
Lt. Col., A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

PARTICIPATION OF 3RD INF DIV (REINF)
IN SICILIAN OPERATION

JULY 10 - 18, 1943

CONTENTS

| | |
|-------------|--|
| FOREWARD | COMMENTS BY MAJ. GEN. L. K. TRUSCOTT, COMMANDING. |
| SECTION I | OPERATIONS |
| SECTION II | INTELLIGENCE |
| SECTION III | SUPPLY |
| SECTION IV | PERSONNEL |
| SECTION V | SPECIAL STAFF |
| ANNEXES | (INDICATED BY NUMBERED TABS) |

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

FOREWORD

DIVISION COMMANDER'S COMMENTS ON "JOSS" OPERATION

1. **GENERAL:** The "JOSS" operation developed no new lessons; on the contrary, it emphasized well-known principles. There were some differences in technique and in solution of problems that may be worthy of comment, and are commented on in the report. I shall limit mine to those points which seem particularly important to me.

2. **PLANNING:** (a) Joint planning: Joint planning is essential in amphibious operations. All elements involved including Army, Navy, and Air, should be closely associated from the initiation of the plan. Army and Navy planners were associated in preparing the "JOSS" plan from the very beginning. Repeated requests failed to produce an Air planner, seriously hampering preparation of detailed planning. An Air planner should be available to all staffs to include the Division in such planning.

(b) Information: Information is the basis for all planning. The tactical plan is the basis for organization, training, and, to some extent, the equipment of elements involved, including both Army and Navy. Full information is essential, with particular emphasis on maps and aerial photographic intelligence. Insufficient maps and delay in obtaining aerial photographic intelligence seriously impeded planning of the "JOSS" operation. The operation clearly demonstrated the value of aerial photographic intelligence and the late attachment to the Division of an expert aerial photograph interpreter proved invaluable. For amphibious operations, the Division staff should include at least two aerial photograph experts. Full information as to craft available and the characteristics of the craft is essential for combined planning. This information was available early for the "JOSS" operation planning.

(c) Tactical planning: However complex the tactical plan may appear, it must be simple of execution. There must be no involved maneuver for any element. The success of the "JOSS" assault, in a large measure, can be attributed to adherence to this rule.

(d) Centralized planning: In the "JOSS" planning, many details which had previously been decentralized to subordinate units, such as preparation of loading plans, wave diagrams, and the like, were performed by a central planning board, which included unit representatives. This method has many advantages. It insures full coordination, mutual assistance, relieves subordinate elements of many details, and improves both speed and quality of planning.

3. **TRAINING:** (a) Training must be objective and realistic. Each amphibious operation is a special operation. Each presents specific problems that require special organization, preparation, and training. Amphibious training of the "JOSS" Force began before receipt of information as to the nature of the problem to be solved. Such training, while valuable, necessarily resulted in considerable waste of time and effort.

(b) Individual and unit training: Individual and unit training should also be pointed toward a specific objective. While our basic training is sound and must be emphasized and perfected, preparation for amphibious operations requires special training for both individuals and units. The limited time available for training therefore requires that training be pointed toward the specific problems that will confront individuals and units. The training problem must be reduced to simple elements and individuals and units must be drilled to the highest degree of perfection in these elements, emphasizing speed and violence. Every member of a team must know all information pertaining to the problem that will confront his unit. The use of models, aerial photographs, and dry-land drills proved most valuable in accomplishing this purpose. The success attained in the "JOSS" assault can be attributed in no small measure to thorough drilling of individuals and units in their specific roles.

(c) Physical condition: The importance of physical condition cannot be over-emphasized. Speed-marching proved of great value in developing physical condition, eliminating the unfit, and instilling confidence and pride in the individual. Training in speed-marching was largely responsible for the speed with which the "JOSS" assault was executed.

(d) Areas and facilities: Areas and facilities for amphibious training should be suitable and adequate. At Arzew inadequate ranges for artillery and small arms seriously hampered training. No facilities existed for training in naval gunfire support and this lack of training was felt throughout the operation. The area for mountain training was somewhat inadequate but suitable for the type of training desired. Difficulties in removing natives and providing suitable impact areas interfered with realism and seriously hampered training. Immediately after the Tunisian campaign the Division was assembled in an area near Jemmapes which was entirely unsuitable for amphibious training. Time spent in such areas can only result in much wasted time.

(e) Naval cooperation: Naval cooperation is essential for satisfactory training. Complete and whole-hearted cooperation afforded by all "JOSS" naval personnel greatly facilitated training of "JOSS" Force.

(f) Rehearsal: No large scale amphibious operation should be undertaken without a full scale rehearsal. Such a rehearsal is essential to test training, check plans, and improve techniques. The rehearsal must be timed so that time will be available for making necessary adjustments and correcting deficiencies noted therein. Shortage of craft and delay in concentration interfered to some extent with "COPYBOOK", which was the rehearsal for the "JOSS" operation. However, "COPYBOOK" was as near full scale as facilities permitted and provided much valuable information.

4. EQUIPMENT: (a) Craft: (1) LSTs, modified to carry six LCVPs, were found ideal for the assault. Each carried approximately one company, in addition to the vehicle load. Designed primarily to carry vehicles, they should have increased messing and sanitary facilities. The addition of hammocks for increased sleeping space would be desirable. LSTs also proved suitable for handling supplies.

(2) LCVPs launched from LSTs are suitable for landing assault troops but the motor noise is a serious disadvantage. A silent motor would increase their suitability tremendously.

(3) LCIs are satisfactory for landing personnel where the beach gradient permits them to beach. However, rubber boats should be carried for emergency use. The LCIs proved to be satisfactory as headquarters ships for subordinate units but should carry an LCVF or suitable power boat to facilitate landing headquarters personnel.

5. (a) PONTON EQUIPMENT: Navy ponton equipment for unloading the LSTs proved suitable. It should, however, be provided in sufficient time to permit more adequate training prior to the operation.

(b) T/BA: Delays in obtaining equipment hindered training for the "JOSS" Force. Shortages of equipment were particularly noticeable in units that concentrated late, some of which had been in action for considerable periods with consequent wear, tear, and shortages. Considerable delay was occasioned in obtaining express authority for every issue in excess of T/BA. Blanket authority for issue of such items would be desirable.

(c) Special equipment: There is a tendency in amphibious operations to carry much specialized equipment. The use of grapnels fired by mortars to remove underwater and beach wire was thoroughly tested in training. This equipment was provided for the operation but there was no occasion for its use. Improvised mounts for mortars, both chemical and 81mm, to fire from LCVPs in the leading wave, either smoke or shell, were provided. This was thoroughly tested during training and proved satisfactory but was not necessary during the operation. Means for carrying grenades, rocket ammunition, mortar ammunition, and the like were improvised. There is a great need for developing standard carriers for such purposes. In future amphibious operations a considerable increase in mine detectors would be desirable. Wire cutters and knives are required in quantity.

(d) Signal equipment: Radio equipment within the infantry regiment lacks sufficient range. The SCR-536 is generally satisfactory within the infantry company but entirely too fragile. There is great need for developing radio equipment of sufficient range that can be transported by hand.

(e) Waterproofing: The new method of waterproofing was generally satisfactory, so far as vehicles were concerned. Considerable difficulty was experienced in waterproofing radios, etc.

6. MISCELLANEOUS: (a) Medium tanks were landed with the assault echelon to provide close support and substitute for artillery until landed and proved most successful. I believe that similar use of tanks is advisable in any situation where beach exits permit tanks to move inland.

(b) Full-tracked vehicles: Only full-tracked vehicles should be landed prior to construction of beach roadways and beach exits. The Division Artillery used the M-7 and they proved entirely satisfactory, doing excellent work during the assault phase.

(c) Chemical mortars: The chemical mortar is an excellent weapon but is entirely too heavy and lacks sufficient mobility for assault landings which must be conducted with speed. Whenever reduced to hand-carry, the chemical mortars consistently failed to keep up with the infantry battalion.

(d) Jeep planes: Piper Cub planes were flown from an improvised flight deck during the assault phase. These planes provided extremely valuable information during the early stages of the assault as well as performing their normal function of directing artillery fire subsequently. Whenever the enemy air situation permits, these planes can be used to great advantage. The construction of an improvised flight deck on an LST is not difficult.

(e) Smoke: Destroyers successfully screened by smoke the approach of LCTs and other craft to Red Beach during the landing. This was effective and undoubtedly prevented serious loss from artillery fire.

7. PERSONNEL: (a) Personnel shortages hampered training of the "JOSS" Force to some extent. An overstrength is essential and should be provided when training for an operation is initiated. The Division was filled shortly before sailing by personnel drawn from the 34th Division, which had just finished the Tunisian campaign. Many of these replacements were not happy about their transfer and there were unfortunate incidents of self-maiming and desertion. The undesirability of stripping one combat division to provide replacements for another is obvious.

(b) The "JOSS" Force totaled about 45,000 personnel. Obviously, a Division staff organized for handling a Division one-third that strength required considerable strengthening. A number of officers were made available for this purpose but arrived just prior to sailing. Competent staff officers should be made available early to assist in organization, training, and concentration.

(c) Concentration: The date for completing the concentration of "JOSS" Force was so late that some units failed to arrive in time for the rehearsal. Some units were inadequately trained in amphibious operations and there was insufficient time for familiarizing them with their problems, or for the Division Commander and staff to become thoroughly acquainted with these units. Obviously all elements of the Force should be concentrated in sufficient time to permit welding into the team.

8. CONCLUSION: Looking back on the "JOSS" operation, I would say that the outstanding factor in the success that attended the operation was the complete cooperation between Army and Navy elements concerned. This cooperation resulted from close association together, knowledge of each other's problems, and willingness at all times to help each other. I've found Admiral Connolly and every member of his command willing always to meet us more than halfway; their spirit of service and efficient execution was a major factor in the success of the "JOSS" operation.

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
(Training Phase)

1. Arzew Area.

a. Intensive amphibious training for the invasion of Sicily began the last week of March, 1943, when RCT 15 moved from Port Lyautey to the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center at Arzew Beach, Algeria. RCT 7 and RCT 30 followed RCT 15 at two-week intervals.

b. The Command Group of the Division staff prepared training schedules and supervised training, which stressed the following:

(1) Physical conditioning. The Division Commander prescribed a new standard rate of march--five miles in one hour, or four miles per hour for a greater distance than five miles. Infantry regiments eliminated men who were physically incapable of meeting this standard. Physical training included log-tossing, obstacle-course running, bayonet training and hand-to-hand combat.

(2) Combined infantry-artillery problems. Infantry learned to follow artillery closely--sometimes within 100 yards--and acquired confidence in its accuracy during combat firing problems. Overhead mortar and machine-gun fire simulated battle conditions. The few casualties resulting from these problems were negligible compared with lives saved when the division entered combat.

(3) Mine-laying and removal; booby traps. Troops trained with British, American, German and Italian mines. All types of booby-traps encountered in Tunisia were demonstrated.

(4) Study of shore-to-shore landing craft; joint work with Navy. Troops test-loaded all types of craft to be employed with various equipment, and tried many different boat employment plans. Experiments with landing rubber boats from LCI's indicated this system probably would not work well except when landing at difficult and undefended spots, but no other solution was at hand. (LCI's could not beach directly in the Arzew area because of offshore bars and beaches.) Shallow beach gradients made the unloading of LST's difficult; experiments with cubicle pontoon bridges from LST to shore were unsatisfactory, and LCM's were habitually used for unloading this type of craft.

c. The two-week period at Arzew ended with a two-day landing exercise in the Pont du Cheliff area. The beach and inland terrain resembled those to be encountered on operation Husky. Each RCT in training, except the 30th Infantry, landed in darkness and advanced to an objective eight miles inland. One reinforced infantry battalion from another regiment represented the "enemy" in each problem.

d. The training schedule issued to cover this two-week period is enclosed as Tab A (1).

2. Mountain Training.

a. Mountain training took place in the Pont du Cheliff area. Training included range estimation, hill climbing, compass and map training, occupation of defensive positions, offensive action in the mountains, scouting and patrolling, night raids and combat firing of all arms except that artillery fire was restricted due to the heavy nomadic native population.

b. The object of this training was chiefly to familiarize the troops with

operations in hilly country. No attempt was made to teach technical methods of mountain climbing. Physical conditioning was another objective, and successful experiments using burros as pack animals were carried out. The experiments were unsatisfactory from the standpoint of condition of the animals, which had been poorly kept by their former Arab owners.

c. The mountain training revealed that careful reconnaissance will enable units to use motor transport in the mountains to a considerable extent.

d. A representative of the Mountain Training Center in the United States lent valuable assistance in drawing up training programs and suggesting training methods.

e. RCT 15 completed its two-week training program at Pont du Cheliff, but the division moved to the Tunisian front before RCT 7 and RCT 30 could undergo the training.

f. The schedule covering mountain training of RCT 15 is enclosed as Tab A (2).

3. Jemmapes Area.

a. Starting May 15 the division was concentrated near Jemmapes, Algeria, where detailed training in reducing beach fortifications and carrying out the division's plan of maneuver was begun. Due to heavy undergrowth, the Jemmapes area was not suitable for training for the operation, but none better could be obtained, so the division was forced to make the best of it.

b. As a general training objective, all units prepared for a landing on defended beaches and an advance inland of about five miles. Speed marching continued, each unit being required to complete five miles in one hour, eight miles in two hours and 20 miles in five hours once a week. Companies and battalions carried out problems on beaches simulating the Sicilian beaches.

c. The division's tactical plan called for the assault of four beaches in the Licata area. Local defenses on three of the beaches were to be reduced by infantry battalions of the division, while the attached Ranger battalion was to clear the fourth beach. These battalions--the 1st Bn 7th Infantry, 3rd Bn 15th Infantry and 2nd Bn 30th Infantry--began specialized training under the supervision of the Assistant Division Commander. They organized anti-pill-box teams, consisting of two rocket gunners, two anti-tank grenadiers, two BAR men, two riflemen with explosives and two leaders; these teams perfected prearranged plays embodying simplicity, maximum rate of fire, and speed. Engineer attachments trained as an organic part of these battalions. Assault battalion commanders were authorized to draw on other regimental units for desired personnel. Other infantry battalions trained to accomplish their mission of passing through the assault battalions and seizing terrain features a few miles inland. One battalion received special training in street fighting. Much of the above training was done at night.

d. Firing during this period included known distance, combat firing and field artillery service practice.

4. Bizerte Area.

a. The division concentrated in an area south and east of Lake Bizerte from June 1 to 10, with other units of Joss force reporting daily. Training stressed coordination with the Navy in all phases of the operation, and was successful in bringing about complete understanding between the Army and Navy in what was expected of each.

b. Specialized training included removal of beach obstacles and mines, attack of actual German-built pillboxes, firing of mortars from landing craft and firing of grapnels for removal of beach wire. Speed marching continued.

c. Exercise "Copybook".

(1) A complete rehearsal for the Sicilian operation, involving all elements of Joss force, both Army and Navy, and actual air support, took place June 20 to 26. The tactical plan and scheme of maneuver for "Copybook" closely followed those for Husky, and beaches and objectives were selected to conform as nearly as possible with those to be met in Sicily. Craft assignment and organization of the force were identical, and the loading was more than a "dry run" since much of the supply and many of the vehicles for the operation were left aboard following the rehearsal.

(2) "Copybook" was incomplete to the extent that a few units had not arrived in the concentration area, several landing craft had not arrived and others were undergoing repair. The Princess Astrid and Princess Charlotte, British LSI's which were to carry the Ranger battalion, were replaced during "Copybook" by LCM's, and some elements of 2nd Bn 15th Infantry were carried all the way from Bizerte in LCPV's.

(3) Shortage of waterproofing material necessitated leaving most of the vehicles aboard their craft during the problem, as there was not sufficient material to re-waterproof them before the actual landing. Key vehicles were unloaded to test methods and timing of unloading; these methods included driving medium tanks from LCT's directly onto the beach, ferrying loads from LST's by means of LCT's, and using the cubicle pontoon ramp. Two 155 mm guns, a type never before used in landing operations, were successfully unloaded, one by ferrying with an LCT, the other over a pontoon ramp.

(4) "Copybook" brought to light many discrepancies which were corrected before the operation. Faults in communication and waterproofing were rectified. Loading and landing plans proved themselves sound, and the division developed confidence in the Navy's ability to land the force on the proper beaches.

(5) Following "Copybook", intensive training ended, drill hours were shortened and men received more time for recreation. Marches and physical conditioning continued to prevent a drop in the high physical standard attained.

(6) F.O. #5, Copybook, is enclosed as Tab A (3).

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
(Planning Phase)

1. On April 6, 1943, Major General L. K. Truscott, Commanding General, 3rd Inf Div, received a directive from Lt Gen George S. Patton, Commanding General, Force 343, that he would command a task force to be known as ENSA, charged with the mission of landing in Sicily in the Sciacca-Castelvetrano area and capturing the airports located in that vicinity. A copy of this directive is attached as Tab A (1).
 2. In view of the fact that the planning for the forthcoming operation and the training had to be carried out simultaneously, a planning section separate from the staff proper consisting of representatives from each General Staff Section was established.
 3. Study of the beaches and the terrain immediately was initiated. British ISIS Reports, aerial photographs and other information received from higher headquarters were carefully studied. All known defensive installations were plotted on a planning map, along with the vital information concerning beach gradients and beach exits.
 4. Based upon this study, an outline plan involving the reduction of the Castelvetrano airdrome and later the Sciacca landing ground, employing such troops as had been made available to the ENSA Commander, was submitted to Headquarters Force 343 on May 1, 1943.
 5. Simultaneously with the submission of this outline plan, the movement of the 3rd Inf Div to the Tunisian front was ordered and initiated. Since it was imperative that the planning for the Sicilian operation continue regardless of the participation of the Division in the Tunisian operation, a small planning staff was left back and set up in conjunction with Headquarters Force 343 at Mostaganem, Algeria.
 6. Shortly after May 1, when the Division had cleared the Mostaganem area, a new directive was received by the Commanding General through his planning staff. (Tab A (2)). The staff immediately instituted a study of the new area similar to the one which had been completed for the Castelvetrano area. The task force name was changed to Joss, and a more complete but tentative troop list and craft assignment was received from Force 343 on May 11, 1943.
 7. Three major technical problems confronted the planning staff at this phase:
 - (1) What should the composition of the Joss Force be, considering the troops made available by Force 343, the limitations of carrying capacity of the landing craft as against the tactical problem involved, and the requirements for maintenance for a period of 30 days as imposed by Commander Force 343's directive?
 - (2) What should be the scale of transportation and personnel, not only of the combat but of the service units, considering the limitations of the number of crafts assigned (Tab A (3)) and the craft capacity as opposed by the desire of all units to operate at T/BA and T/O standards?
 - (3) How could the landing craft as assigned to Joss be unloaded, this craft having been designed for use in much deeper beach gradients than the force was to encounter? This last problem was made more acute by the fact that to date no successful means of loading the LST other than by the use of the LCM in a ferrying capacity had been accomplished. No LCI had yet been beached to the point where troops could disembark directly. Troops had been ferried ashore with the use of rubber boats. It was known that neither the LCM nor rubber boats in sufficient quantity would be available to the Force on the far shore.
- a. Problem No. 1 was the subject of a combined G-3: G-4 study. It was

apparent that if the Joss Force was to be self-sustaining for a period of thirty days it must have the rear area Depot Supply, maintenance units, and administration headquarters comparable to that, but of course more limited in scope, of a field Army. From the units made available to Joss Force by Force 343, the eventual composition and organization of the Service elements can be found in G-4 report on planning.

b. Problem No. 2 was a difficult one and required a careful investigation into the T/BA's and T/O's of units with which a Division Staff is rarely concerned. A tentative scale of assault transportation was made up, the general guiding principle arriving at these figures being a reduction in the maintenance vehicles, elimination of kitchen and supply vehicles, a reduction of ammunition carrying vehicles, justifiable due to the short round trip necessary for refill in the establishment of the initial beach-head, and the cutting down of certain weapons carriers. In general, the assault scale for units in the initial lift consisted of about 60% of their T/BA transportation.

c. Problem No. 3 was the subject of several conferences with the Navy. At that time they were working feverishly on the development of the steel cubicle pontoon as an unloading ramp for the LST. They also agreed to experiment with beaching the LCI at various speeds and various degrees of load on a beach with shallow gradient to determine whether direct debarkation would be feasible.

8. Following up the close of the Tunisian campaign, the Joss Commander visited Force 343 and his planning staff there on May 18, 1943, studied the new mission and evolved an outline plan to cover it. The development of this outline plan pointed the way to specialized training which various units of the Division must immediately undertake. He returned to Jemmapes area where the Division concentrated and immediately initiated this training.

9. The planning staff, now supplemented by Lt Col R.D.Q. Henriques of the British Combined Operation Staff, joined the Division in the Jemmapes area on May 21, 1943. Here the small planning staff which had been functioning at the Mostaganem area was supplemented by the S-3's from the three infantry regiments, the Division Artillery, the 105 AA Gp, 3d Cml Weapons Bn, the Ex officer of the beach group and other such groups or members of the Division Special staff sections who had not yet been brought into the picture. Due to the strenuous training program in which the division was engaged and frequent moves which were taking place, the Commanding General made the decision that all loading plans including the manner in which units would be split between craft, and the landing plans in all necessary detail, would be made by the planning board. For this reason it was felt necessary to include the S-3's of the major units involved as members of the board.

10. The assault transportation table was carefully reviewed by all of this personnel and such changes as deemed necessary were made. Based on the tentative outline plan, the order of battle for each of the four beaches was drawn up. Based on the order of battle, a skeleton outline plan was made and loading tested with scale diagrams to determine tentative craft assignment and the feasibility of carrying the desired troops and equipment in the craft available. The operations Officer of the Naval staff joined the planning board shortly after its arrival in the Jemmapes area and worked as a member of the board during this period. During this period also an aerial photograph interpreter was obtained from the strategic Air Force. His studies proved extremely valuable and brought about small changes in the initial outline plan.

11. One of the questions confronting the board was the feasibility of landing any sizable force on Red Beach. From a tactical standpoint, landing of at least one RCT was extremely desirable. It was not, however, until a careful study from aerial photographs had been made by the interpreter that the success of such a plan could be relied upon.

12. On June 12, 1943, the planning staff moved to Bizerte where it established itself in conjunction with the Naval Staff, charged with landing the Joss Force. Prior to that time, the staff work had relied solely upon conferences with the Naval staff; however, from this time onward until the Force was mounted, the Naval staff and Army staff worked jointly, and in the same building.

13. In conjunction with the Naval staff, the final details of the Force landing table were worked out and work was initiated on the development of a plan for the priority and schedule of lifting the elements of Joss Force which did not accompany the assault. After the development of this project in outline form, S-3's were returned to their units and only the Division Headquarters members of the staff continued to carry the planning forward to its completion.

14. It became apparent that as the plans for loading progressed the requirements for loading personnel on the LST's would exceed considerably the rated personnel capacity of that craft. Accordingly, a test was made in Bizerte Bay to determine just what personnel and vehicle load could be comfortably handled by the craft for a 48 hour period. 450 men and 18 officers, all of Army personnel were loaded complete with their equipment and 4 vehicles on an LST and sent into the Bay for a 48 hour test. The normal Navy complement was also aboard. This test proved that for a limited period of time personnel and vehicle lift could be quite comfortably taken care of without any addition to the existing facilities of the LST. In addition to using the troop space bunks, men bedded down in vehicles, on the trailer tops and some in hammocks supplied by the Navy. No difficulties were involved in feeding or sanitary facilities. This test proved conclusively that the loading plans as drawn by the board would work.

15. The small boat employment was worked out in conjunction with the Naval Commander of the LST Flotillas, the Naval staff and Army Battalion Commander involved. Two factors made the Naval problem quite difficult: (1) The Army's desire to have mortars mounted in the landing craft, available to fire grapnels, HE and smoke on the beaches should the landing be discovered during the approach phase; and (2) the desire to have tank-carrying craft immediately following the assault battalions and also prepared to fire from the craft on the beaches should the landing be discovered during the approach phase. These problems, worked out jointly, evolved into a workable plan.

16. The solution for unloading the LST's became apparent after the Navy had devised a method of using the LCT craft for ferrying. Experiments with the cubicle pontoon proved that it, too, could be relied upon in a calm sea and once the beach was cleared of enemy fire.

(17. Exercises involving the landing of troops direct from the LCI's showed that this too was feasible on a beach with the gradient no shallower than 1 to 70 and where bars or false beaches did not exist off shore.)

18. On or about the 20th of June, the work of the planning board became so integrated with the work of the Division staff as a whole that it ceased to exist as such and all sections took up the problems as those directly concerned with operations. The order of battle and F.O. #5 with annexes are attached as Tabs A (5) and A (6).

SECTION I - OPERATIONS
(Operation Phase)

1. Concentration of Joss Force.

a. The division carried out the concentration of its attachments in the Bizerte area under an Allied Force Headquarters directive requiring that the concentration would begin as late as possible, but would be complete by June 20. Units scattered throughout North Africa were brought together according to the plan drawn up by the division planning board in the Mostaganem area and forwarded to division headquarters in the Jemmapes area. Supply and maintenance installations entered the concentration area first, followed by combat troops; anti-aircraft units were brought in as the concentration progressed and need for their protection increased. The concentration was hindered by the inadequacy of communications and supply in the Bizerte area, which had just been captured from the enemy and was not yet completely organized.

b. G-3 employed a card index file which contained personnel and equipment data on attached units in maintaining a check on the status of the force. Concentration was controlled in accordance with the Chain of Command for Joss force. As units reported to division headquarters, they received administrative instructions and reported to their immediate commander, who assigned areas, supervised administration and training of attached units. (See Planning Tab A (5)).

c. The Navy assisted in the concentration by moving tracked vehicles of CC "A" and the Fifth Armored Artillery Group from Phillippeville to Bizerte in LST's, and by moving the 3rd Ranger Battalion from Nemours to Bizerte in LCI's.

2. Embarkation and Sailing.

a. Following "Copybook", units made necessary adjustments in craft loading. Many of the units which arrived during this period were on a low debarkation priority, which meant that LST's had to be unloaded in order to load the late-comers' vehicles on the top deck. The Naval Base Command at Bizerte, Joss Force Near-Shore Control and Eastern Base Section cooperated in these readjustments.

b. Loss of two LST's enroute to Bizerte caused a last-minute revision of loads, which was accomplished without great difficulty.

c. Vehicles and personnel were loaded under separate plans. Vehicles assigned to a single craft moved first to an assembly area, then to a concentration area from which they were called to the pier as loading progressed. Personnel later marched to the concentration area, from which they were called aboard the craft, passenger lists being checked as they embarked.

d. The convoy sailed in three echelons. The first echelon left Bizerte July 6 with a short stopover at Sousse, while the medium convoy of LST's and a slow convoy of LCT's both left July 7. The convoys employed separate routes, meeting at a rendezvous off Gozo island (near Malta) July 9. The weather July 9 was rough and caused concern as to its effect on the landing. The fleet commander kept the LCT's approximately on schedule by ordering them to cut corners on a shorter route to the rendezvous area.

3. The Assault (092400 - 101100 July, 1943)

a. Arrival in Assembly Area.

(1). The Headquarters ship (USS Biscayne) dropped anchor in the transport area at 0135. It was assumed that all other ships had reached their transport areas and were preparing to disembark, since units had been instructed to break radio silence and report in case of emergency. Prior to 0200 heavy gunfire and air fire could be heard in the direction of Gela. About 0200 searchlights from heights above Licata and the ridge to the west swept the seas off Yellow and Blue beaches, enabling those on the bridge of the Biscayne to see craft in the various transport areas. During this time four of the searchlights converged on the Biscayne and held for some time. The Admiral, thinking the ship was seen, gave the order to prepare to open fire. However, after consulting the Commanding General, it was decided to wait until the enemy actually opened fire. Shortly thereafter the lights went off and it was apparent that, although the Biscayne had stood for about 10 minutes 7000 yards offshore in the converged beams of four searchlights, it had not been seen. At least the shore batteries had not fired and the landing operation went forward as planned.

(2). By 0340 reports began coming in to the Headquarters ship from flotillas that they were all there and that small boats were off and away. This was followed by reports that small craft had landed and were returning. At 0444 a message was sent to the Commanding General, Seventh Army, announcing that first waves had landed on Blue, Yellow and Red beaches.

(3). No word had been received from Green beach. At 0500 the Cub plane on the improvised flight deck aboard LST 386 was contacted by FM radio and told to stand by. Through a misunderstanding, two Cub planes took off and were on the way in at daylight. Shortly afterward, one Cub reported that our troops could be seen climbing the hills back of Green beach. For two hours, these Cub planes continued to spot enemy artillery positions and report progress of our troops on the beaches.

b. Red Beach. (For composition of forces, see F.O. No. 5, and Annexes, Tab A.). 1st Bn 7th Infantry, the Red Beach assault battalion, began landing at 0400B, one hour and 15 minutes after H-hour. The assault waves gained tactical surprise and received no fire until they crossed the beach to the cliff, where machine gun and light artillery fire hit them from both flanks. They ran up gullies to the top of the cliff and within an hour had overcome hostile resistance in the immediate beach area. The battalion went into an assembly area a mile north of Red beach to await orders. At 1000B, Company A relieved elements of the Green force on high ground between Red and Green beaches.

Enemy artillery firing from target areas 11, 22-23, and 28-29 (see Naval Gunfire Support Plan, Planning Tab E 11) continued to interdict the beach for some time. A 47-mm gun firing from area 11 on the left flank of Red beach scored hits on LCT's No. 1 and 5. The beach was smoked to cover the landing of LCT's, and the enemy batteries at 22-23 and 28-29 were finally silenced by naval gunfire.

2nd Bn, 7th Infantry started landing at 0440B, pushed inland and seized its objective at 1000B. Enemy artillery and difficult beach exits delayed the landing and unloading of remaining units. Soft sand on the beach and steep, dry stream beds which were the only beach exits caused trouble in clearing the beach of transport.

3rd Bn, 7th Infantry landed and seized its objectives; three small hills three miles northwest of Red beach by 1000B.

Three mortar squads of 1st platoon, Company D, 3rd Chemical Battalion, were loaded on support craft and were to precede the assault waves prepared to fire on beach targets, or to smoke the beach in event of daylight landing. Due to difficulty in assembling the mortar wave in the rendezvous area, it started

late and approached the beach after two or three infantry waves had landed. One squad landed and the others returned to the LST. The 2nd platoon landed at 0830B, found difficulty in traversing beach exits but reached its assembly area back of the beach at 1030B and immediately established a firing position. It was not required to fire.

The 10th Field Artillery Bn, with 62nd Armored Field Artillery Bn, and Battery A, 9th Field Artillery Battalion attached landed at 0630B, established gun positions 500 to 1500 yards inland, registered and fired on targets of opportunity, including enemy mortars, Infantry in the open, a battery, machine gun nests and an O. P.

Company G, 66th Armored Regiment, landed at 0900 and went into an assembly area a mile inland from Red beach.

c. Green Beach. (For composition of forces, see F.O. No. 5 and Annexes, Tab A). The 3rd Ranger Bn, disembarking in British LCA's from the Princess Astrid and Princess Charlotte, began landing at 0300B, achieving complete surprise. They crossed the beach and passed through the wide band of defensive wire before being discovered. The enemy opened fire with machine guns, disclosing their positions, and the Rangers quickly subdued them.

2nd Bn, 15th Infantry, following the Rangers, landed without opposition. The battalion reorganized and pushed eastward along the Monte Sole hill pass toward Licata. At 0735B, the American flag was raised over Castle San Angelo on the high ground immediately west of the city. At 1130B, after naval bombardment of Licata, 2nd Bn 15th Infantry and other regimental units approaching from the east entered and captured the town.

B Battery, 39th Field Artillery Battalion, landed and occupied a firing position back of Green beach by 0600B. The battery registered and later fired 12 rounds on enemy infantry in the hills to the north at extreme range. The shells burst among the enemy, who retreated beyond range.

The Commanding Officer of Company B, 3rd Chemical Battalion landed at H + 45, reconnoitered the area east of the beach, and a short while later led his 1st platoon into position. The platoon followed the advance of 2nd Bn, 15th Infantry along the ridge toward Licata and by 0530B had the town within range, although no chemical mortar fire was used.

d. Yellow Beach. (For composition of forces, See F.O. No. 5 and Annexes, Tab A). 3rd Bn, 15th Infantry, the Yellow beach assault battalion, began landing at 0345B, one hour after H-hour. The landing was not opposed until the boats actually beached, when enemy machine guns and small arms opened up. The battalion cleared the beach defenses, seized the spurs overlooking the beach, and subsequently reorganized and moved westward on Highway 123, entering Licata at 1130B, about the same time the 1st Battalion entered from the north and 2nd Battalion from the west.

The 1st Battalion began landing at 0445B, pushed one mile inland to its assembly area, reorganized and advanced on its first objective, the high ground immediately northeast of Licata, at 0600B. The objective was reached at 0800B, and the order to advance on Licata was received at 0930B. A platoon was sent to protect the bridges over the Salso, which were unimpaired, and the remainder of the battalion, according to its plan, forded the Salso about two miles upstream from Licata, and moved on the town from the north.

The mortar wave which was to precede the assault waves on Yellow beach failed to rendezvous properly, either because the boat section leaders could not find the control point or because the control point was not established at the designated spot, and the 81-mm and 4.2 inch boat sections proceeded inshore separately. The 4.2's preceded the first wave, trying to draw enemy fire from known positions, but the enemy guns remained silent. The 81-mm

mortars were landed but the 4.2's returned to the LST. One officers and 64 enlisted men from Company A, 3rd Chemical Bn landed about 0830B, established an ammunition dump, contacted 3rd Bn, 15th Infantry and prepared to support the battalion with fire. No firing was done, however.

The 39th Field Artillery Battalion landed, occupied gun positions in the bowl back of Yellow beach by 0630B, registered and first concentrations on enemy strong points.

Company H, 66th Armored Regiment, landed at daylight and went into an assembly area prepared to support the attack on Licata. It was found unnecessary to employ the tanks prior to the fall of Licata.

d. Blue Beach. (For composition of forces, see F.O. No. 5 and Annexes). 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, the Blue beach assault battalion, began landing at 0330B, 45 minutes after H-hour. The assault battalion achieved tactical surprise but met rifle and machine gun fire from pillboxes located along the beach, and artillery fire from a strongpoint east of the beach. Prearranged naval gunfire on Targets 71, 72 and 73 neutralized the enemy artillery (see Naval Gunfire Support Plan, Planning Tab E 11). The battalion, employing the 10-man anti-pillbox squads, cleared the beach defenses in its sector and advanced against the enemy strong point on Poggio Lungo, which it occupied at 0845B. 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry began landing at 0400 B, pushed inland, occupied its objective and reorganized by 0708B. 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry began landing at 0410B, seized its initial objective, high ground immediately overlooking the beach area, at 0500B, and reached its final objective at 1030B.

The mortar wave for Blue beach preceded the assault wave as scheduled but its services were not required. The 1st platoon, Company C, 3rd Chemical Battalion landed at 0730B. Two shells, believed to be 100-mm, struck the bow of LCT 277 during the landing, killing four men of this company and wounding several. The platoon joined its commander in a draw back of the beach but did not fire during this phase of the operation.

The 41st Field Artillery Battalion landed at 0850B, two hours behind schedule, and were in position ready to fire at 1030B. No firing was done from this position, other than registration.

Company I, 66th Armored Regiment, landed successfully and provided supporting fire for 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, reinforcing the fire of Cannon Company. This close-support fire was directed against enemy strong-points and pillboxes.

4. Period 1100 July 10th - 2400 July 10th.

a. The 7th Infantry consolidated its position and continued to land vehicles and attached units in accordance with the priorities established in the landing table. The 2nd Battalion remained on its position but was attached to the 15th Infantry at 1410.

b. Upon receipt of oral orders from the Division Commander at approximately 1200, the 15th Infantry pushed north along Highway 123 and occupied positions as shown on overlay #2. Delaying positions were encountered and over-run.

c. The 30th Infantry held its objectives lightly and concentrated its battalions prepared to move to the north or west to counter any thrust from that direction.

d. The Division CP was established ashore north of beach Yellow at 1215. It moved to a new location just north of Licata, opening at 1535.

e. CC "A" less 3d Bn, 66th Armd Regt, with the 20th Engrs attached, con-

stituted the Joss reserve. At 1200 the 41st Inf (-1 Bn) commenced unloading in the Licata port area.

f. The 20th Engrs, which commenced its unloading at approximately 1000, was attached to the 15th Infantry on landing and was held in regimental reserve. CC "A" continued to unload in the Licata port area and on beaches Yellow and Blue throughout the afternoon and night of July 10-11. From these points it concentrated in assembly area indicated on overlay #2, prepared to move north on Naro when sufficient strength had been landed.

g. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop reconnoitered toward Palma Di Montechiaro along Highway 115. The bridge over the Fiume Palma was found prepared for demolition and defended.

h. Prisoners were beginning to constitute a major administrative problem. Approximately 2000 had been taken by midnight.

i. Infantry regiments conducted aggressive reconnaissance to a distance of five miles. Sporadic air attacks by German planes against the beaches continued throughout the day.

j. The 3rd Ranger Battalion relieved 2nd Battalion 15th Infantry in the town of Licata and provided security for town and port area.

5. Period 2400 July 10th - 2400 July 11th.

a. F. O. #6, issued at 2100 July 10th directed the general extension of the beach head to the Yellow Line, the second objective of Joss Force. The 7th Infantry, supported by the 10th FA Bn and 1st Bn 77th FA, less Btry B, continued its attack to the Northwest at 0600. It captured Palma Di Montechiaro and occupied objectives on the high ground beyond. Action continued throughout the day, the enemy being forced to withdraw toward Agrigento. A brisk battle at Palma by elements of the 3d Battalion, personally led by the Battalion CO, succeeded in clearing the town and pushing on through it. The 2nd Battalion, released from attachment to the 15th Infantry, marched from its position north of San Oliva and re-joined the regiment at 1700.

b. The 15th Infantry attacked northward with Campobello as its objective and Highway 123 as its axis of advance. This advance was supported by the 39th FA Bn and 9th FA Bn (-Btry C). A strong delaying position at (9147) was knocked out. Two Italian 90-mm SP guns and one Italian light tank were abandoned by the enemy on this position. Artillery fire employing a mixture of white phosphorous and time shell proved effective in their neutralization. Organized resistance by German troops was first encountered in the Campobello area. Campobello was occupied the afternoon of the 11th, and positions organized on the high ground north of the town. These positions were held throughout the night. Patrols sent to Naro contacted CC "A" and patrols sent to Riesi contacted the 3d Bn 30th Infantry.

c. The 30th Infantry remained in position, holding its original objective lightly, with the regiment (less 3d Bn) concentrated and alerted for movement. A patrol consisting of 1 Infantry Platoon, 1 Platoon Medium Tanks, 2 Platoons Cannon Company was sent along the coastal highway to Gela with a mission of contacting II Corps. This patrol fought its way through 3 enemy positions and captured 400 prisoners. The patrol leader contacted the Commanding General Seventh Army at Gela at 1430. On its return another enemy position was reduced, and an additional 153 prisoners were captured. The 3d Battalion moved across country to vicinity of Riesi where they occupied and organized positions on the high ground north and south of that town by 2000B. Its mission was the security of the right flank of the force.

d. CC "A" continued to unload through the night and early morning of July 11th. By daylight approximately 2/3 of CC "A" had been landed and were in an assembly area North west of Licata. CC "A" advanced Northwest at 0600, occupied

Naro at 1030B, and then moved into an assembly position north and east of the town prepared for further action. Throughout the day CC "A" was subjected to air attacks from enemy planes and from friendly planes who had mistaken the identity of the troops.

c. The 3d Ranger Bn, was relieved in the town and port of Licata, by elements of the 20th Engineers on the morning of July 11th. The Ranger Bn marched north to an assembly area south of San Oliva and remained in Division reserve.

f. The 20th Engr Regt continued to assist in the unloading at Licata Port. The 36th Engrs continued landing supplies and vehicles over beaches Yellow, Red and Blue. The 2nd Bn, 540th Engrs continued operation of Licata port.

g. Btry C, 36th FA Bn (155-mm guns), unloaded the afternoon of July 10th, had its guns in position west of Licata the morning of July 11th.

h. 3077 prisoners including 150 Germans were taken between H hour and midnight July 11th.

i. Attacks by German planes on the beaches continued. One LST, containing CC "A" vehicles, which had been partially unloaded, was hit and set afire. No other damage of consequence was suffered.

6. Period 2400 July 11th to 2400 July 12th.

a. The 7th Infantry consolidated its position west of Palma and sent patrols north to Naro to contact CC "A".

b. At 1100, the 15th Inf was ordered to seize Delia, clear Bavenuse and Sommatino, and relieve CC "A" upon capture of Canicatti. Sommatino was captured by the 1st Bn, 15th Inf at 1800. The 2nd Bn by-passed resistance at Delia and pushed eastward to Canicatti where it arrived at 2200. The 3d Bn met heavy resistance at Delia. A company of light tanks from CC "A" was sent to support the Bn. Positions were held through the night preparatory to launching a coordinated attack the next morning.

c. At 1045, the 20th Engrs was ordered to relieve the 30th Infantry (-3d Bn) on positions east of Licata. The 30th Infantry was ordered to move on Naro, relieve elements of CC "A" and occupy the high ground in the vicinity of the town. The leading elements moved at 1130 and the advance CP opened at new position at 1645. The relief by the 20th Engrs was accomplished at 1400. The foot elements continued their march on Naro throughout the evening.

d. CC "A", with the 62nd Armd FA Bn attached, launched its attack on Canicatti at 1330. The town was occupied at 1500 but the enemy held the high ground to the north and west. CC "A" reorganized preparatory to launching a coordinated attack against these positions the next day.

e. The 3d Bn, 30th Infantry remained in the Reesi area. Patrols confirmed the presence of a defended road block about 2 miles southeast of town and considerably enemy activity in the sector, particularly on the road south from Mazzarino.

f. The 3d Reconnaissance Troop operated in this sector in conjunction with the 3d Bn.

g. The 3d Ranger Bn remained in Bivouac south of San Oliva.

h. The first turn around of LCI's and unloading of follow-up troops started.

i. The 815th Engr Bn (Avn) began work on a landing strip in the vicinity of Licata landing ground.

j. Enemy air activity continued but bombing of the beaches and port caused little damage.

7. Period 2400 July 12th to 2400, July 13th.

a. The 7th Infantry received F. O. #7, directing a reconnaissance in force by one Bn on Agrigento, at 2200 12 July. The 1st Bn entrucked in reinforcing transportation at 0400 and moved west on Highway 115 to a point about 5 miles west of Palma where they detrucked and advanced on foot. One Battery of the 10th BA Bn and one Battery of the 2nd Bn 77th FA Regt displaced forward to support the action.

b. This reconnaissance developed strong resistance and considerably artillery fire along the high ground west of the Naro river. The battalion withdrew after dark to a position on the high ground vicinity (7347). This day's action was supported by Naval Gunfire adjusted through the 10th FA Bns Shore fire Control Parties.

c. The 15th Infantry relieved CC "A" at Canicatti, occupying positions north and west of the town. The 3d Bn supported by a company of light tanks captured and outposted Delia by 0900. The 1st Bn left Company B to hold Sommatino and sent Company C to hold Delia. The remainder of the battalion assembled in an area just south of Canicatti. The 3d Bn moved to a position on the left of the 2nd Bn north of Canicatti. Relief of CC "A" was completed by 1600.

d. CC "A" upon being relieved by the 15th Infantry moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Campobello in Force Reserve. Patrols were sent to the north and east.

e. The 30th Inf (- 3d Bn) closed into its area and organized its positions by 0300. Company C was ordered north to seize ridge line about 2000 yards southeast of Castrofiliippo.

f. The 3d Ranger Bn remained in Force Reserve south of San Olivia in the vicinity of the Division Post.

g. The 20th Engineers remained in position east of Licata and maintained contact with the 1st Infantry Division north of Gela.

h. The 3d Bn, 30th Infantry remained in position at Riesi and with the 3d Reconnaissance Troop maintained patrols to the north and east of the position. Enemy activity on this flank continued.

i. Company B, 10th Engr Bn took over the guard of a captured ammunition dump near the highway and midway between Somatino and Riesi. The dump containing an estimated 7,000 tons of ammunition of all types was prepared by the engineers for demolition.

j. The 2nd Bn, 540th Engrs continued its operation of the Licata port and the 36th Engrs the unloading at the beaches. Follow-up vehicles started arriving.

k. C-47's landed on the newly build strip near the Licata landing field.

l. Operations to date had resulted in the Capture of 4,477 prisoners.

8. Period 2400 July 13th - 2400 July 14th.

a. At 0500 Company E, 7th Infantry advanced as a combat patrol to Favara

and entered the town without incident.

b. F. O. #8 received from Division Headquarters at 1700 directed the concentration of RCT-7 in the Favara area in continuation of the reconnaissance in force against Agrigento and Porto Empedocle. The 3d Ranger Battalion, 10th FA Bn and 1st Bn 77th FA were attached to the 7th Infantry.

c. The 1st and 3d Bns advanced at 211 followed at 220 0 by the 2nd Bn. At 2300 the CP of the RCT moved forward.

d. B and C Co's of the 15th Infantry were relieved at Sommatino and Delia at 0800 and directed to join their battalion. The remainder of the regiment remained in the vicinity of Canicatti, reconnoitering toward Serradifalco, Montedoro, and St. Cloud. Enemy artillery fire was encountered along the Canicatti-Serradifalco road.

e. Co C, 30th Infantry, reinforced, occupied the high ridge line about 2000 yards south of Castrofillipo with 2 rifle platoons at 1030, and with the remainder of the company reinforced at 2250. Motorized patrols from the regiment along the Naro-Favara road encountered hostile artillery fire about 500 yards east of Favara. The patrol, however, saw men from a 7th Infantry patrol enter Favara from the south and west.

f. In the Riesi area the 3d Bn established contact with the 1st Infantry Division 2 miles southwest of Riesi.

g. The 3d Ranger Bn was ordered to Campobello where they were entrucked and moved to Naro arriving at 2330. Movement on foot to high ground 2 miles east of Favara continued throughout the night.

h. CC "A" remained in Force Reserve in the Campobello area but reconnoitered extensively to the north, northeast and northwest. 3d Rcn Tr remained in the Riesi area. Unloading on Beaches Blue and Yellow in the Licata port area continued.

i. The 20th Engrs remained in position east of Licata with patrols operating toward Gala and Butna. Contact was maintained with the 1st Infantry Division.

9. 2400 July 14th - 2400 July 15th.

a. The 1st and 2nd Bns of the 7th Inf reached their initial objectives during the night 14/15. Both Bns continued reconnaissance to their immediate front and consolidated their positions. The 10th FA Bn and 1st Bn 77th FA Regt displaced forward at 0300.

b. The Commanding General visited the Command Post 7th RCT several times during the day and plans were made for continuation of the operation. The 2nd Bn advanced and occupied high ground north of Favara and prepared to advance to hill 333, just north of Agrigento. A Company of the 30th Infantry relieved the 2nd Bn 7th Infantry north of Favara at 2000 and the 2nd Bn advanced.

c. At 2100 the 3d Bn moved from its position to the area southeast of Favara. The 1st Bn continued reconnaissance toward Agrigento.

d. The 3d Ranger Bn was attached to the 7th RCT and at 1900 advanced to the north of Agrigento.

e. At 1830 the Commanding General directed that the attached engineer company repair bridges over Naro River. This company was fired on from the vicinity of the bridge and was forced to cease work.

f. The 15th Infantry continued daylight and night patrols, entered Montedoro with no opposition, establishing an outpost of a squad there.

g. Company A, 15th Infantry reconnoitering toward Serradifalco received artillery and small arms fire from high ground south and east of the town.

h. The 30th Infantry reconnoitered to the general line Favara - Naro - Montedoro - Canicatti, establishing contact with 7th Infantry on the northwest and 15th Infantry on the southeast. 2nd Bn 30th Infantry occupied high ground in vicinity of Racalmuto and Grotti about 1200. The 3d Bn 30th Inf continued reconnaissance missions in Riesi area.

i. The 105th AW Group furnished AA protection from Licata port, Licata airfield, and CC "A".

j. 2nd Bn 77th FA Regt and Btry A, 77th FA Regt (1st Bn), 36th FA Bn (-Btry C) landed and went into position northwest of Licata.

k. 10th Engr Bn (- Co A, atchd to 7th RCT), guarded dumps and cleared mine fields and enemy wire.

l. Patrols of 3d Rcn Tr reconnoitered north and northwest of Riesi with no contact.

10. Period 2400 July 15th - 2400 July 16th.

a. RCT-7 continued reconnaissance in force against Agrigento in accordance with provisions of F. O. #8, headquarters 3d Infantry Division. 58th Armored FA Bn, 65th Armored FA Bn, and 77th FA Regt moved from previous location and were attached for this action. By 1400 it was apparent that a rapid, aggressive advance would break the thinning outer defenses and uncover Agrigento as well as Porto Empedocle to the southwest. At 1430 the 3d Bn in regimental reserve attacked astride Highway 115 to seize Porto Empedocle. At 1410 large enemy reinforcements advancing by motor toward Agrigento from the Aragona area was broken up by artillery fires, destroying or forcing the abandoning of 50 vehicles and causing 100 casualties to the enemy.

b. The 3d Ranger Bn occupied Porto Empedocle at 1900.

c. Patrols from the 15th Infantry working north and northwest of Canicatti reached Milena and Grotte and Bompensiere and reported them cleared of the enemy. Motor patrols toward Serradifalco encountered artillery fire just to the south of town.

d. 2nd Bn 30th Infantry occupied a position on the ridge extending south and southeast of Racalmuto, extending reconnaissance to the north thereof. The 1st Bn moved into an area northwest of Castrollippo. Both positions were occupied by 2000. The 3d Bn, relieved at Riesi, moved west by motor joining the remainder of the regiment at 1800. They moved into an assembly area north-east of Castrollippo.

e. CC "A" continued extensive reconnaissance on the division front. Milena was occupied by patrols from 82nd Rcn Bn on this day.

f. 20th Engrs was relieved from its mission on the high ground east of Licata and was organized into groups to conduct battlefield salvage.

g. 10th Engrs continued its work in clearing such mine fields and wire as had been reported. Operations in the Licata port area continued.

11. Period 2400 July 16th - 2400 July 17th.

a. 1st Bn, 7th Inf continued its attack against Agrigento, encountering scattered strong points and fierce street fighting. Artillery fire during the day had so weakened the defenses so that the rapid and determined advance forced

Marion's Page -

12 of 7 pgs.

e. Patrols from the 3d Rcn Tr were active in area North and Northwest of Raffadali.

f. Orders from CG 7th Army dissolved Joss Force as of 1800 and placed the 3d Infantry Division in Prov Corps. F.O. #1 from Corps directed the advance on Palermo on designated zones and phase lines. F.O. #9, 3d Inf Div, concentrated RCTs and prepared them for move to NW. The 15th RCT with 4th Tabor of Goums attached started move on Melina at 1730. The 30th Inf moved at 1800 to vicinity of Aragona. F.O. #10 initiated the advance at 0500, 19 July to Green phase line.

13. The advance on Palermo will be covered in a later report. Operations of the division covered in this report are shown in overlays No. 1 to 10 attached as Tab A (1).

SECTION II-INTELLIGENCE
(Training Phase)

1. General.

Intelligence training for the Joss Operation following the training directives of higher headquarters and the lessons learned in Torch Operations and the Battle of Tunisia.

2. Basic Intelligence training in the following subjects was emphasized:

- a. Scouting and Patrolling. (Dismounted and motor patrolling.).
- b. Map Reading.
- c. Identification of enemy uniform and equipment. (Including air craft).
- d. Communications.
- e. Aerial Photos.
- f. Signs, symbols and abbreviations.
- g. Camouflage.
- h. Enemy Tactics.

3. Method

a. Training was of a practical nature, conducted on the field when possible and classroom work reduced to a minimum. A minimum of two night problems a week were required of all regularly assigned intelligence personnel. This training proved valuable in developing initiative and self-reliance. Intelligence units were worked against organizations other than their own in order to develop a higher degree of training. Troops were given much instruction personally rather than by the publication of numerous instruction sheets. Frequent spot checks on training were made by members of the G-2 Section. This had the advantage of stimulating training and building a more complete understanding between headquarters and personnel of units. Battalion intelligence sections were increased from 6 to 10 men in order to take care of losses in combat and to provide a sufficient number of personnel to perform battalion intelligence duties 24 hours a day.

b. Training memoranda covering subjects listed under paragraph No. 2 above were issued to lower units at frequent intervals.

4. Radio Intercept

Mission.

The Radio Intelligence Platoon of the 3rd Signal Company was given the mission of furnishing "Y" Service (enemy intercept) for the Division, and "J" Service (monitoring friendly nets) for the Division and Force #343. The Platoon was given this mission approximately one month before the Operation began.

b. Organization.

T/O Strength: 1 Officer and 34 Enlisted Men.

Officer in Charge: Ottis A. Davis, 1st Lt., 3rd Sig. Co.

Team "Y" consisted of 16 Operators using 4 Radio Receivers capable of working any Frequency between 150 Kcs to 2000 Kcs. Six of these Operators were linguists, three Italian and three German.

c. Training.

- (1) Each team was trained separately because each team had a separate mission.
- (2) Team "Y": It was contemplated that the Division would encounter both German and Italian Troops, so six linguists from the Units within the Division were attached to the Platoon for training to be used in the Operation.
- (3) The Team was first trained in the most commonly used military terms, abbreviations, symbols and stereotype messages used by the enemy. Then the Team was trained in recognizing the German and Italian Stations by copying news reports, and some known tactical nets of radio.
- (4) "J" Service had been used by the British VIII Army in the Tunisian Campaign and worked out successfully. Captain Hertog, a British Officer who worked "J" Service in the Tunisian Campaign, was sent from AFHQ to 3rd Signal Company to assist in the Training of a Team for "J" Service. The Team was first trained in copying voice message that were most commonly used by front line units, then monitoring all tactical nets within the Division, during the training period before the operation for security purposes.
- (5) An Army intercept team of one officer and six men (three radio operators and three code clerks) were provided by the 128th Sig Co (RI) to accompany the Task Force. They were to receive the information obtained by radio intercept of the parent organization which remained in Bizerte.

5. Exercise "Copybook".

- a. The exercise "Copybook" (a full scale dress rehearsal) was useful from an intelligence standpoint in two ways. The fact was brought out that the liaison plane had considerable possibility when used as a means of getting information. In fact, the first information of interest to G-2 came from this source. The problem ended too soon to give the various intelligence agencies much opportunity to transmit any volume of information to division headquarters.
- b. The other advantage of "Copybook" from an intelligence standpoint was that it gave Eastern Base Section and the Counter Intelligence Corps an opportunity to check the effectiveness of security measures in the area. Results of the check showed the need of tightening up the measures in effect.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
(Planning Phase)

1. General:

a. Intelligence for Joss came from many sources. In order to collect, and evaluate and disseminate this information, Major Grover Wilson, A C of S, G-2, 3rd Infantry Division was selected as a member of the Joss Force Planning Board. Lt. Col. Henriques, operations, and Capt. Butler, photographic interpreter, of the British Army and Lt. Col. Mercer C. Walter, 3rd Infantry Division were later added. As the plan developed, naval and air corps members were added to the board, who, in addition to other matters, assisted in furnishing intelligence from their respective headquarters.

b. Information on terrain, communications, customs of the people, and towns was very good and came principally from two sources - ISIS (British topographical Survey) and Aerial Photographs. Practically all the information of fixed defenses came from aerial photographs. Information of the beaches was given by the Navy and verified by the ISIS and aerial photographs. Relief models were employed to give a proper appreciation of terrain. Their use early in the planning stages is essential. Timely photos and their accurate interpretation is vital to proper planning of such an operation. Had the necessary planning been dependent on aerial photos and interpretations furnished thru regular channels it would have seriously delayed the proper planning. Fortunately, Joss Force was assigned a photographic interpreter and arranged special photo missions whereby the results were obtained within 48 hours or less after a request was made.

2. Information File.

a. A Joss Force Information File enclosed as Tab B (2) was published to all units of the force for the purpose of creating a file whereby all intelligence information could be kept together and changes in the form of addenda could be added as new information became available.

3. Intelligence (G-2) Plan.

a. A G-2 plan was prepared covering three phases of operation: 1st (offshore), 2nd (Beach Assault), 3rd (Beach inland to objective). The essential elements of information were supplied by the Commanding General. This plan is enclosed as Tab B (1).

4. Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory.

a. Purpose.

(1) The Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) is the military organization set up to preserve law and order and provide for the safety and welfare of the civilians in occupied territories. All powers of government and jurisdiction in the occupied territory over its inhabitants and final administrative responsibility were to be vested in General H. R. Alexander, General Officer Commanding and Military Governor, and the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories was established to exercise these powers under his direction.

(2) The exercise of the powers of the Crown of Italy were to be suspended during the period of military occupation and the Fascist Party and all discriminatory decrees and laws were to be annulled.

(3) The administrative and judicial officials of the provinces

and communes and all other government and municipal functionaries and employees, of state, municipal or other public services, except such persons who were known Fascists, were to be required to carry on their normal functions in order that the civilians would not be faced with complete disruption of public utilities, food and water supplies and protection of life and property. The AMGOT personnel, upon occupation of a commune by the military, planned to post proclamations advising the populace of the new order and endeavored to ferret out the undesirables and Fascists in key points and replace them with persons of non-Fascist tendencies without disrupting the normal routine to too great an extent. In many instances this would necessitate the complete running of the Civil Government by the AMGOT until such time as the local police could be reorganized and a Civil Government properly established.

b. Organization.

(1) The AMGOT personnel attached to Joss Force was organized as follows: Chief of Section, Assistant to the Chief, Public Safety Officer and Two Assistants, Civilian Supply Officer and Assistant, Public Health Officer, and Finance Officer.

(2) The planning schedules for AMGOT called for another British Major well versed in General Administration and for 12 - 15 enlisted men who were to be drivers, clerks and interpreters. The British Major and these men did not arrive by the time Joss Force started its operation; neither did the transportation which was promised and badly needed.

c. All facilities and information in the planning headquarters were made available to AMGOT personnel and the detailed plans of the operation were presented to them in order that they might properly carry out their instructions from higher headquarters.

5. Photo Interpretation.

a. General.

During the planning stage, the best information available of the topography and of the fixed defenses was obtainable from air photographs. As a result the tactical plan of each unit was mainly based upon, or considerably influenced by the information extracted from the air photographs. A ground check after landing revealed this type of information as being extremely accurate. Apart from the detailed interpretation of each defensive position, the following information, mainly of a topographical nature, was also obtained from the air photographs.

Topography: Lengths and widths of beaches.
Types of cultivation.
Exits from the beaches.
Estimations of heights of cliffs, river banks, etc.
Bridges and culverts.
Silhouettes and prominent features useful for landing.
Crossing of River Salso.
Road and tracks into the interior.
Places on the railway crossable by M/T.

Defenses: Location of defensive installations, including obstacles.
Arcs of fire of each CD position, pillbox and MG position.
Amount of "dead ground" of each gun position.
Ways of approach to each gun position.

b. Distribution of Information.

The photographic interpreter went over the photographs stereoscopically with each regimental and battalion commander and S-2. In addition to this, the information enclosed in Joss Force Information File was distributed by the following means:

(1) Defense overlays with description (issued by this Headquarters)

| | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|-----|
| First report issued 11 June 1943. | No. of copies | 150 |
| Second report issued 18 June 1943. | No. of copies | 150 |
| Third report issued 28 June 1943. | No. of copies | 200 |
| Fourth report issued 1 July 1943. | No. of copies | 200 |

(2) Defense overprints (issued by Force 343)

1st edition printed May 1943. This edition was too diagrammatic in the presentation of its information to be of any great assistance in the detail planning.

2nd edition printed 19 June 1943. The information of this edition was very excellently presented and was subsequently found to be extremely useful. This Division did not receive these overprints for distribution until the 3rd July 1943. This delay is considered too long and would have been serious if the Division had depended upon these overprints for its planning. There did not seem to be any reason why these overprints should not have been in the hands of this Division two days after the printing.

(3) Annotated Mosaics (issued by G-2 Section, 3rd Infantry Division).

1 - East of Licata showing defense and topographical information issued 5th July 1943. No. of copies: 50.

(4) Photographs:

The ultimate supply of photographs was good but the time lag throughout the planning phases and the campaign from the time the photographs were taken to the time they were received by this Headquarters was much too great. This meant that the Division was planning and fighting on information that was too old. In some cases photographic sorties of the same area but of different dates arrived at this Headquarters at the same time. This meant that the latest sortie only was interpreted and consequently the other sorties were wasted. Of great value were oblique photos of beaches and adjacent foothills. The following is considered to be the maximum requirements of photographs for the needs of the Division:

(a) Initial cover of an area - 5 copies.

Distribution: 1 copy for divisional Headquarters
1 copy for divisional Artillery
1 copy for each regimental Headquarters

(b) Subsequent cover - 1 copy for divisional Headquarters only.

(c) Prior to any operation, approximately 30-50 copies of specific prints covering the exact area would be ordered. These would be circulated to the formations lower than Regimental Headquarters.

6. Counter-Intelligence.

a. The counter-intelligence plan for Joss Force was two-fold: Near shore and far shore security.

(1) Near Shore.

(a) Near Shore security was carried out in cooperation with G-2 section EBS at Mateur. Internal security in Joss Force was safeguarded by an effective CS system operating all units: By the CIC field security detachment under 1st Lt. Jack B. Cameron, with 1 officer and 11 agents.

(b) Object of all security measures was to deny the enemy knowledge of the destination of the force, the time for departure, and the units involved in the operation.

(c) Security measures employed by EBS included the following:

(1) Arrest and detention of all suspects considered dangerous or potentially dangerous.

(2) Establishment of road blocks to spot check traffic and keep unauthorized personnel out of the assembly and embarkation areas.

(3) Signal security of all EBS communications in the Bizerte - Mateur area.

(d) Routine spot checks were made by CIC personnel to ensure that the above measures were being carried out.

(e) One of the most dangerous violations of security was the presence of large numbers of poorly guarded German and Italian prisoners in the Bizerte - Ferryville area. These prisoners were being used on work details. Their presence in the area increased the risk of loss of security should they escape and transmit what they had seen to Germany or Italy. Efforts to have them removed were unsuccessful.

(2) Far Shore.

(a) General.

The counter-intelligence plan for Joss Force far shore had for its objectives the security on the far shore of an initial beach-head and was divided in two parts:

1st - Security of the Port and town of Licata.

2nd - Security of all other areas.

(1) Port Security.

CIC Port Section "A" Joss Force was to land with the 15th Infantry at beach yellow. The Section was divided into five teams, two of which were to operate in the port area and three in the town area. Their mission was to establish emergency security at the port and to provide counter-intelligence security in the town proper.

As soon as practicable the port and town installations were to be taken over by the Beach Group under command of the CO 36th Engineers. At that time the control of the Port CIC Section "A" was to pass to control of the Port Commander.

CIC objectives in Licata were: Police station, post office, RR station, ports, docks, customs buildings, town hall, telephone exchange, road and RR bridge over river Salso, public utilities, banks, etc.

Search and detention of all known enemy agents and suspects, was to be made.

(2) CIC section, Field Security.

The CIC security section, composed of one officer and five men were to land with the 7th Infantry on Beach Red. Their objectives were to search enemy CP's, bivouac areas, battle field casualties and fixed defensive positions for documents of intelligence value, including radio direction finders, searchlight positions and radio stations.

b. General Instructions Relative to CIC.

(1) All CIC sections were to operate under 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced) Headquarters, conducting investigations of subversive, sabotage, and espionage cases, making arrest, searching civilian homes for concealed weapons, handling security problems, and in general carrying out the Counter Intelligence functions within the jurisdiction of the Force.

(2) During the combat phase of the operation CIC personnel planned to operate in uniform identifying themselves by green arm bands bearing the red letters "C. I. C."

(3) All members of the C. I. C. were to have complete power of arrest over civilian and military personnel, both enemy and allied, as pertains to counter-intelligence matters.

(4) Civilians captured for any subversive acts involving espionage, or sabotage were not to be released from PWI until such persons had been cleared by the CIC.

7. Public Relations.

a. Public Relations was handled by one public relations officer, Lt. L. G. Hoover, Allied Force Headquarters; one radio commentator, Mr. Merrill Mueller, and one news Photographer, Mr. Charles Corte, were attached to the Joss Force for the operation. A quarter-ton truck and trailer was provided by higher headquarters for their use. The radio commentator provided dispatches for all news services and the photographer likewise furnished pictures for all picture services. In other words, their work was completely pooled as was the work of correspondents and photographers with other forces.

b. Arrangements were made to send unprocessed film back through Near Shore Control to the Army Pictorial Service at Algiers and to send a 100 word dispatch during the first 10 hours by radio to Seventh Army Headquarters. As matters worked out, many channels were used in sending photographs and dispatches to North Africa, planes being available at the Licata landing ground after the second day.

c. The radio commentator and photographers with the force had both had considerable experience with the Army during the Tunisian Campaign and required no special arrangements other than those noted above.

8. Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams.

a. A detachment of Prisoner of War Interrogators was attached to Joss Force by AFHQ prior to the commencement of the operation "Husky". This detachment, consisting of five officers and ten enlisted men and having been drawn from the PWI pool at the Combined Services, Detailed Interrogation Center, reported with transportation to the Commanding General, Joss Force on 17 June, 1943.

b. The detachment was divided into four teams, consisting of one officer and two enlisted men each, and representing within each team a minimum of one Italian speaking and one German speaking interrogator, so that the battalions following immediately upon the assault units might be provided with a means of obtaining information of tactical value from prisoners of war. One team accompanied CC "A" and one team remained at Joss Force Headquarters.

c. During the planning phase the Prisoner of War Interrogators were briefed on their part of the operation and instructed as to the contemplated plan of operation. All information from higher headquarters covering Order of Battle in Sicily was made available to them. They were then attached to the RCT's so that they might become acquainted with those people with whom they were to work.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE
(Operations Phase)

1. Operational Procedure.

a. A situation map was kept from which an overlay was taken every 24 hours showing enemy situation as of 2400B daily. Separate map was kept showing results of tactical air reconnaissance.

b. The only file maintained was the journal in which all incoming and outgoing messages were posted. Information copies of pertinent messages were sent to other staff sections.

c. Spot reports of important incidents were forwarded immediately to higher headquarters and subordinate units. G-2 Periodic Reports, daily as of 2400B with the daily 24 hour enemy situation overlay, are attached as Tab B (1). These overlays and Periodic Reports show the daily contact with the enemy forces together with known facts concerning the enemy and his gun emplacements, dumps, reserves, movements, etc., for that particular day.

d. An information liaison tent was established where liaison officers from lower commands made their headquarters between trips to their units to deliver and receive information for G-2 and other staff sections. Tactical information was sent to the liaison tent in order that they might keep abreast of the situation.

e. The G-2 journal contains the complete detailed account of all instructions and information sent to G-2 with the noted action taken by G-2. All operations and movements pertaining to G-2 are also covered in the journal.

2. Ground Reconnaissance.

a. Close-in ground reconnaissance was performed aggressively by numerous foot and motor patrols within the zone of advance of each unit.

b. In addition to unit reconnaissance, the 3rd Reconnaissance Troop performed missions as assigned prior to D-day as covered in Field Order No. 5, 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced), (Tab A (6)). Subsequent reconnaissance missions were carried out over a wide area on both flanks and in the forward area. After the landing, CC "A" performed the bulk of reconnaissance to the front and subsequent to their transfer Co B of the 82nd Reconnaissance Troop took over reconnaissance under division control. Reconnaissance missions were planned a day in advance and the unit commanders or their liaison officers were briefed as to the required information.

3. Aerial Reconnaissance.

a. Requests: In addition to pre-arranged reconnaissance missions that were laid on by higher headquarters, daily requests were made through the attached air-support party to the XII Air Support Command for missions covering Joss area.

b. Results: Tactical reconnaissance reports for the island as a whole came in from the first day of the operation. Specific information of the Joss area was somewhat slower and did not really begin to give a suitable picture until after the third day of the landing. This is believed to have been due to poor communication facilities of XII ASC when afloat. After the third day, when the XII Air Support Command communications were set up on the shore, considerably more information became available. A separate tactical reconnaissance

map was maintained and a general picture of enemy movements was obtainable at any time. However, the information received was not in sufficient detail for accurate route reconnaissance or ground locations.

c. Air Photo Interpretation: After the landing several sorties of aerial photographs were received. Due to the rapidity of the advance they were of little value.

4. Radio Intercept.

a. 3rd Signal Intercept.

(1) Operation: "Y" Service.

A large amount of enemy traffic was intercepted each day but all messages were in code and could not be broken. A Signal Intelligence Team would have been valuable in breaking these messages.

(2) "J" Service.

All Reconnaissance and Regimental Nets were monitored. Approximately twenty messages were intercepted per day. All messages which pertained to the enemy or friendly dispositions, and did not violate security, were retransmitted to Force #343 in their original form or code.

(3) "Y" and "J" service would have been more successful if the platoon had been working only one of these services. Either service requires all personnel and equipment within the platoon to work successfully.

b. Army Intercept. With the exception of one message the "Y" Service Intercept provided by the detachment of the 128th RI Co failed to furnish any information of the enemy.

5. Operation of PW Teams.

a. The PWI team attached to RCT-7 was landed with the battalion following the assault battalion and began to interrogate PW's on the beach. An enclosure was hastily erected shortly thereupon and the interrogation was conducted within the enclosure. AS RCT-7 began to advance inland, the interrogation teams followed the Regimental Headquarters. All prisoners taken by RCT-7 were evacuated to the rear along the main axis of advance. The interrogation team met and interrogated prisoners along this route. After an appreciable advance inland had been attained, the PWI teams remained near the Regimental CP where they were able to intercept PW's being evacuated from all battalions of RCT-7.

b. The PWI team attached to the 2nd Battalion, RCT-15, was landed with that battalion and began to interrogate on the beach where a number of PW's had already been gathered. When the 2nd Battalion began to advance inland, the PWI team followed and interrogated along the axis of evacuation. During the later phase of the operation they interrogated in the vicinity of the Regimental CP. Later this team was returned to Division Cage.

c. The PWI team attached to RCT-15 was landed with the battalion immediately following the assault battalion and began interrogation on the beach. It followed the advance inland of RCT-15 and interrogated along the road, down which the PW's were being evacuated. After the initial day's action the team conducted interrogation at the Regimental CP.

d. The PWI team attached to the RCT-30 was probably the first PWI team ashore. At that time, it obtained information from a PW that enabled a unit

of RCT-30 to out-flank an enemy strong point and take the position without difficulty. An enclosure was erected on the beach and the PWI team remained at this place the better part of the morning. Later in the day they caught up with RCT-30 and began interrogating along the axis of evacuation.

e. The PWI team attached to CC "A" was not landed until D plus 2. By this time, the unit PW cage had already been erected in Campobello and the team worked at this point.

f. The team attached to Joss Force Headquarters was landed early in the afternoon on D-day. There was a large number of PW's at RCT-15 enclosure, and therefore, this team went to work there. At a later period during D-day this team joined Joss Force Headquarters and began to carry on their work at the division cage in Licata.

g. After the initial phase of the operation was over (D-day) the PWI teams interrogated PW's at RCT collecting points when PW's were available there. When PW's ceased to arrive at a central collecting point within the RCT, PWI teams moved themselves to different locations along the axis of evacuation and continued their work in rear of the assault battalion CP's.

h. A total of 12,322 prisoners had been processed as of 2400, 18 July and each PW team had interrogated an average of 25 prisoners a day for detailed interrogation.

i. Attached as Tab B (5) is an overlay showing identifications daily as of 2400B of enemy units in Joss Zone of Advance.

6. CIC Port Section "A" Missions and Operations.

a. Licata.

(1) Port Section "A" landed at beach yellow with the 15th Infantry. The CO of CIC Port Section "A" landed at H plus 45 minutes and the balance of his personnel at 1000B. Upon landing the section divided as outlined in previous plans and entered Licata with the assault troops. Between H plus 45 and 1800B, 11 July 1943, the following CIC missions were accomplished.

(a) Enemy positions between beach yellow and Licata searched and all documents collected.

(b) Port Security established.

(c) Security established in town of Licata.

(d) Enemy positions surrounding Licata searched and documents collected.

(e) Immediate liaison with AMGOT and ONI.

(2) After proper security had been established in Licata the section was divided into two groups. Under the CO, 1st Lt. J. B. Cameron, four men operated as the assault section and moved as previously directed toward the next port. Under Lt. Van Kirk five men remained in Licata until they were relieved by CIC Port Section "B" personnel, or CIC section personnel, Seventh Army, at which time they were to join the assault section of Port Section "A".

b. Agrigento and Porto Empedocle.

(1) Assault Section of Port Section "A" entered the outskirts of Agrigento at 0200 17 July, surveyed the situation and returned to the CP 7th Infantry for the balance of the section. The section then entered the city at 0630B.

(2) Looting and rioting were prevalent in the city as there were no American guards nor any AMGOT officials. After two hours the rioting quelled by the CIC Section. Immediate steps were taken to re-establish the civil government pending the arrival of AMGOT by taking the necessary action with the Carabinieri, the Fire Chief, the City Public Health Officer and director of the City Hospital and a Civil Engineer.

(3) The General Vicar for the Province of Agrigento, Monsignor Saturo Antonio offered his services during the rioting. He placed his priests throughout the city to quell disorder, gather the dead, bring in public officials and advise as to the general situation.

(4) At 1330 on the 17th of July, AMGOT officials arrived and the above mentioned action and information received brought to their attention.

(5) All CIC missions were accomplished for Agrigento and Porto Empedocle which for the most part were similar to those outlined under 6 a for Licata. Port Security and security in the cities of Agrigento and Porto Empedocle were established in the same manner as for the town of Licata.

7. AMGOT.

a. Major Ashworth, the Public Safety Officer, landed with the 15th Infantry assault force on D-day. He proceeded to the city of Licata as soon as it fell and arranged for police protection. The balance of the AMGOT force landed sometime later on D-day at Licata and established an office in the local City Hall. The local governing officials were immediately contacted and assisted in organizing the city government under American occupation. Many problems were encountered as electric power was not available and the inhabitants had no way of grinding their grain because the mills had shut down. As a result, there was a food shortage. There was loss of property for which claims were made; questions of farmers being permitted to move about with their herds and flocks and many other problems in the handling of the civilian population. Proclamations were posted and the inhabitants were made to understand that AMGOT and the Americans were not there to exploit them but to administer justice.

b. AMGOT officials entered Canicatti, Favara, and Agrigento, as soon after the army occupied these towns as was possible. Due to their lack of personnel and vehicles there was some delay. In some cases lack of transportation and personnel prohibited AMGOT from entering smaller towns. None of the AMGOT vehicles arrived and consequently they had no mode of travel except for an occasional borrowed vehicle and a rare commandeered civilian car. Problems similar to those mentioned in the previous paragraph were encountered throughout the entire sector in addition to other problems of a localized nature.

8. Public Relations.

a. Frequent mention of the success of the landing at Licata during news broadcasts early in the campaign indicates that the dispatches reached their destination without undue delay, although it is possible the announcements were made direct to the press by higher headquarters on the basis of military reports. News reporters and photographers, including Mr. Michael Chinigo of International News Service were given permission to visit any sector of the front they desired. They were briefed in the situation as frequently as possible.

SECTION III- SUPPLY
(Training Phase)

1. Background: The training of the Third Infantry Division for operation "Husky" cannot be considered as commencing in North Africa at Fifth Army Invasion Training Center. Rather, it has been a continuous process since 1939 at Fort Lewis, Washington when the Division experiments, trained and evolved principles for a landing from transports on hostile shores.

a. A key note of this early training was the search for a solution to the supply problem presented when an Infantry Division is cut off from its normal base of supply and must take along with it, on transports and freighters, a sufficient quantity of supplies to exist for a period of sixty to ninety days. A corollary to this problem was the necessity of removing the supplies from transports and freighters across beaches and to the Division wherever it might be fighting.

b. During the period before the North African landing valuable logistical data was accumulated; Standing Operation Procedures were established and published concerning supply, embarkation and debarkation. Transport Quartermasters were trained and became familiar with the use of templates in planning, priority unloading lists, scale loading diagrams and Navy operation. To move the supply across the beaches, a beach or shore party was created, first composed of a loose organization of Division troops including supply and evacuation elements as well as labor and later composed of a separate Engineer Beach Group charged with supply responsibility.

c. This early amphibious training culminated as part of the Western Task Force in operation "Torch" against North Africa. This operation was invaluable experience in that it proved and disproved some of the principles established during early training.

2. Fifth Army Invasion Training Center. Amphibious training of the Division received little attention from the conclusion of the operation "Torch" November 1942 until the establishment of the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center at Arzew, Algeria in the month of February 1943. At that time intensive concentration began on the problem of perfecting amphibious operation from shore to shore instead of ship to shore.

a. By direction of Fifth Army, Division Staff representatives, including an assistant G-4, were sent to inspect training facilities, make suggestions and recommendations and return to the Division to initiate amphibious training.

(1) It was found that the training at the Center was concerned with shore to shore operation, using shipping designed to place the Division on the hostile shore with little disturbance to the normal triangular operation.

(2) Recommendations were made and adopted that a Transport Quartermaster School be established, that the training include actual loading and unloading of supplies upon which the troops being trained would depend for sustenance.

b. Immediately following the inspection made by the Division Staff Officers, regimental and separate battalion executive officers, S-3's and S-4's were sent to the Training Center for preview of the projected training.

c. The Division was then moved by Regimental Combat Teams to the Center and received the following training in embarkation, supply and evacuation:

(1) Training for embarkation was taught by a Transport Quartermaster School and by practice loadings and unloadings concluding with Regimental Combat Team exercises.

(a). The Transport Quartermaster School was not fully effective because of the speed with which the training had to be conducted and because the personnel and units sent to attend, in general, were not the personnel who were later Transport Quartermasters for operation "Husky". The school emphasized theoretical organization of Ports of embarkation and loading problems which are the responsibility of higher headquarters. It did not emphasize the need or the means for organization involving the S-3's, S-4's and Unit Commanders in planning priority discharge lists and loading diagrams.

(b). The practice loadings were inadequate in that they consisted in running a few vehicles on a craft to see if they would "fit" rather than in attempting complete loading based on loading plans and diagrams.

(c). The training time allowed to Regimental Combat Team exercise was extremely beneficial. Units were able to check loading plans, officers and drivers became familiar with the characteristics and capabilities of craft and by trial and error learned the most efficient methods of loading.

(d). All training in debarkation at the Center was received during the combat team exercises. The problem of unloading the LST on a shallow beach was not solved and none of the methods finally used in "Husky" were tried. However, training received in the unloading of supplies was of inestimable value

(1). The 2½-Ton Truck, Amphibious proved the ideal solution for transporting supplies from craft to beach dumps.

(2). The Engineer Shore Party was increased by trained supply troops and additional labor and equipment which enabled them to construct beach exits and establish operating supply dumps.

(2). The Training Center solved one of the most difficult problems in amphibious landings when it effectively trained the Division in using the asbestos fibre grease method of water-proofing vehicles. Personnel became familiar with its use and the grease enabled practically complete normal operation of vehicles immediately upon landing.

(3). The Division G-4 Section and the Division Special Supply Staff carried on an intensive study of the logistical problem. Detailed studies of the new craft were made and complete scale drawings prepared. Scale model templates of all vehicles were made and vehicle loadings tried. Responsibility of various phases of loading and unloading were reviewed. Standing Operating Procedures were initiated to crystalize thoughts and ideas received during the training period. The new craft available for use (LCI'S, LCT'S, LCVP (R)'S, LCA'S AND LST'S) were enthusiastically received as being an attempt to adapt the shipping so that the Division would be placed on the hostile shore with a minimum of interruption in its normal operation.

d. The training at the Center was abruptly concluded when the Division moved to enter the Tunisian campaign.

3. Early in April the Division had received the directive from higher headquarters concerning operation "Husky". A Planning Board was established and continued functioning so that when the Division returned to the Jemmapes area from Tunisia in May specific training for the operation began immediately. This training did not involve matters of supply. The activities of embarkation and evacuation were arrested until the solution to the tactical problem had been completed so that the composition and the timing of movement of the units, vehicles and weapons would be established.

4. "Copy Book".

a. Rehearsal of "Joss" Force for the invasion of the Island of Sicily was designated by the code name of "Copy Book". The plan was to make "Copy Book" as near like the actual operation as was possible. It was contemplated

to embark all troops and equipment in the assault echelon of the force and to utilize in the exercise, every landing craft that was to participate in the actual operation. The value of a complete practice for such an operation was clearly realized and every attempt was made to make "Copy Book" a perfect rehearsal. After "Copy Book" it was planned to have all craft carrying vehicles remain loaded, ready for the operation. This meant that the loading of "Copy Book" was to be the actual loading for the operation.

b. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to carry out this plan due to the fact that some organizations attached to the Division and designated to participate in the assault had not yet arrived, that some vehicles had not yet arrived, that a considerable amount of supplies had not yet arrived, and that approximately twenty-five Navy craft were either not operational or had not yet reported.

c. Thus, to a certain extent, the loading for "Copy Book" was artificial and, upon termination of the exercise, necessitated considerable unloading and reloading of craft.

d. Another complicating factor was that water-proofing material did not arrive until three days before the actual loading commenced. A detailed plan for waterproofing and training for water-proofers had been worked out prior to this time. However, due to the late arrival of water-proofing material, these plans had to be abandoned. The actual water-proofing had to be decentralized to the units of the force who worked day and night to accomplish the job prior to their "Copy Book" loading date. Due to this, the water-proofing for "Copy Book" was not done in an entirely satisfactory manner and, after the exercise, required constant and energetic checking of all vehicles loaded on craft to insure that water-proofing met the proper standards.

e. The conduct of the exercise "Copy Book", from a G-4 standpoint, was relatively simple. It consisted of the complete unloading across the beach of all LCT's which were loaded with the beach group, tanks, assault infantry vehicles and a portion of the artillery. It involved the unloading of all personnel not connected with vehicles and testing the unloading of LST's both by the use of the Navy pontoon bridge and by shuttling with LCT's. This was the first opportunity for the "Joss" Force to test the feasibility of unloading by pontoon bridge from LST's. Results were entirely satisfactory and vehicles, tanks, and tractor drawn 155-mm Howitzers were unloaded.

f. Due to the amount of supply and time involved it was impracticable to rehearse the loading of supply; however, in order to test a standard plan of loading supplies and to give training in unloading, three LCT's were loaded with three days' rations, gasoline and water for the entire force. The plan of loading these LCT's was to load the supplies in three equal sections, extending from bow to the stern and each the width of a 2½-ton Truck. In each of these sections one type of supply was to be loaded so that all three would be immediately available, depending upon the needs of the moment. The loading enabled three trucks to unload simultaneously with three separate types of supply available. These three LCT's were loaded but, due to the time allowed for "Copy Book", the opportunity to unload them on the beach was not presented. The value of this plan was, however, amply demonstrated.

SECTION III - SUPPLY
(Planning Phase)

1. Directives from Higher Headquarters.

a. Specific embarkation, supply and evacuation planning of task force "Joss" for the "Husky" operation began with the receipt from higher headquarters of a directive; a supply plan, and a list of craft (See Planning Tab A(2), Tabs C (1) and A (3) respectively.) These documents gave the following important embarkation, supply and evacuation factors concerning the assigned mission:

(1) Composition of a sub-task force consisting of the Third Infantry Division (Reinforced) with four battalions of engineers (combat) as beach party; combat units in addition to the division, including an armored combat team, armored artillery, field artillery, coast artillery; and army supply troops, including two truck companies, an ordnance battalion with all types of ordnance maintenance; quartermaster service and railhead troops and supply depot troops for each service.

(2) Responsibility of supplying the Third Infantry Division (Reinforced) for a period of 30 days following D-day.

(3) The operation contemplated a shore-to-shore movement.

(4) The craft available for transportation of the force and its supplies were to be 40 LST's; 86 LCT's; 54 LCI's; LCVP (R)'s for assault battalions, two LSI's and one headquarters ship.

(5) The force would be landed on defended beaches in the vicinity of the Ports of Sciacca and Mazzara del Vallo.

(6) The types of supply and basis for figuring the amounts of supply to be furnished the task force for its support.

(7) Phase requisitions had been computed and submitted by I Armored Corps (Reinforced) on a basis of seven days' supplies separately for the assault phases, D plus 4 phase, D plus 8 phase, etc.

2. Planning Board.

a. In order to transform ideas and methods created during general training into concerted action designed to accomplish the mission, a Planning Board was established separate from the division general and special staff offices. The board included in its personnel the G-4, the assistant G-4 and the heads of the division supply staff together with other specialists such as the division ammunition officer.

b. At various times during the planning period the board called on other members of the division services for assistance in finding the solution to specific technical problems.

3. Estimate of the Situation.

a. Under direction of the G-4, the supply members of the planning board began immediately upon an estimate of the situation which included consideration of:

(1) Mission.

- (2) Terrain.
- (3) Shipping available.
- (4) Supply requirements of the force.
- (5) The capabilities of the supply troops furnished the force.
- (6) Facilities available for embarkation.
- (7) Duties and responsibilities of higher headquarters and Service of Supply, North African Theater of Operations.

4. Problems to be Solved.

a. After careful consideration of the matters involved in the estimate of the situation the following problems were presented for solution:

- (1) General ideas and methods proven in general training had to be reduced to operational directives.
- (2) The miscellaneous disconnected supply troops had to be organized under single authority prior to the operation and indoctrinated with their duties and responsibilities.
- (3) The normal channels of supply must not be disturbed save for exceptional circumstances.
- (4) Special equipment needed for the operation must be determined and immediately procured.
- (5) Material and equipment must be especially prepared for the specific operation.
- (6) Transport quartermasters must be provided for each craft other than LCVF (R)'s.
- (7) The types and quantities of supplies to be taken in the assault, first and subsequent followups had to be computed and procured, based on the actual units, vehicles, and weapons scheduled to participate in the operation instead of based on an estimate of the composition of the force represented by the phase requisitions made by higher headquarters.
- (8) Procedures for the embarkation must be established.

5. Solutions.

a. The approved solutions to most of the problems presented were embodied in instructions prepared and published to the command beginning May 27, 1943 and entitled "Embarkation, Supply and Evacuation Plan." This series of directives included the following:

- (1) Section I - General Principles and Organization.
(See Tab C (2)).

(a) Early in the planning phase it was clearly recognized that for a force the size of Joss (three times the normal strength of the division with approximately 50 separate attached units) a special organization, other than the division service troops, would be necessary for supply, evacuation and embarkation. This fact was emphasized by the directive that the force would be prepared to sustain itself on Sicily for 21 to 30 days. It was obvious

also that the formation of this special organization could not wait until the actual landing but that it must be formed if possible prior to the concentration of the force in the staging area.

(b) Accordingly, the concept of supply control through "near shore", "far shore" and "beach sector" was crystallized and a scheme of special organization was drawn up to provide this control (see paragraph 2 of Section I, and Annexes No. 1 and 2.) It was necessary to form three new agencies to carry order to span the gap between Services of Supply on the friendly shore and the consuming troops on the hostile shore, and to control embarkation and shipping. Keeping in mind the basic principle that normal procedures and channels of operation should be retained wherever possible, the formation of the following agencies was evolved:

(1) Force Depot.

(2) Near Shore Control.

(3) Beach Group (Reorganized to fit Joss plan).

(c) Force Depot.

(1) Composition:

This installation consisted of all the quartermaster, ordnance, chemical, medical and signal supply troops attached to the division other than The Beach Group. It was controlled by a small provisional headquarters commanded by a Colonel, Quartermaster Corps especially procured for this purpose. His principal assistant and executive was a Major, Assistant G-4, who headed a staff consisting of a specially selected officer from each of the division services.

(2) Purpose:

The mission of the depot was to furnish to the Joss force all those services and evacuation normally supplied to a division in the field by an Army headquarters. The depot was set up to operate on the Near Shore exactly as it would be on the Far Shore of Sicily. It was capable of establishing truckheads and railheads anywhere on the island of Sicily and was charged with maintaining these installations at all times within 15 miles of the division rear boundary. Thus we have the unique but highly satisfactory arrangement of having the command of a higher echelon of supply and evacuation directly vested in the unit being supplied. The difficulty of this arrangement was that the Force Depot performed functions which would normally have been performed by an Army, and the burden of organizing and operating the supply and evacuation services for Joss force imposed a hardship on the division during the time it was actively engaged in its own planning and intensive training.

(d) Near Shore Control.

(1) Composition:

Near Shore Control was a provisional headquarters commanded by a Colonel especially procured for the purpose. This officer was also the commanding officer of all troops in the follow-up echelons. Near Shore Control included the division embarkation officer and division transport quartermaster (TQM), both from the G-4 section. It was also the headquarters for all subordinate TQM's.

(2) Purpose:

This installation was created to plan, control and sup-

ervise the embarkation of all organizations, and to load all supply ships. It worked in close harmony with the corresponding organization of the Navy and with the 1st Embarkation Group of EBS, which was charged by higher headquarters with the responsibility of the supply and embarkation of Joss force.

(e) Beach Group.

(1) Composition:

This installation consisted of a regiment of engineers (the 36th), especially organized as a division shore party, with one battalion of the 540th Engineers (Port) and certain medical and supply troops attached.

(2) Purpose:

Its purpose was to organize Beaches Red, Yellow and Blue so as to facilitate the landing of the force, to unload supplies and establish dumps, and, upon capture of the Port of Licata, to repair and operate this port.

(f) The organization of the Third Division and attached combat and supply troops was established (See paragraph 3 and Annex No. 4 to Tab C (3)). It will be noted that the channels of supply and the supply troops concerned were organized and functioning, upon arrival in the concentration area prior to embarkation, exactly as they were to be organized and were to function on the hostile shore during the operation.

(2) Section II - Supply and Evacuation (Tab C (2)).

(a) This section established quantity and method of issue and supply; and the method of evacuation prior to embarkation and during the operation.

(b) In Annex No. 1, entitled "Transportation and Loading of Supply," the standard loading of supply LCT's and LST's invented by the planning board was adopted.

(c) The tonnages of supply in the assault lift, including the amounts to be loaded in otherwise empty trucks, was set forth. (See Paragraph 3, Annex No. 1)

(3) Section III - General Instructions for the Preparation of Material and Equipment for Embarkation. (Tab C (2)).

(a) This section deals with tables for embarkation; identification and marking of material; preparation for craft loading, including maintenance and water-proofing and the procurement of special equipment.

(b) Inclosure No. 10 to this section established the items and amount of clothing and individual equipment to be carried by the individual soldier in the force. This instruction resulted from the planning board's desire to lighten the burden of the individual soldier in his dash across the beach and to enable every organization with slight assistance (19 additional 2½-ton trucks to each infantry regiment) to transport all of its equipment and baggage in its organic vehicles. The chief feature of the allowances established are the Squad Bag (1 per 4 men--see column 4; Incl. No. 10) and the sleeping bag or bedding roll (see column 3, Incl. No. 10).

(4) Section IV - Instructions for transport quartermasters (See Tab C (2)).

(5) Section V - Instructions for loading personnel on craft (See Tab C (2)).

b. As soon as the assignment of units, vehicles and weapons was made to the assault, first and subsequent followups and the composition of the force became established, it was revealed that the estimate used by higher headquarters upon which to compute supplies was far less than the actual composition of the force. Therefore, it was apparent that the planning board had to make its own computations and requisitions for supply in order that sufficient quantity and type would be assured.

(1) Using the supply plan furnished by higher headquarters as a basis of computation, quantities of all supplies were computed. Requisitions were not prepared but rather loading diagrams were prepared for the supply craft planned to be loaded. These diagrams showed, by supply service, the type, amount of supply required, and the manner of its stowage.

(2) The loading diagrams for supply in the assault were presented to the Eastern Base Section (1st Embarkation Group) who were responsible for the loading and procurement of supply for these convoys.

(3) The loading diagrams showing supply requirements for the D plus 4, D plus 8 and D plus 14 supply convoys were furnished to the Services of Supply, North African Theater of Operations, who were responsible for the loading and procurement of supply for these later convoys.

(4) In addition; due to the shortness of time and the immensity of the supply task involved, the increased ammunition requirements were sent by radio to I Armored Corps (Reinforced) and to the Services of Supply.

c. The tactical emphasis on artillery, whereby the maximum number of artillery units, vehicles and weapons were included in the assault and were intended to be used to the maximum in the operation, called for an examination of the unit of fire upon which all ammunition supply was based. This unit of fire was that established by the War Department and was included in the supply plan from higher headquarters to be used as a basis of ammunition computation. However, the division ammunition officer, during the battle of Tunisia, procured from the II Corps ammunition officer a list of the amount expended by the II Corps as an average day of fire. On comparison, in certain items, the War Department unit of fire was considered inadequate. In view of the projected use of artillery it was believed that the II Corps day of fire more nearly represented what would be the actual rate of expenditure in this operation. Therefore a revised unit of fire was created, based on the II Corps experience and the tactical situation foreseen. Lists of ammunition for the operation were prepared and sent to higher headquarters requesting that ammunition be furnished on this new basis. Even though time was short, by extreme effort higher headquarters and the Services of Supply were able to obtain the increased quantities of ammunition. The advisability of this increase was later proved in the operation where the amount of ammunition used exceeded the rate of expenditure established by the War Department unit of fire. At no time was the use of artillery or other weapons curtailed by the lack of ammunition.

6. Change in Mission.

a. In the midst of the planning phase instructions were received from higher headquarters that the mission of the division had been changed so that the landing was to be in the vicinity of the Port of Licata instead of the ports of Sciacca and Mazzara del Vallo.

(1) A study of the new terrain, including beaches and ports, disclosed no reason to change the supply planning which had preceded the announcement of the new destination because from the supply standpoint the two destinations were similar.

b. Shortly prior to embarkation, I Armored Corps (Reinforced) informed the division that its supply responsibility would not extend beyond D plus 14, at which time higher headquarters would take over supply. It was also indicated that it was probable that supply responsibility would be assumed by higher headquarters at an even earlier date.

(1) The only alteration in the plans caused by this change was that supply requirements had only to be computed for the assault, D plus 4, D plus 8, and D plus 14.

7. Administrative Order.

a. The final phase of the work of the supply members of the planning board was devoted to the careful preparation of Administrative Order No. 1 to accompany Field Order No. 5 (Operation Husky). (Tab. C (3)).

(1) Special care was taken in the preparation of the overlay to this administrative order so that location of dumps would be accurately determined and coordinated since it was necessary that every regimental, battalion and company commander have a clear understanding of where the supply installations were located.

(2) The only available maps were over 60 years old. To eliminate any possibility of error the overlay of the administrative order for the operation showing roads and installations was laboriously prepared from very recent air photographs.

SECTION III - SUPPLY
(Operations Phase)

1. General.

G-4 operations involving equipping, loading, embarkation, supply and evacuation will be considered under four headings according to the four groups which controlled and operated the force supply services during the operation: Force Depot, Near Shore Control, Beach Group and Division Supply Services.

2. Force Depot.

a. Concentration Area:

In the concentration area the Force Depot was located in an area between Ferryville and Mateur, south of Bizerte. It was based for supply on the Eastern Base Section of SOS. It was set up and in operation prior to the arrival of the first combat troops. The first mission of the Force Depot, excepting daily supply and maintenance, was the equipping of the division and attached units. One hundred per cent equipping was not attained due to the scarcity of many items in EBS. It is estimated, however, that upon embarkation all units were more than 95 per cent equipped and had all of their major items. In addition to T/BA equipment, a considerable number of specially authorized items were obtained and issued.

b. Operation on Far Shore:

The Force Depot continued operation in Africa until after the departure of the Assault Echelon of the Force and up until two days prior to the embarkation of the first follow-up which included a balanced operating portion of the Force Depot. This contingent landed on D + 3 and D + 4 days, took over central dumps and warehouses already established by the Beach Group just north and west of Licata, reconnoitered for other installations and began operation on D + 5 day. This marked the end of direct supply of troops by the Beach Group and resumption of normal supply of the force. The depot established railhead supply for all troops west of Licata and continued the operation of a daily train and advance railhead at Campobello which had been initiated on D + 4 day by the division quartermaster and division ammunition officer. The 10th Field Hospital and 11th Evacuation Hospital were landed and placed in operation east of Licata under the control of the Force Depot. These installations received casualties from the 3rd and 56th Medical Battalions, held and treated seriously wounded men, and evacuated hundreds of others by LST to Africa. During its period of operation the depot supplied, in addition to the Joss force, a regimental combat team of the 9th Infantry Division, major elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the entire 2nd Armored Division. Thus, for a short period the reinforced 3rd Infantry Division supplied more than 60,000 troops.

c. Dissolution of Force Depot:

The life of the Force Depot overseas was short, however. At midnight July 19, pursuant to instructions from 7th Army, all attached supply, medical and ordnance troops were detached from the division and attached to the newly-created Special Engineer Brigade. This occurred nine days after the landing and just as the rapid push of the division from Agrigento to Palermo began. Some of the units formerly operating under control of Force Depot, including ammunition and truck units, were removed entirely from the division area and were no longer available to perform the necessary supply and transportation functions. The Special Engineer Brigade, suddenly and unexpectedly thrust

into the picture while the combat operation was in full swing, was unable to coordinate the remaining units so as to fill the gap left vacant by the dissolution of Force Depot. As a result, the entire burden of supply was placed squarely on the division, which did not have sufficient organic transportation to maintain its own supply over the long distances which prevailed.

3. Near Shore Control.

a. Difficulty in obtaining personnel delayed the organization of Near Shore Control, and its establishment was not complete until just prior to "Copybook." While it worked well during embarkation for the assault, its value was most apparent during loading of the followups, when the regular division staff was on the far shore.

b. Good communication existed between Near Shore Control at Bizerte and division headquarters in Sicily. Changes in priority of loading, notification of sailing, and requests for supplies and replacements were handled quickly.

c. The last of Joss force's troops and equipment were loaded and sailed July 21. Besides embarking the division and its attachments, Near Shore Control loaded the Tabor of Moroccan Goumiers and 14 LST loads of the 7th Army personnel and equipment. Seven days' supply for the assault echelon was loaded on five LST's and seven LCT's. These craft accompanied the assault and were unloaded on D + 3 without loss.

4. Beach Group.

a. Beach group engineers landed before daylight with the combat troops. Shortly after daylight Beaches Yellow and Blue were organized and prepared to unload any type of craft, including LST's, which could not be beached and had to be unloaded by a 300-foot pontoon bridge.

b. By noon D-day, supplies were being unloaded on Beaches Yellow and Blue and water tanks established on the beaches had been filled from LST's. Enemy aircraft made several strafing and low-level bombing attacks on the beaches during the day.

c. Red beach was a poor one for unloading supplies. The surf was rough, there were no suitable exits in the cliff behind the beach, and the terrain inland for a mile or more was rough and sandy and roadless. While some supplies were unloaded on this beach, it was abandoned for unloading and after D-day all craft were directed to the port of Licata or to Yellow and Blue beaches.

d. 2nd Bn, 540th Engineers arrived in Licata about noon of Day-day and by 1500 had unloaded five LCI's containing troops of CC "A". That night they began unloading LST'S. All LST's containing supplies, except one, were unloaded at this port. The battalion, working with the Naval Advance Detachment, policed and repaired the port and put it in operating condition.

e. In three days the Beach Group had landed 188 craft, and had unloaded and placed in beach supply dumps about 7000 tons of supplies of all classes. Beaches Yellow and Blue were later improved by construction of hards, and the port was prepared to handle six LST's simultaneously. On one occasion, 14 LST's were unloaded in five hours.

f. On D + 7 the advance detachment of the Beach Group entered Port Empedocle with the combat troops and within 24 hours had the port in operating condition. This shortened the supply base of the division nearly 40 miles. Both the ports of Licata and Empedocle continued to unload supplies and troops throughout the Sicilian campaign.

5. Functioning of Normal Division Supply Agencies.

a. Concentration Area. Supervision and guidance of Force Depot services occupied the chiefs of division supply services when the force concentration began. After two or three weeks' operation the need for supervision disappeared, and staff officers were able to devote themselves to equipping the division and attached troops. Each new organization was required to hold a showdown inspection and to requisition immediately for shortages. Special equipment not authorized in T/BA but necessary for the operation posed the greatest problem. Other headquarters could seldom furnish information as to what items were available in the theater, and the difficulty of obtaining special approvals from Force 343, SOS and issues from EBS consumed a prohibitive time. From the division's standpoint, it would have been more satisfactory to have a board decide upon special equipment well in advance of the operation, get the list published as an authorization from higher headquarters, and then adhere to this list. This method has the advantage of giving supply services adequate notice as to what non-T/BA equipment is desired.

b. Operation on Far Shore.

(1) Licata to Agrigento. The division special staff officers from supply services disembarked with G-4, landing on Yellow beach at 1200 D-day. The special staff began to inspect quantity and type of supplies unloaded up to that time, while G-4 officers visited the beaches where unloading was going on to ascertain the supply situation. It was found that the status of all classes of supply was satisfactory except Class V. To speed unloading of ammunition and organize a dump, the division ammunition officer took over control of the ordnance ammunition company assigned to the Beach Group. This resulted in some conflict of authority, but solved the problem. Division's organic services were also forced to organize forward dumps before the arrival of Force Depot, because of the speed of the advance. On D + 3 a Class I, III and V railhead dump was established at Campobello. Opening of the port of Empedocle and establishment of a dump there by the Beach Group relieved the division of this responsibility with respect to units which were at Agrigento preparing to move on Palermo.

SECTION IV - PERSONNEL

(Training Phase)

1. Replacement Situation.

a. Immediately following the Kasserine Pass battle in Tunisia the third week in February, the 3rd Infantry Division (minus 30th Infantry, attached to VI Corps) was called upon to furnish 3000 replacements, of which 2600 were infantry and 400 were artillery troops, to bring front-line units up to strength. In addition, 140 infantry and 20 artillery officers were furnished. Prior to departure from Bizerte, there were certain other losses, such as transfer of hospitalized officers and enlisted men each time the division moved. To offset these losses, the following replacements were received:

| | <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DATE</u> | <u>SOURCE</u> |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| <u>Officers</u> | <u>EM</u> | | |
| 108 | 1501 | Feb 1943 | 2nd Replacement Depot |
| 0 | 200 | March 1943 | 1st Replacement Depot |
| 21 | 1966 | April 1943 | 2nd Replacement Depot |
| 0 | 201 | April 1943 | 2nd Replacement Depot |
| 21 | 1264 | June 1943 | 34th Division |
| 4 | 0 | June 1943 | 1st Replacement Depot |
| <u>50</u> | <u>590</u> | July-Aug 1943 | 7th Replacement Depot |
| 204 | 5722 | | |

b. While the 3000 men lost in February represented only one-fifth of the division's total strength, the ranks of the 7th and 15th Infantry regiments were cut virtually in half, and many of the officers and men they lost held key positions. To complete the picture, a study of the 1966 enlisted replacements received the first part of April showed that 85 per cent had received only the bare 13 weeks' basic training prescribed for all enlisted men, and that out of 1416 men who had fired the rifle for record, only 908 had qualified.

c. From the training standpoint, this meant that the division was required to carry on a good deal of small unit and rudimentary amphibious training at the same time it was embarking on its program of intensive specialized training. The replacements received from the 34th Division in June, it is true, had had combat experience but had to be fitted into trained amphibious teams in a short period.

d. The division had made continuous efforts to bring its strength up to, or above authorized strength for some months before the operation, but experienced difficulty because replacements were being held in reserve for possible duty on the Tunisian front.

2. Operational Strength.

As of D-day, the strength of the division was as follows:

| | <u>T/O Strength</u> | <u>Assigned Strength</u> |
|------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| Officers | 717 | 730 |
| Warrant Officers | 43 | 38 |
| Enlisted Men | 14,763 | 14,939 |

SECTION IV -- PERSONNEL
(Planning Phase)

1. Graves Registration.

a. The division burial and graves registration plan is shown in Annex No. 5 to Section II, "Supply and Evacuation", of the supply and evacuation plan. (See Tab C (2)). The chief feature of the plan is provision for burial sections organized organically in each regiment and battalion. Mainly because of this feature, the burial service continued to function even when two platoons of the 48th QM Co (GR) were detached from the division on D plus 5 and D plus 8. The plan was discussed in detail at a meeting of all burial and graves registration officers of the division and attached troops 17 June.

2. Evacuation of Prisoners of War.

a. The division plan for evacuation of prisoners of war is shown in Annex No. 6-A to Section II, "Supply and Evacuation" (See Tab C(2)). The plan followed established procedures closely in that regiments were made responsible for evacuation to division collecting points, and division was made responsible for evacuation to beach or higher echelon enclosures.

b. The Beach Group Commander, through his attached MP Company, was given the task of receiving and guarding prisoners at points designated for initial enclosures until these duties could be taken over by the 379th MP Escort Guard Company and the 2641st PW Processing Detachment, which were to land later on D-day.

SECTION IV - PERSONNEL
(Operations Phase)

1. Burial and Graves Registration.

a. As of 31 July, the 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced) had buried 149 American Army dead, of which only nine remained unidentified. These nine were charred bodies taken from LST No. 158 July 12. It is not yet known which dead were Army and which were Navy, but a check of the records of missing persons is being made in an attempt to identify them. Identification of other dead was expedited by several means other than identification discs, a new one being that all troops printed their names and serial numbers on the inside of each legging.

b. The division operated for two weeks over a distance of approximately 100 miles with all burials, both Allied and enemy, being concentrated in a single cemetery at Licata with the exception of 36 Axis burials at Agrigento.

c. The total of 372 burials was divided as follows:

| | |
|--------------|-----------|
| U. S. Army | 149 |
| U. S. Navy | 18 |
| British Army | 1 |
| British Navy | 5 |
| French Army | 1 |
| Italian Army | 157 |
| German Army | <u>41</u> |
| Total | 372 |

d. Prisoner of war labor exclusively was used for digging graves.

e. The burial plan provided for a subsidiary cemetery behind each beach, to be used as collecting points and for burials if the operation didn't progress fast enough to permit evacuation to the main cemetery. However, no burials were necessary in these subsidiary cemeteries.

2. Evacuation of Prisoners of War.

a. From D-day to D plus 8, the 3rd Infantry Division (Reinf) enclosures registered 12,322 prisoners, of whom about 1200 were German.

b. During the Joss phase of the operation, or until the establishment of an Army cage at Porto Empedocle, the escort guard company and processing detachment functioned under division control. Because the guard company had been formed recently and had received little indoctrination in handling prisoners, the establishment and operation of the cage at Licata was not efficiently performed. Speedy corrective measures, such as tightening up on guard discipline, stopping fraternization with prisoners and insisting upon the greatest possible degree of segregation, were taken by the G-1 and Provost Marshal, so that after two or three days the operation of the cage was satisfactory. The processing detachment was also lacking in knowledge and experience and required much supervision in the execution of its duties. Better prior training of these units would have removed a heavy load of responsibility from the G-1 and Provost Marshal.

c. In practice, the plan for evacuation of prisoners from front-line units to the division cage was virtually re-written as the operation progressed. There

was too great a time lag between the displacement of the regimental CP's and that of the division collecting points, since information of the regiments displacement had to be routed through G-1, who ordered the movement of the collecting points and notified the regiments of their new locations. The plan in operation at the conclusion of the Joss campaign was as follows: The regimental collecting point was eliminated entirely, and battalions evacuated directly to the division collecting points, which were moved up close behind the regimental CP's. One MP officer and 25 men were assigned to each of the three collecting points. This MP detail worked closely with the regimental staff although technically the Provost Marshal retained control. A liaison MP NCO remained at the regimental CP and notified his detail every time the CP moved. By keeping the collecting point close to the regiment the MP's assumed the entire responsibility for prisoner guard and evacuation to cages, thus eliminating one of the greatest causes of straggling-- use of infantry soldiers for prisoner escort, because after delivering prisoners to the division cage, the average infantryman is well worn out and takes his time about catching up to his unit.

d. By using captured transportation to evacuate prisoners, the MP's conserved manpower, time and energy.

3. Evacuation of Casualties.

a. From D-day to D plus 8, the following known casualties were suffered by the division and opposing forces (this includes only enemy dead and wounded evacuated by the division):

| | <u>Allied</u> | <u>Enemy</u> |
|----------|-------------------|---------------|
| Killed | 145 | 57 |
| Wounded | 395 (incl 10 Off) | 455 |
| Missing | 130 | - |
| Captured | <u>6</u> | <u>12,322</u> |
| Totals | 676 | 12,824 |

b. Detailed figures on division non-fatal casualties, including cases of illness and injury, are found in the reports of the division surgeon and medical installations attached to the force.

c. There were no replacements planned for or received during the Joss phase of the operation (D-day to D plus 8).

SECTION V - SPECIAL

1. Administration.

a. Training.

(1). There was no special administrative training.

b. Planning.

(1). Joss Force Administration Center was formed by attaching personnel sections of all attached units to the 3d Infantry Division Administration Center together with the MRU, Finance Office, Staff Judge Advocate, Assistant Division Surgeon, Special Service Office and the APO, a total of approximately 600 enlisted men and 70 officers. An Administrative Control Section to accompany the advance CP was formed from this group, comprising the Adjutant General, an Assistant Adjutant General, one warrant officer and six enlisted men.

(2). The plan of operation was for the Administrative Control Section to accompany the assault force and land on the beaches behind the assault troops to obtain and record accurately all casualties occurring during the initial phase of the amphibious assault. This section would make a radio report on casualties by number only to Seventh Army at H plus 6 and daily thereafter. Casualties by name and organization were to be recorded and forwarded by the most expeditious means to the Administration Center where routine Battle Casualty Reports would be accomplished as well as the processing of individual records. This procedure was to continue until such time as shipping priorities would allow the Administration to be moved to Sicily, at which time the personnel of the Administrative Control Section would revert to their normal duties. In order to accomplish this it was necessary to make careful plans in advance to insure that necessary information could be obtained accurately and expeditiously without burdening the combat elements with reports. To fit these needs the following was adopted:

(a). Extract pages of the revised morning report were mimeographed and furnished to the First Sergeant of each company and battery of the force with instructions to record thereon all changes occurring for the period midnight to midnight and to submit this report to the Administrative Control Section at the Division CP not later than 0800 the following morning. The unit personnel clerks in the Administration Center were instructed that upon receipt of these extracts they were to prepare the regular company report.

(b). The Division Surgeon and the commanding Officers of all medical installations were assembled and plans were made whereby they would maintain complete blotters and admission reports on all casualties in their respective medical installations, and that this information would be furnished daily to the Administrative Control Section.

(c). The Division Graves Registration Officer, together with the unit Graves Registration Officers made arrangements whereby a daily report of burials would be furnished the Administrative Control Section.

c. Operations.

(1). The Administrative Control Section embarked on LST 377 which was the alternate command ship, carrying with them one 3/4-ton weapons carrier of equipment only. This equipment included complete Machine Records rosters for the purpose of recording casualties, a mimeograph machine, portable typewriters and a small amount of stationery and office supplies.

(2). On the morning of 10 July 1943 at approximately 1100, the Assistant Adjutant General and two enlisted men were dispatched by an LCV(P) to land at Green Beach, obtain information on casualties and then to proceed to Red Beach and obtain reports of casualties, with instructions to return to Yellow Beach at such time as lateral communication was established through the town of Licata.

(3). At approximately 1600 the Adjutant General and the balance of the Control Section departed from LST 377 by an LCV(P), landing on Yellow Beach for the purpose of obtaining casualty information for that area, thence to proceed to the Division CP and establish the section.

(4). At approximately 1900 the detachment from Green and Red Beaches returned to the CP located within the city limits of Licata, where the casualty reports were consolidated and radio report made to Headquarters Seventh Army aboard the USS Monrovia.

(5). The following morning all units, with very few exceptions, had delivered their morning report extracts to the Control Section. Also the medical installations had submitted their reports through the Division Surgeon and were received by the Control Section prior to noon. The information received from the morning reports and medical reports was recorded on the Machine Records rosters and the radio casualty report was dispatched by 1800.

(6). The morning report extracts and the medical Admission and Disposition sheets were taken to the Port of Licata and arrangements were made with the Naval Officer in charge to dispatch them to the Administration Center by a returning LST.

(7). On the morning of 12 July 1943 the Graves Registration Officer made his first burial report and together with the morning report extracts and Admission and Disposition sheets the same procedure was followed as for the preceding day. This same procedure was followed daily until the Administration Center was established in the city schoolhouse at Casteldiaccia, Sicily, on 28 July 1943.

(8). Summary. With the cooperation of the First Sergeants and unit commanders, commanding officers of the medical installations and the Division Graves Registration Officer, the Administrative Control was able to record accurately and completely the casualties for the entire operation as they occurred and was able to keep higher headquarters informed daily of the entire loss through casualties for the Joss operation. Only eleven (11) cases remain unidentified; these casualties were burned beyond recognition by a direct bomb hit on LST 158, 11 July 1943.

2. Signal.

a. Training.

(1). Signal Communication training for the 3rd Division was conducted at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center for each Combat Team separately, under Division control, using the special facilities available at the Invasion Training Center. The Communication training of the Division was seriously curtailed at the Training Center due to inability to obtain radio equipment in sufficient quantities to fully equip all units as desired. Training was interrupted by the movement of the Division from the Invasion Training Center to the Bizerte Area just prior to the end of the Tunisian Campaign, but was resumed in the Jemmapes Area and continued in the Bizerte Area until the Division was embarked for Operation "Husky".

(2). Special training was conducted for all staff and field Officers in voice radio procedure, including link sign procedure, initially by utilizing

a conference connection on the telephone system and later in actual radio net operation. Two Amphibious Communication Exercises were carried out, one in the Jemmapes Area and one in the Bizerte Area just prior to Exercise "Copybook". Both were modeled as closely as terrain conditions would permit on the actual plan for Operation "Husky". This gave all communication personnel in the Force an opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with the specific tasks required of them.

(3). During the training period an old system of communication, namely the foot relay of messages, was revived and found to be of practical value. The system as used in this Division was to station two (2) men every one-half ($\frac{1}{2}$) mile along wire lines forward of Regimental Command Posts to physically relay messages, to be used as guides for Staff Officers and to assist in the maintenance of wire circuits. It is necessary to provide the personnel for this means of Communication from sources other than the Communication Sections.

(4). For Exercise "Copybook": Late arrival and installation of Navy and Army radio equipment for headquarters ship caused considerable difficulty in providing radio communications to the various headquarters afloat, during the ship to shore movement and during the initial phase ashore.

(5). After daybreak on the day of the exercise considerable information was furnished the Division Commander by two (2) Artillery Liaison planes equipped with SCR-609. A test was conducted on one of the Artillery Liaison planes by equipping the plane with a loud speaker in an attempt to provide direct one-way voice communication between the plane and the Division Headquarters Ship. The test did not produce as satisfactory results as hoped for due to the high noise level existing on the Headquarters Ship. However it is felt that there is a practical use for such communication in ground areas where the noise level is relatively low.

(6). On Exercise "Copybook" due to non-availability of the SCR-511 it was necessary to equip six (6) of the Infantry Battalions with the SCR-609. This substitution of equipment was found to be unsatisfactory because of the weight and size of the SCR-609.

b. Planning.

(1). Ample time was provided during the planning phase to provide for the preparation of Signal Annex #5 to Field Order #5 and the Signal Operation Instructions copies of which are appended hereto - Tab A(6) and B(1) respectively.

(2). In addition to the usual means of communication in the Division the Signal Plan provided for the use of the relay messenger system mentioned above, the attachment of a Signal Construction Company for the repair and maintenance of existing wire facilities and for the use of a series of special radio nets to provide all Commanders from the Division Commander to the Infantry Company Commander with radio control of their respective units. For this reason of brevity and clarity these radio nets are presented in diagramatic form appended hereto. It is to be noted also that parallel radio nets are provided from Division down to Infantry Battalions. (See Tab E (2)).

(3). Waterproofing material for communication equipment was set up by higher headquarters during the planning phase. This aspect of Amphibious Operation must receive much more careful attention from the Signal Corps supply agencies since it is an absolutely vital element of the Communication Plan.

c. Operations.

(1). The discussion of the Operation is divided into the following two phases: (1) seizure of the Initial Beach head and (2) the advance inland. On "D" day the first radio contacts were made at 0400 with the following stations:

Force #343 afloat, Staff Officer #3 on Blue Beach in the Division Commander's Net, and CC "A" afloat in the Division AM Command Net. Staff Officer #1 on Red Beach was contacted at 0410 and Staff Officer #2 on Yellow Beach was contacted at 0425, both stations working in the Division Commander's Net. Staff Officer #4 in the same net on Green Beach was not contacted until 0800. The other sets in the Division Commander's Net were not landed until after H plus 6 hours and the last contact was made in this net at 1100. Following the contact with CC "A" noted above the remaining stations in the Division AM Command Net were contacted, the 7th Infantry station being the last station to come into the net at 1100. The SCR-608 on the Headquarters Ship was used to contact the Artillery Liaison Planes which were flown from a special flight deck on a LST and to contact the Regimental Commanders by voice by entering the Regimental FM Command Nets. Radio contact with Joss Rear at Bizerte was made at 0800. The AM Net from the Headquarters Ship to Engineer Shore Battalions was never operative. Wire Communication was established with the Regiments as follows: 30th Infantry 1230, 15th Infantry 1400 and 7th Infantry 1700.

(2). During the first week of the advance inland radio and wire communication were maintained to the Combat Teams and Division Artillery at about fifty per-cent (50%) efficiency. The two principal difficulties encountered in radio communication were the blanking out of signals caused apparently by the ruggedness of the terrain and interference, particularly at night, due to the number of stations operating in the frequency range of our sets. Some of the interference was definitely planned enemy radio jamming while some of it was undoubtedly due solely to overcrowding of the radio spectrum. The principal difficulty in the establishment of wire communication during the first week of the advance inland was the time required to repair existing open wire circuits. In most cases it was found necessary to use open wire rather than field wire due to the distances over which the Division operated. Further difficulty with wire communication was caused by the relief from the Force of the attached Signal Construction Company almost immediately upon its debarkation.

(3). During the second week of the advance inland radio communication suffered from the same difficulties encountered during the first week and wire communication was practically non-existent due largely to the speed of movement of the Division. In any future operation of comparable speed it is felt that complete reliance for rapid communication must be placed on radio so that the effort and materiel of the wire teams may be conserved so as to be available to the division when the situation causes the units to advance more slowly.

(4). The results obtained from the use of the radio nets, discussed in the Section on Planning, during the operation positively indicate the desirability of changing the Tables of Basic Allowances for the Infantry Division so as to provide the necessary equipment for the establishment of the radio nets shown on the attached diagram. It is felt that the following modifications of existing equipment would improve the radio plan used during this Operation: (1) the manufacture of three additional crystals for the SCR-511 in order to provide a separate channel for each of the nine Infantry Battalions of the Division and (2) the issue of all twelve crystals and coils for the SCR-536 so as to provide a separate channel for each Company of the Infantry Regiment.

(5). In any future operation the whole Division Signal Company should be loaded on the "D" Day Convoy since it is found, as a result of this operation, that the services of the entire Company are required commencing "D" day. In any operation similar to this one where existing wire circuits will be found, even though damaged, it is essential that a Signal Construction Company be attached to the Force to be loaded on the "D" Day Convoy and to remain with the Force throughout the Operation. The installation of the initial communication system is greatly facilitated in a shore to shore movement due to the ability to land rapidly vital communication equipment and transportation.

(6). Signal Supply functioned very well throughout all phases of the

operation with the exception of a complete failure to provide adequate material for the waterproofing of communication equipment. In spite of this failure very little equipment was lost due to salt water damage because of the ingenuity displayed by the units of the Division in providing their own waterproofing material. It is essential that development of some type of waterproof bag, capable of being easily and quickly put on and removed from the various types of communication equipment, be immediately undertaken and pushed rapidly to completion in the United States where materials are readily available, so that units engaged in Amphibious Operations will not be forced to improvise waterproofing equipment.

3. Medical.

a. Training.

(1). Training objective was the correction of deficiencies in the Medical service brought out by Operation Torch, which deficiencies were:

(a). Standard system of Medical Department reports and records of casualties was too complicated, cumbersome and slow to meet requirements of combat.

(b). Too much medical equipment was hand-carried ashore by battalion medical sections and reinforcing collecting company personnel.

(c). Insufficient transportation accompanied battalion medical sections ashore.

(d). Improper use of reinforcing collecting company personnel with infantry battalion medical sections, viz; attempting to evacuate 2 - 3 miles to beach by hand and wheel litter carry instead of using collecting personnel to care for pools of casualties left behind at aid station sites until collecting company ambulances could be landed.

(2). Training Subjects. Intensive training in the following subjects was conducted during February, March and April of 1943, and terminated in a division landing problem at the Pont de Cheliff River in April, 1943.

(a). Medical Department Casualty Reports and Records during combat - (See Planning Tab C (2)). During routine care of sick and injured and in all field exercises and problems the regimental medical detachments and the medical battalion clearing stations were required to keep records and reports as summarized in this inclosure.

(b). Principles of evacuation during amphibious operations.

(c). Liaison between all medical elements of Army and Navy.

(d). The naval medical beach group: Organization, function and means of shore to ship evacuation.

(e). Reinforcing (collecting) platoon with infantry battalion medical section: Organization, equipment and function..

(f). The amphibious (beach group) medical battalion: Organization, equipment and function.

(g). Participation by battalion medical sections, reinforced, in following infantry problems:

(1). Battalion in attack (with overhead artillery support).

- (2). Battalion in defense.
- (3). Street fighting.
- (4). Landing in rubber boats.
- (5). Beach obstacles and demolitions.

(h). Participation in RCT landing problems.

(3). Conduct of Training. The above subjects were presented at the ITC, Port aux Poules by demonstrations, field exercises and problems in which all medical units participating carried full amphibious equipment and in which simulated casualties were processed. These exercises included naval medical beach groups who evacuated simulated casualties to LST's by the use of amphibious 2-1/2-ton trucks. Lectures and conferences were held to a minimum and realism was stressed. Detailed training schedules were prepared by the division surgeon and the officer in charge of medical training at the ITC and were incorporated in the division training schedules. For details of organization and amphibious medical equipment see Planning Tab E (3).

(4). The one outstanding lesson learned was the urgent need for convincing the Navy that proper washing and sterilization of mess gear could be carried out on all craft and must be carried out in order to prevent the incidence and spread of diarrhoeal diseases during the voyage. Very explicit instructions on this matter were immediately put out by the naval surgeons to all ship and craft captains.

c. Planning.

(1). Medical plans for the specific mission assigned Joss Force began May 21, 1943 and resolved itself into the three phases indicated below:

(a). Employment of Medical Units of Division and Attached Combat Troops. As outlined in Tab E (3).

(1). Medical sections of the three assault battalions landing initially on Beaches Red, Yellow and Blue were not reinforced by collecting company personnel because conditions under which these battalions landed and their mission made such reinforcement inadvisable.

(2). The medical section of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry which landed with the 3d Ranger Battalion on Beach Green reinforced by 1 officer and 20 enlisted men to care for pools of casualties left in the hill features northwest of Licata.

(b). Order of Landing of Reinforcing Medical Units and Follow-up Elements of Medical Units Landed in the Assault Group. As indicated in Annex 3.

(c). Coordination with the Naval Medical Service in the following points were effected:

(1). Mess Sanitation aboard LCT's, LCI's and LST's.

(2). Putting aboard each craft sufficient supply of the following special drugs to insure that assault troops landed in state of maximum health and efficiency:

Atabrine
Quinine

Motion Sickness Capsules
Sulphaguanadine

(2). Equipping of all LST's to be used in evacuation with 1 medical officer, 5 enlisted men (Medical Department) and sufficient litters, blankets and splints for exchange.

c. Operations.

(1). H-hour to H-plus 2. Battalion medical sections reinforced by collection platoons landed behind their infantry battalions with amphibious equipment hand carried ashore.

(2). H plus 2 to H plus 4. Attached collecting companies (less detachments) landed.

(3). H plus 10. Personnel of clearing companies and personnel of 10th Field Hospital landed.

(4). By H plus 30 the vehicles of the two clearing companies began to come off LSTs. These were scheduled to land by H plus 8, but due to some bombing of beaches by the enemy, insufficient beach space for unloading and unsuitability of Beach Red for unloading, the clearing company vehicles and equipment were 22 hours late. Vehicles of the 10th Field Hospital landed on schedule and proceeded with personnel on foot to assembly area as planned.

(5). By H plus 34 all assault clearing stations and the 10th Field Hospital were in operation.

(6). Total casualties for D-day:

| | |
|---------------------|---------------|
| Slightly wounded | - - - 26 |
| Seriously wounded | - - 24 |
| KIA (Approximately) | - - <u>10</u> |
| Total | - - - 60 |

(7). The casualty rate for D plus 2 was 0.5%. 113 wounded were evacuated by Navy to Africa and from this time on, evacuation by Navy was very efficiently carried out.

(8). Medical Installations (D plus 2):

(a). 1st Clearing Platoon, Co "D", 3d Med Bn moved to Campobello in support of RCT - 15.

(b). Medical Battalion CP and 2nd Clearing Platoon remained near Beach Red at De Gaffe.

(c). Clearing Station, 56th Med Bn and 10th Field Hospital at Beach Yellow.

(d). Following medical units, without any equipment or transportation, scheduled to arrive D plus 4, arrived and were attached to the 10th Field Hospital for rations and bivouac:

11th Evacuation Hospital (2 Off, 135 EM and 42 Nurses).
10th Field Hospital (18 Nurses).

(e). Santa Maria Hospital. Licata was inspected and found to be a small filthy hole which a few nuns were pitifully trying to operate. It was of no use to us.

(f). With the help of AMGOT a dispensary for care of sick and wounded civilians, operated by captured Italian medical officers, was set up in the red Cross Building in Licata.

(g). Medical Installations (D plus 3):

(1). 2nd Clearing Platoon, 3d Med Bn at Staz di Gaffe in support of RCT-7.

(2). 1st Clearing Platoon, 3d Med Bn was at Campobello in support of RCT-15, RCT-30 and CC "A".

(h). The Surgeon, 7th Army, inspected medical installation of Joss Force accompanied by the Force Surgeon.

(i). Forty-eight wounded and sick civilians being treated in our medical installations were turned over to the Italian dispensary in the Red Cross building at Licata.

(j). D plus 4 to D plus 8 inclusive:

(1). Advance of Joss Force continued to the northwest with very few casualties. Agrigento was captured and Porto Empedocle was occupied. On July 18th the Division CP moved to the vicinity of Aragona and combat elements began concentrating in assembly areas for the big push to Palermo

(2). Medical Installations. During these operations clearing platoons under division control supported RCTs as follows:

RCT-15: 1st Clearing Platoon, 3d Med Bn.
RCT-7 : 2nd Clearing Platoon, 3d Med Bn.
RCT-30: 2nd Clearing Platoon, 56th Med Bn.

Clearing platoons kept to within 4-10 miles behind their RCTs and moved forward as necessary, reporting their location to their respective medical battalion commander who in turn reported them to the Force Surgeon. Casualties were evacuated from clearing stations by the 56th Medical Battalion to the 10th Field Hospital (non-transportables) and to the 11th Evacuation Hospital which opened at 1200 July 15 in vicinity of Beach Yellow, after its equipment and transportation unloaded at Licata on July 14-15.

(3). Air Evacuation. A holding station at Licata Airport was established, using a clearing platoon of the 56th Medical Battalion. Seventeen patients were evacuated by air. Air evacuation was unsatisfactory since very few transport planes were available and planes were not equipped with litters for exchange.

(4). Medical units relieved from attachment to the 3d Infantry Division and taken over by Army:

20th Malarial Control Unit.
Veterinary Detachment (8580GG)
Co "B", and 1 Plat, Co "D", 51st Med Bn (still in Africa).
1 Plat, CO "A", 36th Amb Bn (still in Africa)
11th Evacuation Hospital (Beach Yellow)
128th Evacuation Hospital (still in Africa)

4. Ordnance.

a. Training.

(1). Training was based on the principle of normal Ordnance operation as far as consistent with the tactical plan of Amphibious Operation. Contact Parties of ten to fifteen men and one officer from the 703d Ordnance Co (IM) made contact and worked at Regimental and other unit areas, normally at the Service Company bivouacs. These Contact Parties were trained to supply, maintain, and evacuate Ordnance materiel of the units. Special emphasis was placed on this form of training while the Division was at the Invasion Training Center.

(2). After concentration of units in the Bizerte Area the training was conducted as outlined in Planning Tab C (2). The 42nd Ordnance Battalion (M&S) began assembling on D-35 and completed the concentration on D-20. Training was conducted in accordance with Ordnance Instructions noted in Planning Tab E (2). Before joining the Force, several of the Ordnance Companies had had combat experience in the Tunisian and Moroccan Campaigns. They were excellent, well trained Companies, which were organized and further trained to operate under the 42nd Ordnance Battalion (M&S) to supply and maintain the Ordnance Materiel of the Force.

(3). The 64th Ordnance Company (Amn.) joined the Force in the Concentration area on D-33. They were trained in their phase of the operation by the Engineer Beach Group, and further trained in the Amphibious Ammunition Supply problem of the Joss Force Operation by the Division Ammunition Office. They were also trained in the amounts and types of Ammunition that was to be used in the operation.

(4). Schools were held as follows:

(a). Waterproofing: Invasion Training Center held waterproofing schools for units in waterproofing of Ordnance materiel. Due to necessity of getting waterproofing accomplished for "Copybook", this school was cut short and only Ordnance personnel participated.

(b). Bomb Reconnaissance: Bomb Reconnaissance Officers' School was held for unit representatives.

(5). For "Copybook" only the assault group actively participated. This consisted of Contact parties of one officer and fifteen enlisted men from the 703rd Ordnance Company (IM) with each Regiment of Infantry. All other ordnance units participated indirectly insofar as maintenance and supply of ordnance materiel, and waterproofing of materiel was concerned.

(6). Waterproofing materiel arrived at the time loading started for "Copybook". Some units did not have sufficient time to waterproof their ordnance materiel properly, nor was the waterproofing materiel readily available. Enormous amounts of waterproofing materiel, shrouds, flexible hose, tubing, etc had to be manufactured as substitutes for materiel that SOS failed to supply. Many faults were observed in the waterproofing done by units. Corrections were made on deficiencies noted when materiel was re-waterproofed and rechecked. All materiel loaded in "Copybook" was either re-waterproofed, touched up, or rechecked after exercise. This necessitated ordnance inspectors, going from ship to ship to inspect, and in most cases actually do the waterproofing in order to get it done properly and on time. Unit Commanders were responsible for waterproofing their materiel. There were some cases of extreme negligence of some unit commanders in getting their materiel properly waterproofed, and then checked by ordnance inspectors.

(7). Due to lack of time to publish memorandum and lay exact plans for waterproofing, most of the information regarding same was handled verbally. See Planning Tab E (4). Exact plans could have been made had exact information been available on times and amounts of arrival of waterproofing materiel.

(8). Units of the assault waves for "Copybook" carried their organic load of ammunition. The bulk supply of ammunition for the assault in the operation was not loaded or used to participate in "Copybook".

b. Planning.

(1). List of Ordnance Units available for operation was furnished by

I Armored Corps (Reinf). After the Tactical plan was furnished, the Ordnance plan was drafted and published as Annex #4 to Section II, Supply and Evacuation, Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division (Reinf) dated 12 June 1943 (Tab C (2)). This plan covered the organization of Ordnance units and maintenance and supply of Ordnance material. Plan of maintenance was covered also in Memorandum No. 58, Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division (Reinf), dated 9 June 1943. Tab E (5)).

(2). The Ammunition Supply plan began with the planning phase on D-day minus 45. During this phase requirements were estimated to fit the tactical plan: changes in the tactical plan were closely followed and the Ammunition Plan changed accordingly. The Ammunition Supply plan was finally fixed, ship loading list prepared for the "Assault" and the first two "Follow-ups". Liaison was established with the SOS Base Sections in order that they could load according to the plan. This Ammunition Supply plan was published in Inclosure #1 to Annex #4, to Section II, Supply and Evacuation. Tab C (3)).

(3). Ammunition requirements for the assault were computed by using the II Corps Tunisian Campaign experience table of a day of fire. Quantities per weapon were corrected according to G-3's estimate of the tactical situation. Five days of fire were estimated, then this quantity broken down by beaches according to the number of weapons landing at each one. Loading lists were prepared for each craft.

(4). Plans were made for the 64th Ordnance Company (Amn) in regards to their far shore mission and instructions issued accordingly to all officers and NCO's of this organization.

(5). Beginning on D-day, daily contact was maintained with EBS to keep the Division informed on availability of Ammunition. At the same time the Division Ammunition Office physically set up with the Division Planning Board and Near Shore Control at Bizerte so that information on troop and craft changes could be immediately obtained.

(c). Operations.

(1). Maintenance and supply was accomplished according to Ordnance Plan. By agreement with EBS, major items of Ordnance materiel were supplied on Status Reports of Units. Approximately 50% of shortages were filled before units left Africa. The 3rd Infantry Division was filled to T/BA on watches, leaving binoculars and trench knives as critical shortages. Status Report shows excess of small weapons, and excess of total numbers of vehicles in most cases.

(2). Approximately 5 to 10% of small major items were sent in the assault to be available at Beach Dumps for replacement. These were loaded in six trucks 2½ ton of the 3rd Quartermaster Company and three trucks 2½ ton Dukws, distributed to all beaches. Cleaning and preserving materiel was also loaded in these vehicles to be placed in Beach Dumps.

(3). All unit commanders expressed themselves as pleased with replacement items plan, cleaning and preserving materiel, and plan for immediate backing of ordnance contact parties.

(4). The loading phase of ammunition proceeded according to plan and was accomplished 100%. The Division Ammunition Officer, by close liaison with the planning board and EBS accomplished the well planned Ammunition Supply Plan, and had shipped on schedule the entire ammunition requirements.

(5). On D-day, contact parties of the 703d Ordnance Companies (LM) landed late, about H plus 10 and later, but proceeded to contact assault units and render immediate ordnance service.

(6). Units of the 42nd Ordnance Battalion (M&S) were due to arrive on D plus 4, but did not actually arrive until D plus 9. Thus, they did not participate in this phase of the operation.

(7). Ammunition unloading proceeded more slowly than anticipated. However ammunition was available in dumps organized for issue by H plus 10, after which balanced ASP's maintained stocks in excess of demands within 20 miles of troops until D plus 9, during which period Joss Force had control. D - day unloading was to "Off the Beach" dumps at Yellow Beach (Combined with Blue Beach), and Red Beach. About 300 tons were in dumps by H plus 24. Unloading did not occur as planned, some ammunition destined for one beach being placed in other beach dumps. Rapid tactical movement of combat units forced them to draw from the nearest beach dump. This caused unbalanced Beach Dump Stocks and necessitated shifting of different types of components from one beach to another.

(8). On D plus 3 a new ASP was opened at Oliva, 5 miles northwest of Licata. ASP Yellow was serving troops to the east, and ASP Red was serving troops to the west. Control of the 64th Ordnance Company reverted to Division on D Plus 3. On D plus 4 an advance ASP was opened at Campobello about 20 miles north of Licata. One day of fire was maintained for all units in that area, movement being by train. All dumps reported daily by 2000 as of 1800 their balances on hand and the days issues. Daily issues were considered as ammunition expenditures because of units failing to submit reports of expenditures. Analysis on D plus 5 showed that based on fire rates prevailing for the first six days, there was on hand in organized ASP's at least 11 days of supply of every type of ammunition. On D plus 7 the ammunition from ASP Red Beach was started moving to ASP established at Empedocle. This ASP opened on D plus 8.

(9). Comments and Conclusions.

(a). The operation demonstrated the advantage of having a detailed and flexible plan formulated well in advance of D - day. Presence of the ordnance ammunition company on the beach on D-day was an advantage, and would have proved more so had the company been used to handle ammunition exclusively instead of being used also for other cargo handling.

(b). Fair results were obtained from waterproofing in spite of difficulties in obtaining materials and supervising their proper application.

(c). Division assumed control of the ammunition company on D+3. It was only after this had been done that it was possible to maintain a balanced ammunition supply in forward ASP's.

(d). On D+9, 7th Army removed maintenance; supply and ammunition organizations from division control. The division had no prior knowledge that this was to be done and the transition of control might have caused great strain or breakdown of the supply situation had this period not coincided with a lull in combat.

5. Air Support.

a. Training.

(1). Air support for "Copybook" was furnished by the XII Air Support Command in the form of dive bombers, tactical reconnaissance, and fighters in accordance with NATAF operation instruction #122, Tab E (1)).

(2). In a note to the XII Air Support Command, four targets were designated, one of which was in a range area for live bombs. It was requested that all pilots be briefed on the area of operations and that all formations contact the Headquarters ship upon approaching the convoy area. It was further requested that all dive bomber pilots be briefed on all targets as a change of targets might be necessary.

(3). Due to the limited number of aircraft available, the following number of missions of two planes each were used: Dive Bomber, 6: Tactical Reconnaissance, 4: Fighter, 12.

(4). By direct contact with XII Air Support Command dive bomber attacks were prearranged on designated targets at times to coincide with the plan of advance. During the operation, one mission was reassigned to another target upon which the crews had been briefed. Also, one mission was assigned a target which was designated and described to the flight while in the air. These two changes in target designation were made from the Division Headquarters ship by means of VHF radio with complete success.

(5). A dawn Tac/R mission was prearranged. All others were upon call. The elapsed time between time of call and time of reporting in to Headquarters ship in the operation area averaged one hour and forty-five minutes; aircraft being routed over a distance equivalent to that anticipated in operation "Husky".

(6). The 12 Fighter Aircraft missions were dispatched by XII Air Support Command as they desired. They reported to fighter control aboard Headquarters ship upon approaching the area and were controlled and vectored successfully using unidentified plots obtained from the ship's radar.

(7). Reception of the air support net was very poor due to interference and this was corrected prior to "Husky" by the reassignment of the Division net to another radio on the opposite side of the ship.

b. Planning.

(1). The planning of "Joss" Force was considerably hampered by (1) the policy that no direct air support would be available during the assault phase and (2) the failure of the XII Air Support Command to furnish a liaison officer to the force until just prior to the operation.

(a). The air plan and policies outlined in memoranda from Force 141 indicated that there would be no direct air support during the assault and that requests would be submitted only in emergency, after which crews would be briefed prior to takeoff. This meant that naval gunfire was the only weapon available to support the assault troops until artillery was put ashore, which at best would be around 1000 on D-day. It was the force planners' desire to put all available weapons including air support against the immediate enemy resisting the landing during this most critical period. However, as it became more and more evident that no direct air support other than fighter cover would be available during the assault air support was not considered in the assault plan of operation which included smoke screening in event of a daylight landing.

(b). Numerous requests were made to higher headquarters to attach an air liaison officer to "Joss" Force from the XII Air Support Command. Many indications were given that one would be attached. It was not, however, until after Exercise "Copybook" that an officer was attached. Because of this it was necessary to assign to an air corps officer from the War Department and not a member of the supporting air command, the duty of arranging and conducting from headquarters ship the air support phase of "Copybook", and of assisting in the planning for loading and using the various air corps detachments—fighter control, radar teams, and air support parties.

(2). Plan of Air Support Force 343 (Tab E (6) and Annex #9 to F.O. #5, Headquarters 3d Infantry Division (Tab A (6)) outline the air support planned for "Joss" Force.

(c). Operations.

(1). In addition to reconnaissance missions previously planned by

Force 343, special missions were requested to assist in determining the enemy's plans and movements. Reports of all Tac/R were submitted to G-2 as soon as received over Air Support Net. These reports were delayed during the first few days because of poor communications with XII Air Support Command aboard the USS Monrovia. After XII Air Support Command communications were set up ashore, requests were accomplished and results obtained within a reasonable time.

(2). Aside from pre-D-day requests, only one bombardment mission was requested. This was against artillery positions near Agrigento. This request was refused by Air Support Command. Due to lack of heavy organized resistance no other bombardment missions were deemed necessary. Radio from Force 343 prior to the operation stated that requests as listed in paragraph 6 of Annex #9 to F.O. #5 (Planning Tab A (6)) were forwarded deleting the D-day requests, however, no evidence of previous bombing was reported except at Licata.

(3). An imaginary line of the map beyond which bombardment missions can be scheduled with no danger to friendly troops known as the bomb safety line was kept from 5 to 10 miles ahead of front line units because of the rapid advance. It was submitted at least once daily and sometimes more often to Air Support Command Headquarters.

(4). In spite of detailed plans to prevent attack by friendly planes on friendly troops and vice versa, as outlined in Paragraph 9, 10, and 11 of Annex #9 to F. O. #5 (Planning Tab A (6)), several attacks were made on troops of this Division and several American planes were shot down by our troops. From questioning pilots at Division Headquarters, it was apparent that pilots were being briefed on bomb lines at least one day old, during the first ten days. Either this fact or perhaps the similarity of towns in Sicily could have been responsible for the bombing of our troops by P-38s and the bombing of Naro after its occupation. The firing on friendly aircraft by friendly troops evidenced a low standard of AA training and discipline which cannot be avoided in an unseasoned unit liable to enemy air attack, except by enforcement of strictest AA discipline. Air units must be indoctrinated with the danger of being fired upon and trained to abstain from maneuvers such as diving, quick turning and low-level flying over friendly troops when enemy air may be expected. The worst offenders were A-36's of the 86th Group which had not seen previous combat.

6. Naval Gunfire Support.

a. Training.

(1). Training for the use of Naval Gunfire Support in "Husky" Operation began when the 3rd Infantry Division sent nine Shore Fire Control Parties to the Invasion Training Center for a ten day course. A majority of this personnel had been training for the use of Naval Gunfire support long before the "Torch" Operation, so this course at the Invasion Training Center was a refresher. However, the highlight of the ten day period was a bombardment practice by the USS Savannah and nine destroyers (one squadron). The SFC parties from the 3rd Infantry Division spotted the fire. Then later, just a week prior to D - day, these same shore Fire Control Parties were given an opportunity to direct their supporting ship in a practice firing near Mostaganem. After the firing, all personnel went aboard the USS Brooklyn for a critique of the bombardment firing practice. Many problems were discussed and considered, and the exercise was important because it gave the ship's gunnery Officer an opportunity to talk with the Artillery Officer who would spot the ship's fire.

b. Planning.

(1). The Naval Gunfire Planning for the Husky operation was done by Commander Standley, USN; Lt. (jg) H. C. Manning, USNR; Lt. Col. Connor, USA; and Major Kerwin. The Naval Plan was Annex F of Operation Order 109-43, and the Army Plan was Annex 6 to Field Order No. 5 (Tab A (6)).

c. Operations.

(1). The use of Naval Gunfire to support the Joss Attack Force during the "Husky" operation was considered successful. The method of directing Naval Gunfire through a fire direction center and the control exercised over it at all times contributed to this success. Even though mines and attacks by enemy aircraft were serious obstacles, the firing ships were able to execute all fire missions except one, that one being a request for smoke, and mines around Porto Empedocle prevented the ships from coming in close enough. However, it was felt that certain delays in the delivery of Naval Gunfire were unnecessary and could have been eliminated. The results of the operation proved that Naval Gunfire when properly controlled is a valuable and powerful weapon.

(2). The following is a summary of the achievements of Naval Gunfire in support of the 3rd Infantry Division:

(a). All shore fire Control Parties established communications with their Fire Support Destroyers or the Cruisers of the General Support Group. SFCP 22 and SFCP 31 actually directed Naval Gunfire and the other Shore Fire Control Parties kept communication with their ships until the parties were disbanded by field artillery battalions.

(b). For the first time in any operation, according to the Naval Liaison Officer, Naval Gunfire was successfully directed from an Artillery Fire Direction Center (10th F. A. Bn), and Forward Observers adjusted Naval Gunfire from Infantry Observation Posts by using artillery procedure.

(c). Direct hits were made on the railway battery on the Mole in Licata Harbor and on gun positions northeast of Licata. The strong points east of Beach Blue was covered with shell fragments from Naval Projectiles.

(d). Naval Gunfire was effectively delivered on targets near Agrigento which could not be reached by the Field Artillery unless it moved into positions which lacked cover and concealment.

(e). Voice instead of CW was successfully used for ship-to-shore communication, and it was found that delays in the delivery of fire could be decreased. When it is possible, voice should always be used.

(f). On D-plus eight days Naval Gunfire was still available to the 3rd Infantry Division and it continued to be available to the 82nd Air Borne until the end of the Western Phase of the campaign. (For detailed report on Naval Liaison Officer, see Tab E (1)); for detailed report of Division Artillery Commander, see Tab E (2)).

7. Quartermaster.

a. Operations.

(1). D-day, 1000.

(a). The Division Quartermaster disembarked from LST #377 and boarded the USS Biscayne, to receive orders from the Commanding General. H+8 The quartermaster landed on Beach Yellow to carry out instructions of the Commanding General. H + 20, the remainder of the Division Quartermaster personnel landed on Beach Yellow and Blue. H + 21, a CP was established at the Licata Chemical Works. Orders given Commanding Officer, 3rd Quartermaster Company were to dispatch all available vehicles for the hauling of cargo from beaches.

(2). D ÷ 1, 0515.

(a). Thirty vehicles from the 3rd Quartermaster Company were dispatched through Division Transportation Officer for the purpose of hauling supplies from beach to dumps. All classes of Quartermaster supplies were issued, assault bags were opened and contents separated for issue, Classes I, II & IV being stored in building located in the Licata Sulphur plant area. Class III dump located one mile east of Licata on route to Beach Blue. All Classes of Quartermaster issued.

(3). D ÷ 2,

(a). All Classes of Quartermaster supplies issued. Beach Red cleared of all supplies. Truck dispatched from Division Transportation Office to continue hauling supplies from beaches to dumps.

(4). D ÷ 3.

(a). Twenty trucks from the 3rd Quartermaster Company under the command of 2nd Lt. Joseph Lerner were dispatched through the Division Transportation Office to operate at the port area. These trucks remained on duty with the port until D + 8.

(5). D ÷ 4.

(a). All Classes of Quartermaster supplies issued. Advance party established CP at the railroad station in Campobello. At 1600, the railhead was bombed and strafed by ten enemy planes (probably Me 109's) with American markings. Damage resulting from the attack: fifty water cans destroyed and slight damage to a 2½ ton truck. No casualties.

(6). D ÷ 5.

(a). All classes of supplies arrived via train from Licata. Issues made from Campobello. Prisoners were evacuated to Licata via returning train.

(7). D ÷ 6.

(a). All classes of supplies issued.

(8). D ÷ 7.

(a). All classes of supplies issued. Reconnoitered area in vicinity of Canicatti. Advance CP established at Railroad Station in Canicatti.

(9). D ÷ 8.

Issued all classes of supplies from railhead in Canicatti. Supplies arrived via daily train from Licata.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED